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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan covers activities associated with 
Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 107 of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order
(FFACO, 1996 [as amended February 2008]).  CAU 107 consists of the following Corrective 
Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site. 
 CAS 01-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site - High Alt 
 CAS 02-23-02, Contaminated Areas (2)  
 CAS 02-23-03, Contaminated Berm  
 CAS 02-23-10, Gourd-Amber Contamination Area 
 CAS 02-23-11, Sappho Contamination Area 
 CAS 02-23-12, Scuttle Contamination Area 
 CAS 03-23-24, Seaweed B Contamination Area 
 CAS 03-23-27, Adze Contamination Area 
 CAS 03-23-28, Manzanas Contamination Area 
 CAS 03-23-29, Truchas-Chamisal Contamination Area 
 CAS 04-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site T4-a  
 CAS 05-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site  
 CAS 09-23-06, Mound of Contaminated Soil  
 CAS 10-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site M-10  
 CAS 18-23-02, U-18d Crater (Sulky)
Based on historical documentation, personnel interviews, site process knowledge, site visits, 
photographs, engineering drawings, field screening, analytical results, and the results of data 
quality objectives process (Section 3.0), closure in place with administrative controls or no 
further action will be implemented for CAU 107.   
CAU 107 closure activities will consist of verifying that the current postings required under 
Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835 are in place and implementing use 
restrictions (URs) at two sites, CAS 03-23-29 and CAS 18-23-02.  The current radiological 
postings combined with the URs are adequate administrative controls to limit site access and 
worker dose.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan identifies the activities 
required for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 107.  CAU 107 is included in the 
Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996 [as amended February 2008]), 
and consists of the following Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 
 CAS 01-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site - High Alt 
 CAS 02-23-02, Contaminated Areas (2)  
 CAS 02-23-03, Contaminated Berm  
 CAS 02-23-10, Gourd-Amber Contamination Area 
 CAS 02-23-11, Sappho Contamination Area 
 CAS 02-23-12, Scuttle Contamination Area 
 CAS 03-23-24, Seaweed B Contamination Area 
 CAS 03-23-27, Adze Contamination Area 
 CAS 03-23-28, Manzanas Contamination Area 
 CAS 03-23-29, Truchas-Chamisal Contamination Area 
 CAS 04-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site T4-a  
 CAS 05-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site  
 CAS 09-23-06, Mound of Contaminated Soil  
 CAS 10-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site M-10  
 CAS 18-23-02, U-18d Crater (Sulky)
1.1 SAFER PROCESS
CAUs that may be closed using the SAFER process have conceptual corrective actions that are 
clearly identified.  The SAFER process combines elements of the data quality objective (DQO) 
process and the observational approach to plan and conduct closure activities.  The DQOs are 
used to identify the problem and define the type and quality of data needed to complete the 
investigation phase of the SAFER process.  The purpose of the investigation phase is to verify 
the adequacy of existing information used to determine the chosen corrective action.  The 
observational approach provides a framework for managing uncertainty during the planning and 
decision-making phases of the project. 
The SAFER process allows for technical decisions to be made based on information gathered 
during site visits, interviews, meetings, research, and a consensus of opinion by the CAU 107 
team members.  Any uncertainties are addressed by documented assumptions that are verified by 
historical documentation, photographs, engineering drawings, field screening, analytical results, 
and onsite observations. 
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Historical documentation and existing characterization data were reviewed to develop this 
SAFER Plan.  There is sufficient information to close CAU 107 using the SAFER process 
without the collection of additional data.  The existing data support the selection of a closure 
option of closure in place with administrative controls or no further action.
1.2 SUMMARY OF PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The CAS locations are controlled in compliance with the radiation protection standards set forth 
in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835.  These controls limit personnel access 
to the sites.  Future access to the sites will be controlled under operational work authorization 
procedures and continued 10 CFR 835 compliance actions.  Four of the 15 CAS areas do not 
require controls under 10 CFR 835.  The remaining CAS locations are Underground Radioactive 
Material Areas (URMAs) or Radioactive Material Areas (RMAs).  None of the sites require 
controls for the purposes of limiting the spread of radiological contamination.   
Closure of CAU 107 will be accomplished by verifying that the current postings required under 
10 CFR 835 are in place.  As a conservative measure, use restrictions (URs) will be implemented 
at two sites, CAS 03-23-29 and CAS 18-23-02, due to the assumption that limited contamination 
is present and additional characterization is not feasible.  The current radiological postings 
combined with the URs are adequate administrative controls to limit site access and worker dose. 
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2.0 UNIT DESCRIPTION 
CAU 107 comprises 15 CASs located in Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site 
(NTS) (Figure 1).  CAU 107 is included under the Soils Sub-Project of the U.S. Department of 
Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) 
Environmental Restoration Federal Project.  
CAU 107 CASs consist of areas where nuclear weapons tests were conducted.  Nuclear weapons 
tests were often conducted as part of a series, and each series was given a name such as 
Operation Mandrel.  Individual tests within a series were given names, such as CALABASH.  
Nuclear weapons tests can release gaseous and/or non-gaseous radioactivity into the 
environment.  Radioactive gases produced by nuclear weapons testing include isotopes of xenon, 
krypton, and iodine.  Non-gaseous radionuclides resulting from nuclear weapons testing include 
cobalt-60, cesium-137, strontium-90, uranium isotopes, plutonium isotopes, and europium 
isotopes.
2.1 CAS RELATIONSHIP TO TESTS
Historical information about the nuclear weapons testing that resulted in the CAU 107 CASs 
shows that a distinct, test-related release of radionuclides to the surface soils that could lead to a 
worker dose greater than 25 millirem per year (mrem/yr) does not appear to have occurred at or 
near the CAS locations.  The CAU 107 CASs resulted from nuclear weapons testing and 
associated activities.  The activities that resulted in these CASs fall into three categories that 
were developed for this SAFER Plan:  deep underground, far above the ground surface, or near 
the ground surface.  Each CAS category is discussed below. 
2.1.1 CASS RESULTING FROM DEEP UNDERGROUND DETONATIONS
Eleven of the CASs in CAU 107 resulted from underground nuclear weapons detonations.  These 
specific underground detonations were conducted in shafts drilled deep into the ground and often 
left visible evidence on the surface in the form of subsidence craters, which are depressions on 
the surface from the roof of the blast cavity collapsing into the void left by the explosion.  Some 
underground detonations did not form craters but still have the potential to collapse.  These areas 
are designated as potential craters.  Entry into craters or potential craters is not permitted unless a 
subsidence study is conducted to ensure the area is safe for entry.  Subsidence studies have not 
been completed for any of the crater or potential crater areas associated with the CASs in this 
SAFER Plan because no sampling or entry is required. 
Most underground tests were designed to contain radiological releases.  They were designed so 
that radioactive materials would be held deep underground and not allowed to escape to the 
atmosphere.  The containment methods were generally successful; however, radioactive gases 
did escape from some underground tests.  Radioactive gases disperse in air quickly and have 
short half-lives (Nuclear Data Center, 2006).  Therefore, even for tests for which there was a 
containment failure, the surface soils in the area generally did not become radiologically 
contaminated.  This type of radiological release typically involved gaseous and volatile isotopes 
of xenon, krypton, and iodine (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office 
[DOE/NV], 1996). 
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The operational nature of an underground detonation tends to fuse and confine fission products 
underground (U. S. Department of Energy [DOE], 1993).  Additionally, DOE/NV (1996) states, 
“Very few of the tests or simultaneous detonations resulted in particulate release with 
accompanying fallout of radioactive material.”   
Surface soils may have become radiologically contaminated from underground testing through 
post-test activities such as drill-backs and cable pulls.  Drill-backs were holes drilled from the 
surface down to the cavity where the device had been detonated.  Samples were collected to 
gather information to describe the performance of the nuclear device.  Sample material was in 
containers; however, it was common for radiological readings to be elevated during these 
operations.  This is because the radioactive sample material could be detected through the sample 
container and not typically because of surface soil contamination.   
Instruments were attached to cables and placed underground with the nuclear device before it 
was detonated to measure test results.  After the test, the instruments were pulled to the surface 
to assess performance aspects of the nuclear device.  The cables attached to the instruments had 
the potential to be radiologically contaminated or, more likely, to be activated.  Activation of 
these cables occurred by the same process by which soil activation occurs, as described in 
Section 2.1.2.  These post-test activities have been perceived as a means of contaminating 
surface soils by bringing radioactive materials to the surface.  However, historical data indicate 
that soils at the CAU 107 sites were not contaminated by these post-test activities. 
2.1.2 CASS RESULTING FROM FAR ABOVE THE GROUND DETONATIONS
Three of the CASs in CAU 107 are associated with nuclear detonations that occurred in the 
atmosphere well above ground surface.  The fireball, created when the nuclear device was 
detonated, could not draw materials, such as soil, into the contaminated plume because the 
detonations occurred too far off the ground; therefore, the soil in the area below the test 
detonation did not become contaminated (Spriggs, 2007).   
Another way in which radioactive materials may be created through nuclear testing is by soil 
activation, which occurs when subatomic particles, neutrons, are given off in the detonation.  The 
neutrons then interact with material such as soil.  These interactions between neutrons and 
material cause the material to become radioactive.  Detonations associated with these CASs were 
conducted too far above ground for the neutrons to significantly interact with soils or other 
materials at the ground surface (Spriggs, 2007). 
2.1.3 CAS RESULTING FROM NEAR THE GROUND SURFACE DETONATION
The only CAS in CAU 107 that involved a detonation near the ground surface is CAS 04-23-02, 
which is associated with the RAY test.  This atmospheric test was conducted by placing the 
nuclear device on a tower.  Nuclear weapons tested at the NTS were of different sizes and 
designs, which resulted in different levels of explosive power, known as yield.  In general, 
lower-yield atmospheric tests result in lower levels and smaller areas of contamination, while 
higher-yield tests result in more contamination dispersed over a larger area.  This CAS is related 
to a lower-yield nuclear test of 200 tons (DOE/NV, 2000). 
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2.2 DATA SOURCES
Significant historical information and data are available for these sites.  Because of this large 
amount of information and the very low potential for historical contaminant release or future 
contaminant transport, these sites are considered to be adequately characterized on the basis of 
existing data.  The historical data indicate these sites may proceed through the SAFER process 
without the collection of additional data. 
The following sections provide site descriptions, operational history, release information, and 
previous investigation results for each site.  The information used in the development of this 
SAFER Plan falls into four general categories:
 Site Description Information:  Provides the associated nuclear weapons test name, sources of 
potential contamination, and specific features included in the CAS 
 Operational History:  Provides process knowledge about the tests to determine if a distinct, 
test-related radiological release to surface soils occurred 
 Release Information:  Includes documentation from a variety of sources for the type of 
potential contaminant releases 
 Historical Characterization Information:  Includes a description of previous efforts to 
characterize, document, and/or evaluate the sites 
These information sources are generally not quantitative; however, when evaluated together, 
they provide sufficient information to characterize the sites.  The sections below discuss the data 
and how the data sources support one another.  When evaluated together, these data sources are 
consistent with each other and with operational history.  The data indicate that the sites will not 
cause an NTS worker dose greater than 25 mrem/yr. 
2.2.1 SITE DESCRIPTION INFORMATION
The Environmental Compliance group of a previous NTS contractor, Reynolds Electrical and 
Engineering Company, Inc. (REECo), performed a survey of abandoned facilities and disposal 
sites at the NTS in 1990 and 1991.  The primary goal was to identify unknown environmental 
hazards related to chemicals regulated by the Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation and Liability Act.  This effort involved visiting several hundred sites and became 
the basis for creating many of the CASs listed in the FFACO.  The results of this effort are 
published in Nevada Test Site Inventory of Inactive and Abandoned Facilities and Waste Sites
(REECo, 1991).  The REECo report does not include all of the CAU 107 CASs but was used to 
outline potential sources of radiological contamination and define the scope of the CAU 107 
CASs (REECo, 1957; 1973a; 1973b). 
2.2.2 OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The nuclear detonations associated with the sites in CAU 107 include eight atmospheric 
detonations (1951–1957) resulting in four CASs, and eleven underground detonations
(1964–1972).  Entities (national laboratories or contractors) within the DOE (formerly the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission [AEC]) prepared reports on various aspects of the atmospheric 
tests soon after the tests were conducted.  In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
prepared a series of reports in the early 1980s to document information related to radiological 
effects to soldiers during atmospheric testing.  Pertinent information from these documents is 
presented in this SAFER Plan.  For the eleven sites associated with underground detonations, 
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documents written by the NTS Management and Operations Contractor (M&OC) and the 
national laboratories were reviewed for operational information related to the construction and 
conduct of the detonations.  These historical documents provide information supporting 
conclusions regarding potential contaminant releases to the surface soils. 
2.2.3 RELEASE INFORMATION
Two primary types of information were reviewed to evaluate the potential for test-related 
contaminant releases to the surface soils.  These data sources are discussed below.   
2.2.3.1 Radiological Effluents Released from U.S. Continental Tests, 1961 through 1992
This report includes compiled data for all radioactive releases associated with the underground 
nuclear testing program since 1961 (DOE/NV, 1996) for which there were documented releases.  
DOE/NV (1996) presents descriptive historical data concerning the types of releases and 
qualitative data on the types and relative amounts of radionuclides that were released to the 
environment as a result of the tests.  The types and quantities of radioactive material released are 
presented.  The following eleven sites are documented in DOE/NV (1996): 
 CAS 02-23-02, Contaminated Areas (2)  
 CAS 02-23-03, Contaminated Berm  
 CAS 02-23-10, Gourd-Amber Contamination Area 
 CAS 02-23-11, Sappho Contamination Area 
 CAS 02-23-12, Scuttle Contamination Area 
 CAS 03-23-24, Seaweed B Contamination Area 
 CAS 03-23-27, Adze Contamination Area 
 CAS 03-23-28, Manzanas Contamination Area 
 CAS 03-23-29, Truchas-Chamisal Contamination Area 
 CAS 09-23-06, Mound of Contaminated Soil  
 CAS 18-23-02, U-18d Crater (Sulky)
Nine of the above-listed detonations are documented in DOE/NV (1996) as having a radiological 
release due to the detonation itself, and two sites have documented releases due to post-test 
activities.  This type of radiological release typically involved gaseous and volatile isotopes of 
xenon, krypton, and iodine (DOE/NV, 1996).  Specific information regarding the nature of these 
releases and the impact to surface soils is discussed in Sections 2.3 through 2.17 of this SAFER 
Plan.  CALABASH, which is associated with CAS 02-23-02, and GOURD-AMBER, which is 
associated with CAS 02-23-10, are not listed as having a radiological release of any kind. 
Data presented in DOE/NV (1996) were compiled from classified and unclassified reports, 
memoranda, and letters prepared by the DOE, the U.S. Public Health Service, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the national laboratories, the Defense Nuclear Agency 
(DNA) (predecessor to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA]), and DOE contractors.  
All data were reviewed by DOE health and safety personnel, the national laboratories, the EPA, 
and DTRA.  The data presented here represent the consensus of opinion of the reviewing subject 
matter experts. 
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2.2.3.2 Radiological Safety and Health Reports
Various measurements were collected during and immediately following the weapons tests.
These measurements were collected to document the radiological conditions to which the public 
and test workers were exposed.  The data collected quantified how much radioactivity was in the 
air and in what direction the wind carried the radioactivity.  Information about the radiological 
condition of the surface soil in the test area was also gathered.  The test director used this 
information to determine when it was safe for workers to enter the test area.  The time at which 
the test director declared the area safe was called the Recovery Hour.  Test workers were then 
allowed to enter the area to recover test equipment and instruments. 
These data provided input to the CAS-specific conclusions reached in this SAFER Plan.  Data 
showing that the radioactivity in air at a specific location decreased rapidly indicate that the 
radioactivity dispersed quickly and had a short half-life (Nuclear Data Center, 2006).  This 
shows that the release consisted of gaseous radionuclides that did not collect in or on the surface 
soil.  Data that quantified the amount of radioactivity remaining in the surface soils after the 
radioactive cloud dispersed indicated whether or not contamination was deposited in or on 
surface soils.  A Recovery Hour was only established when the test had a reasonable potential to 
contaminate surface soils.  A Recovery Hour was not established for some of the tests related to 
the CASs in CAU 107 as there was no reasonable potential for surface soil contamination to 
occur.  A discussion of these data and the potential impact to surface soils due to test-related 
radiological releases is presented in the CAS-specific sections below.   
2.2.4 HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
Numerous efforts to characterize the nature and extent of radiologically contaminated soil at the 
NTS have been conducted since the tests at these sites occurred.  Radiologically contaminated 
soils are typically characterized by a number of processes, including collecting soil samples for 
laboratory analysis, conducting aerial radiological surveys, field screening with direct-reading 
survey equipment, and performing in-situ gamma spectroscopy.  The information presented in 
this SAFER Plan relies on aerial radiological data, field screening data, and in-situ gamma 
spectroscopy data.  Information about background radiation and characterization methods is 
presented below, and specific information for each CAS is presented in Sections 2.3 
through 2.17. 
Background Radiation 
Background radiation exists in the environment from natural and man-made sources.  The 
background level of radioactivity in soil is the amount of radioactivity that cannot be 
attributed to a specific source but is due to low-level, worldwide natural and man-made 
sources.  Background radiation at the NTS comes from two primary sources: 
 Natural Sources:  These are radioactive elements that occur naturally in the 
environment.  The primary source at the NTS is uranium and its daughter products.  
Uranium is an ore that exists naturally in the earth’s soils and is not a result of 
man-made activities.  Another significant contribution comes from radon gas that is 
released from the earth’s crust. 
 Global Fallout:  U.S. and foreign nuclear weapons testing resulted in widespread, low 
levels of radiological soil contamination called global fallout.  Global fallout cannot 
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be attributed to one specific test or group of tests but is residual contamination 
resulting from all tests performed worldwide. 
Principles of Radiation Detection 
Radiological contamination can be detected by several instruments.  The selection of 
instrumentation and survey method depends on the type of particles emitted during 
radioactive decay and on the material in which the radioactive element is deposited.  
Alpha particles are emitted from contaminants such as plutonium and uranium.  Beta 
particles are emitted from contaminants such as strontium.  Gamma rays are emitted from 
contaminants such as cesium, cobalt, and americium.  Instrument selection also depends 
on what information is needed.  Some instruments provide a yes or no determination of 
whether or not radiological contamination is present.  Other instruments can quantify 
specific amounts of contamination for one or many radionuclides. 
 Instrument-General Data:
An ion chamber detects ionizing radiation and is capable of providing a yes or no 
indication of whether or not radiological contamination is present above background 
levels.  Ion chambers measure exposure rates in units of roentgens per hour (R/hr).  A 
roentgen is a measure of the amount of ionizing radiation in air.  The scale of an ion 
chamber can be adjusted to read in smaller units, such as milliroentgens per hour 
(mR/hr) (one-thousandth of an R/hr) or microroentgens per hour (microR/hr) (one 
millionth of an R/hr). 
The Field Instrument for the Detection of Low-Energy Radiation (FIDLER) is an 
instrument that preferentially detects low-energy gamma rays such as those emitted 
by americium-241.  Since americium-241 is a daughter product of plutonium-241, 
FIDLERs detect plutonium indirectly by detecting americium. 
Aerial Radiological Survey data (fly-over data) are collected by mounting a gamma 
ray detection instrument on a helicopter or airplane.  Data collected in this manner 
can be analyzed and processed to meet many characterization goals.  Data provide a 
yes or no indication of whether or not radiological contamination is present above 
background levels and the prevalent radionuclide.  The data also show relative levels 
of total radiological contamination but do not provide radionuclide-specific 
quantities.  The fly-over data show where there is no detectable contamination and 
areas of relatively higher contamination. 
 Instrument-Specific Data
In-situ gamma spectroscopy detects gamma ray emissions and allows for the 
quantification of specific radionuclide contaminant levels for multiple radionuclides.  
Gamma emissions occur at specific energies for each radionuclide.  In-situ gamma 
spectroscopy identifies different radioactive contaminants based on these emissions 
and their associated energies.  This type of measurement technique is performed by 
taking direct measurements of radionuclide activity in place (in-situ) without the need 
to collect and analyze soil samples.  These measurements and the associated results 
are collected in real-time. 
Quantities of non-gamma-emitting radionuclide contaminants can be inferred from 
gamma survey data.  Soil samples are collected and analyzed in a laboratory to 
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determine the amount and type of radioactivity present.  These types of analyses can 
detect alpha- and beta-emitting radionuclides, such as plutonium and strontium.  
These same samples are also analyzed for gamma-emitting radionuclides, such as 
cesium, cobalt, and americium.  Ratios between the gamma-emitting and 
non-gamma-emitting radionuclides are then calculated.  Quantities of alpha- and 
beta-emitting radionuclides can be calculated by multiplying gamma survey results by 
this ratio.  This approach allows a limited number of soil samples to be used to 
characterize large areas that have been radiologically surveyed. 
The primary characterization data used for the development of this SAFER Plan were collected 
by the methods discussed above.  The sections below provide details on the specific 
characterization data sets used in this SAFER Plan. 
2.2.4.1 Aerial Radiological Surveys (Fly-Over Data)  
In 1994, the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) conducted a site-wide fly-over survey that 
provided 100-percent coverage of the NTS.  As a result, areas with increased radioactivity due to 
testing were identified as regions of interest (ROIs).  An ROI is an area where radiological 
contamination was detected above background radiation levels.  ROIs define the NTS areas of 
contamination that are directly related to a test or group of tests conducted in close proximity to 
one another.  Numerous areas at the NTS were identified as ROIs by this survey effort.  These 
areas are locations of atmospheric nuclear testing.  CAU 107 does not include any of these areas; 
however, closure of other Soils Project CAUs will address these sites. 
Fly-over survey data analysis provided relative amounts of strong gamma-emitting radionuclides 
and americium-241.  Americium-241 is a daughter product of plutionum-241, and the presence 
of americium generally means plutonium is also present. 
Maps were produced showing relative amounts of contamination across the NTS and are 
presented in each CAS-specific section of this SAFER Plan.  The methods are summarized in 
Aerial Radiological Surveys (Proctor, 1997).  These data were used in this SAFER Plan to 
provide an indicator regarding the likelihood that a test-related radiological release to surface 
soils occurred at or near the CAS locations. 
The fly-over data show that the following nine sites have no detectable radionuclide 
contamination at or near the sites: 
 CAS 01-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site - High Alt 
 CAS 02-23-02, Contaminated Areas (2) 
 CAS 02-23-03, Contaminated Berm 
 CAS 03-23-24, Seaweed B Contamination Area 
 CAS 03-23-27, Adze Contamination Area 
 CAS 03-23-28, Manzanas Contamination Area 
 CAS 03-23-29, Truchas-Chamisal Contamination Area 
 CAS 05-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site 
 CAS 18-23-02, U-18d Crater (Sulky) 
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The six sites where the 1994 fly-over survey detected low levels of contamination include the 
following:
 CAS 02-23-10, Gourd-Amber Contamination Area 
 CAS 02-23-11, Sappho Contamination Area 
 CAS 02-23-12, Scuttle Contamination Area 
 CAS 04-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site T4-a 
 CAS 09-23-06, Mound of Contaminated Soil 
 CAS 10-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site M-10 
Operational history indicates the low levels of contamination identified at the above-listed CASs 
were not caused by test-related operations at these sites, but are due to contamination from other 
CASs not included in CAU 107.  These other CASs are locations where atmospheric testing led 
to large, distinct contaminant plumes, and the above-listed CAS locations are within the edges of 
these known contaminant plumes.  These plumes are associated with other Soils Project CAUs.
Available data suggest that contamination identified in the above-listed CAS areas as part of 
CAU 107 will not lead to a worker dose greater than 25 mrem/yr.  However, closure of the 
atmospheric testing sites for the other CAUs will determine the appropriate 25-mrem/yr 
boundary.  Sections 2.6, 2.8, 2.13, 2.15, and 2.16 of this SAFER Plan provide additional details. 
2.2.4.2 Nevada Test Site Contaminated Land Areas Report
In 1998, the NTS M&OC Radiological Control (RadCon) Department began what is known as 
the Demarcation Project, which systematically evaluated all previously identified radiologically 
contaminated areas at the NTS for compliance with 10 CFR 835, “Occupational Radiation 
Protection.”  10 CFR 835 provides for different levels of radiological control depending on the 
level of radiological hazard present at the site (CFR, 1993).  The purpose of this effort was to 
verify that the levels of radiological control were appropriate based on the hazards present, 
assure that proper fencing and postings were in place to control site access, and replace or update 
postings as necessary.  Compliant control for areas of the NTS generally consists of the 
following types: 
 URMAs:  These areas are controlled because there is contamination known or suspected to 
be present below the surface.  These areas do not contain surface contamination that can be 
tracked from one location to another and are controlled to ensure workers do not perform 
subsurface work, such as excavation, without the appropriate work controls to mitigate the 
hazards.
 RMAs:  These areas are controlled because there is contamination known or suspected to be 
present on the surface of the site but not in a form or at levels that can be tracked from one 
location to another.  These areas are controlled to limit general access to workers. 
 Contamination Areas:  These areas are controlled because there is contamination known or 
suspected to be present on the surface of the site in a form and at levels that may be tracked 
from one location to another.  These areas are controlled to limit the spread of contamination. 
Measurements collected to determine what type of radiological controls were appropriate for the 
sites included exposure rate and FIDLER readings.  Exposure rate measurements detect 
higher-energy gamma-emitting radionuclides, such as cesium-137, cobalt-60, and europium 
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isotopes.  FIDLER measurements detect americium-241, which, if present, implies plutonium is 
also present.  These radionuclides are those that are commonly associated with nuclear testing.  
Traceable alpha and beta/gamma contamination was also assessed.  The RadCon Department 
maintains a database of current postings.  This effort is described in the Nevada Test Site 
Contaminated Land Areas Report (Bechtel Nevada [BN], 2000).  The CASs in this SAFER Plan 
currently either require no radiological controls, are posted as URMAs, or are posted as RMAs.
None of the areas require controls to limit the spread of contamination.  The Demarcation Project 
monitors sites periodically to ensure continued compliance with 10 CFR 835. 
The historical data presented in BN (2000) were evaluated to support the decisions made in this 
SAFER Plan.  This type of data provides an indication of whether or not the surface soil is 
radiologically contaminated.  Evaluation of the data, combined with information on existing 
radiological boundaries obtained from the current NTS M&OC (National Security Technologies, 
LLC [NSTec]) RadCon Department, supports the conclusions derived from the operational 
history, release history, and aerial radiological survey data. 
2.2.4.3 Radionuclide Inventory and Distribution Program
In 1981 DOE began conducting a thorough survey of contaminated surface soils at the NTS 
under the Radionuclide Inventory and Distribution Program (RIDP) using an in-situ gamma 
spectroscopy technique developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).  In-situ 
gamma spectroscopy provides radionuclide-specific levels of contamination in real-time without 
collecting soil samples.  Edgerton, Germeshausen, and Grier, Inc.; Energy Measurements; and 
the Desert Research Institute (DRI) performed the work, which included five years of field work 
and an additional three years of analysis.  The results were published in five reports (McArthur 
and Kordas, 1983; 1985; McArthur and Mead, 1987; 1988; 1989).  A summary report was also 
published (McArthur, 1991) that provided an integrated estimate of the levels of soil 
radioactivity at the NTS, including estimated quantities of the 16 most significant man-made 
radionuclides produced by nuclear weapons testing. 
Aerial radiological survey data collected between 1976 and 1984 were used to plan locations for 
the in-situ measurements.  Generally, the RIDP took many measurements on a tight grid in 
known radiologically contaminated areas, while areas of lower contamination involved fewer 
measurements spaced further apart.  Some measurements were also collected in areas that were 
not expected to be radiologically contaminated.  Where radionuclide levels were greater than 
what is attributable to widespread global fallout, the radionuclides were assumed to result from 
NTS activities.  The RIDP surveyed all areas where aboveground tests had been conducted and 
where other localized sources of contamination may be present, such as waste dumps.  The only 
known areas of surface radioactivity not surveyed were a few rugged highland areas and craters 
where the survey vehicle could not safely access the sites. 
The RIDP also collected soil samples at selected locations in increments from the surface down 
to 15 centimeters below ground surface to determine the distribution of radionuclides with 
depth.  The contaminant distribution with depth is not uniform at the NTS.  Most radionuclides 
are concentrated in the top several centimeters of soil.  Understanding this distribution allowed 
the RIDP to accurately quantify the amount of contamination present.   
Contaminant levels for gamma-emitting radionuclides were determined through direct 
measurements; however, soil samples were collected in order to quantify contaminant levels of 
non-gamma-emitting radionuclides.  These results allowed the RIDP to determine contaminant 
levels for all radionuclides suspected to be present. 
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For this SAFER Plan, the RIDP data were plotted using geographic information system software.  
The RIDP data locations were plotted with the 1994 aerial survey fly-over data, and these maps 
are presented in each CAS-specific section of this SAFER Plan.  Where RIDP data were 
collected near the CASs, the data were used qualitatively to support the conclusions drawn from 
the historical process knowledge, release information, aerial survey data, and BN (2000) survey 
data.
The RIDP data provide radionuclide-specific activity results for all measurement locations.  
These data can be used to estimate radiological dose.  Radiological dose is a way to quantify 
increased risk to human health due to exposure to radiation.  The risk-based approach to closure 
of radiologically contaminated sites establishes a dose (or risk) that is considered acceptable in 
that it does not cause undue harm to individuals using the contaminated lands.  The Industrial 
Sites Federal Sub-Project established this risk level at 25 mrem/yr for an NTS worker.  Doses are 
not measured directly, but are calculated using models that consider the amount of contamination 
present and how the land will be used. 
These models can also derive the amount of residual contamination that will cause an individual 
to receive the dose limit.  The model calculates a limit for soil contamination for a given dose 
limit, such as 25 mrem/yr.  These soil concentration limits are called Derived Concentration 
Guides (DCGs).  DCGs were not calculated in this SAFER Plan; however, comparisons were 
made to the DCGs set forth in Development of the Scientific Basis for Establishing the Boundary 
Conditions Between “Unrestricted Use” and “Posting” for Exposure Due to Residual 
Radioactive Contamination of Soil at the Nevada Test Site (Anspaugh and Daniels, 1995).  This 
comparison was made to augment process knowledge and other characterization information and 
is not intended as a formal dose assessment.  RIDP data were used as follows: 
 The DCGs set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995) were based on a 100-mrem/yr dose to 
an NTS worker, not a 25-mrem/yr dose as negotiated with the Nevada Division of 
Environmental Protection for the Industrial Sites Federal Sub-Project.  Therefore, the DCGs 
had to be adjusted downward to reflect a 25-mrem/yr dose and were reduced to a quarter of 
the published limit. 
 RIDP values were compared to the adjusted DCGs using the sum of the fractions approach.  
This approach is commonly used when multiple radionuclides are present as it allows for the 
incremental dose from each radionuclide to be added together. Since the DCG for each 
radionuclide is different, this method normalizes each radionuclide’s contribution to dose by 
calculating a fraction.  The fractional contribution to dose that each radionuclide makes is the 
concentration of the radionuclide divided by that radionuclide’s associated DCG.  If the 
concentration result is less than its associated DCG, the fraction will be less than 1.  If the 
concentration is greater than its associated DCG, the fraction will be greater than 1.  A 
fraction less than 1 indicates that the DCG has not been exceeded, while a fraction greater 
than 1 indicates the DCG has been exceeded.  It is possible that no single radionuclide is 
greater than its associated DCG, but when the small contribution from each radionuclide is 
added together, the sum of these contributions exceeds the limit.  An example follows: 
o The concentration of plutonium-238 divided by its associated DCG is 0.5. 
o The concentration of cesium-137 divided by its associated DCG is 0.75. 
o These fractions are added together, and the result is 1.25.  In other words, the total DCG 
is exceeded, even though no single radionuclide is above its associated DCG. 
 The sum of the fractions was calculated for each RIDP result as discussed above. 
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 Measurements with a sum of the fractions greater than 1 indicate a possible dose to workers 
greater than 25 mrem/yr. 
The limits in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995) are conservative in that they assume worker 
residence time is 2,000 hours per year.  This is equivalent to the Industrial Use Scenario, defined 
in Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006b), that 
assumes the worker residence time is 1,800 hours. 
The CASs in this SAFER Plan fall into the Occasional Use Scenario that assumes a worker 
residence time of 80 hours per year.  Comparing the Anspaugh and Daniels (1995) limits to those 
derived for the Occasional Use Scenario is very conservative.  The DCGs used in this SAFER 
Plan assume a worker will be exposed to radiation 25 times longer than what is assumed for the 
most realistic worker exposure scenario of 80 hours per year. 
This evaluation indicates that no measurements at or near the CAS locations exceed the 
conservative, adjusted DCGs; in other words, the potential dose to an NTS worker is less than 
25 mrem/yr. 
2.3 CAS 01-23-02, ATMOSPHERIC TEST SITE - HIGH ALT
CAS 01-23-02 was designated to address potential surface soil contamination associated with the
HA (HIGH ALTITUDE) nuclear weapons test.  This test was detonated at approximately 
40,000 feet (ft) above mean sea level (amsl) (DOE/NV, 2000).  This test left no surface 
impression, and there is no distinct contamination plume associated with this CAS.  Ground zero 
does not exist for this test given the height of detonation.  Postings are not required at this CAS 
location under requirements of 10 CFR 835.  Field visits were made to this CAS on January 9 
and 10, 1996, and May 11, 2006.  Site visits in 1996 confirmed that there were no fenced areas 
and no postings.  Field crew and vehicles were surveyed upon completion of the field visit.  No 
readings were detected above background levels.  During the 2006 site visit, no postings or 
fencing were observed other than the site marker placed during the 1996 field visit. 
2.3.1 OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The HA test was part of Operation Teapot and was conducted on April 6, 1955.  The test had a 
3-kiloton (kt) yield.  The HA nuclear device was dropped from an airplane and detonated well 
above the ground surface, causing a wide, swift dispersion pathway.  Aircraft were sampling 
radioactivity in the air over the NTS during the HA test.  Three of the four sampling aircraft 
could not fly high enough to collect air samples because the radioactive cloud wafted higher than 
the airplane could fly.  Pilots flying the sampling aircraft reported that the HA cloud dissipated 
rapidly and was difficult to see (DNA, 1981). 
The test director did not establish a Recovery Hour because no significant radioactive fallout was 
observed and such precautions were not needed.  Post-test aerial surveys of terrain were not 
conducted due to the height of detonation and because no significant onsite radioactive fallout 
was detected during the test. Ground-based radiological safety support was not needed for this 
test as radiological fallout was not expected to reach the ground surface.  The HA test caused no 
significant onsite radiological fallout.  As a result, ground-based surveys were unnecessary, and 
no protective clothing or radiation survey meters were issued to project personnel (DNA, 1981). 
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2.3.2 RELEASE INFORMATION
The HA test caused a radiological release to the air space above the NTS.  However, process 
knowledge and operational history strongly indicate that the HA test did not cause radiological 
contamination of surface soils within the boundaries of the NTS.  Surface radiological 
contamination produced by a nuclear test conducted close to ground surface is largely due to 
materials (soils and tower material) being drawn into the resulting radioactive cloud 
(DNA, 1981).  Since this test was detonated at 40,000 ft amsl, this process did not occur 
(Spriggs, 2007).  Figure 2 is a photograph of the HA detonation and shows that no material was 
drawn into the area at detonation.  The contrails were created by test aircraft prior to the 
detonation to measure nuclear blast characteristics. 
FIGURE 2. HA DETONATION
2.3.3 HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
The following data were used to evaluate the potential surface release being investigated for 
CAS 01-23-02 and were used to determine the likelihood of a release to the surface soils in the 
area.
2.3.3.1 Fly-Over Data
The fly-over survey performed in 1994 does not show detectable levels of radionuclides in the 
area of this CAS and does not identify any nearby areas as ROIs (Hendricks and Riedhauser, 
1999).  The fly-over survey process is well established and has been used at many sites to make 
the “yes-no” type of decision used in this SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2005).  The fly-over data 
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are used in a semi-quantitative way to support the conclusion made based on operational history 
that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the HA operations.  There were 
141 measurements collected within a 500-meter (m) radius of the HA site (Figure 3).  While the 
fly-over data, depicted in Figure 3, are shown as points, the field of view of the detector is large; 
thus, the fly-over survey provided 100-percent coverage of this area.  These data were analyzed 
as provided in Proctor (1997) and Hendricks and Riedhauser (1999).  The results of the analyzed 
survey data are shown in Table 1.  All measurements were less than the detection limit of the 
instrumentation. 
TABLE 1. FLY-OVER DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT TYPE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION LIMIT
NUMBER
MEASUREMENTS         
>DETECTION LIMIT
Total man-made 141 1.5 microR/hr 0
americium-241 141 50 cps 0
The fly-over data presented above represent many individual measurements (referred to as point 
data), and each measurement is corrected for background radiation.  The fly-over survey process 
continuously collects background radiation levels.  Each gross measurement is then corrected to 
remove background radiation levels, resulting in data that show the added man-made radiation 
resulting from testing or other activities.  The fly-over measurements for total man-made 
radiation are very sensitive, with the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr.  Typical background 
exposure rates are approximately 15 microR/hr.  Thus, the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr 
results in detection of man-made radiation that is greater than approximately 10 percent of 
natural background radiation.
The fly-over surveys have very good sensitivity for americium-241.  Americium-241 sensitivity 
is approximately 50 counts per second (cps).  A specific correlation to soil concentration values 
was not performed; however, a conservative correlation of 50 cps to 300 nanocuries per square 
meter (nCi/m2) has been estimated by RSL based on other similar flights and the flight altitude of 
200 ft.  This value, 300 nCi/m2, was then compared to RIDP measurements made in 
non-operational areas of the NTS where no local releases of radioactive material occurred to 
determine whether or not the fly-over survey is capable of discerning levels of radioactivity 
indicative of a widespread radiological release.  Since the RIDP values in the non-operational 
areas range from 24 to 573 nCi/m2 and the fly-over sensitivity is approximately 300 nCi/m2, this 
shows that the fly-over survey is capable of discerning where operational releases have occurred.
No americium-241 fly-over survey measurements were greater than the detection limit, similar to 
the non-operational areas of the NTS.  These data confirm that there was not a widespread 
release to surface soils.  
2.3.3.2 Contaminated Land Report Data
Radiological surveys conducted for BN (2000) did not include this CAS location because 
radiological contamination was not suspected in the area. 
2.3.3.3 RIDP Data
Several RIDP measurements were taken within 500 m of the HA site (McArthur and Mead, 
1987) (Figure 3).  RIDP values were used to evaluate operational history and support the 
conclusion that the HA detonation did not lead to a widespread contaminant release to surface 
soils.  RIDP measurements taken within 500 m of the HA site were evaluated against limits set 
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forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995) as explained in Section 2.2.4.3 of this SAFER Plan.  
Table 2 provides the maximum, minimum, and average values of these data and compares the 
maximum value to the limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995).  All values are well 
below these limits.  This evaluation is not intended as a formal dose assessment but as a means 
by which these data may be compared to evaluate the validity of the operational history release 
assumptions. 
TABLE 2. RIDP DATA SUMMARY
RADIONUCLIDE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MINIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
AVERAGE
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MAX VALUE
FRACTION OF 
DCG
americium-241 4 240.47 78.70 166.10 0.10
barium-133 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
cobalt-60 4 0.69 0.57 0.65 0.00
cesium-137 4 71.89 54.94 63.06 0.02
europium-152 4 12.68 12.50 12.59 0.01
europium -154 4 13.70 10.50 11.85 0.01
europium -155 4 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.00
plutonium-238 4 143.61 47.00 99.19 0.02
plutonium -239 4 1501.31 663.31 1399.98 0.29
strontium-90 4 231.15 176.65 202.73 0.00
Results for strong gamma-emitting radionuclides measured by RIDP in the HA vicinity and at 
the non-operational areas where releases did not occur were compared. All HA maximum values 
were within the range of the values measured at the non-operational areas.  While still within the 
range of values for non-operational areas, there are two RIDP values in the northern portion of 
the HA area with slightly elevated americium-241 and plutonium values.  However, the HA 
weapon used a uranium core; therefore, these slightly elevated values are not attributable to HA 
activities. These results support the process knowledge and fly-over data. 
2.3.4 CONCLUSION
The operational history indicates that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the HA 
detonation; therefore, without a credible exposure pathway, the potential for a worker to receive 
a dose greater than 25 mrem/yr in this area is not realistic.  This conclusion is supported by the 
100-percent coverage fly-over survey data and the RIDP data.
The site is in a stable condition and requires no additional controls.  Based on the information 
presented above, data are adequate to support a closure option of no further action.
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2.4 CAS 02-23-02, CONTAMINATED AREAS (2)
CAS 02-23-02 is associated with a potential surface release that occurred during post-test drilling 
activities near the CALABASH detonation site.  While a release did not result from the 
CALABASH detonation itself, operational history indicated that elevated exposure rate readings 
were noted during post-test drilling.  In addition, alpha contamination was detected on a core 
shoe that had been down-hole.  The CAS boundary encompasses the two locations (cellars) 
where the post-test drilling operations occurred (U-2av PS#1A and U-2av PS#2A).  The 
boreholes were previously plugged and the cellars are backfilled. The cellars are not included in 
the scope of the CAS.  The scope of the CAS is limited to potential surface contamination that 
resulted from the post-test drilling. 
2.4.1 OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The CALABASH test was part of Operation Mandrel and was conducted on October 29, 1969.
The test had a 110-kt yield.  CALABASH was detonated in emplacement hole U2av (DOE/NV, 
2000).  Post-test drilling was conducted near the CALABASH test location at borehole numbers 
U-2av PS#1A and U-2av PS#2A.  The FFACO describes this CAS as “Contaminated Areas (2).”  
Radiological contamination was suspected to be present at the surface due to elevated exposure 
rates detected during post-test drilling conducted at borehole PS#2A and because removable 
alpha contamination was detected on a core shoe used during post-test drilling operations at this 
borehole (REECo, 1973a).  The maximum gamma exposure rate measured at borehole PS#2A 
was 6.0 mR/hr.  Borehole PS#1A was abandoned prior to reaching the detonation cavity; 
therefore, surface contamination was not suspected in this area.  Subsequent surveys by the 
radiological demarcation group did not identify surface contamination at either cellar location, 
and they are posted as URMAs.  The URMA postings are historical, likely because they were 
associated with the post-test boreholes.   
2.4.2 RELEASE INFORMATION
There was not a surface radiological release from the CALABASH detonation itself (DOE/NV, 
1996).  While elevated exposure rate readings were noted during post-test drilling operations at 
borehole PS#2A (REECo, 1973a), operational history indicates this type of elevated reading was 
typical of post-test drilling and sampling operations and is not a unique indicator of surface 
radiological contamination.  The post-test holes were drilled in order to collect samples; 
therefore, elevated readings were often observed due to the release of gaseous radionuclides or 
elevated radioactivity emanating from within the sample container.  DOE/NV (1996) does not 
document a radiological release from the CALABASH detonation or from post-test operations; 
thus, it is concluded that elevated exposure rate measurements were from the contained sample 
material and not from soil contamination or other surface release. 
In addition, a single alpha-contaminated swipe was collected from a core shoe.  The swipe was 
collected from equipment that had been down-hole and not collected from either the drilling 
platform or the general work area (REECo, 1973a).  This swipe is not an indicator of surface soil 
contamination. 
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2.4.3 HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
The following data were used to evaluate the potential surface release being investigated for 
CAS 02-23-02 and were used to determine the likelihood of a release to the surface soils in the 
area.
2.4.3.1 Fly-Over Data
The fly-over survey performed in 1994 does not show detectable levels of radionuclides in the 
area of this CAS and does not identify any nearby areas as ROIs (Hendricks and Riedhauser, 
1999).  The fly-over survey process is well established and has been used at many sites to make 
the “yes-no” type of decision used in this SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2005).  The fly-over data 
have been used in a semi-quantitative way to support the conclusion made based on operational 
history that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of operations at borehole PS#2A.  
As stated previously, there was not a release to surface soils resulting from the CALABASH 
detonation itself.  There were 129 measurements collected within a 500-m radius of the 
CALABASH detonation (Figure 4).  While the fly-over data, depicted in Figure 4, are shown as 
points, the field of view of the detector is large; thus, the fly-over survey provided 100-percent 
coverage of this area.  These data were analyzed as provided in Proctor (1997) and Hendricks 
and Riedhauser (1999).  The results of the analyzed survey data are shown in Table 3.  All 
measurements were less than the detection limit of the instrumentation.
TABLE 3. FLY-OVER DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT TYPE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION LIMIT
NUMBER
MEASUREMENTS         
>DETECTION LIMIT
Total man-made 129 1.5 microR/hr 0
americium-241 129 50 cps 0
The fly-over data presented above represent many individual measurements (referred to as point 
data), and each measurement is corrected for background radiation.  The fly-over survey process 
continuously collects background radiation levels then corrects each measurement to remove it, 
resulting in data that show the added man-made radiation resulting from testing or other 
activities.  The fly-over measurements for total man-made radiation are very sensitive, with the 
detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr.  Typical background exposure rates are approximately 
15 microR/hr.  Thus, the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr results in detection of man-made 
radiation that is greater than approximately 10 percent of natural background radiation.  No 
measurement for total man-made radiation at or within 500 m of the CALABASH detonation site 
exceeds this detection limit. 
The fly-over surveys have very good sensitivity for americium-241.  Americium-241 sensitivity 
is approximately 50 cps.  A specific correlation to soil concentration values was not performed; 
however, a conservative correlation of 50 cps to 300 nCi/m2 has been estimated by RSL based on 
other similar flights and the flight altitude of 200 ft.  This value, 300 nCi/m2, was then compared 
to RIDP measurements made in non-operational areas of the NTS where no local releases of 
radioactive material occurred to determine whether or not the fly-over survey is capable of 
discerning levels of radioactivity indicative of a widespread radiological release.  Since the RIDP 
values in the non-operational areas range from 24 to 573 nCi/m2 and the fly-over sensitivity is 
approximately 300 nCi/m2, this shows that the fly-over survey is capable of discerning where 
operational releases have occurred.  No americium-241 fly-over survey measurements were 
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greater than the detection limit, similar to the non-operational areas of the NTS.  These data 
confirm that there was not a widespread release to surface soils.
2.4.3.2 Contaminated Land Report Data
Results of the surveys conducted in support of BN (2000) were used qualitatively to support the 
conclusions gleaned from the operational history.  The surveys conducted for BN (2000) 
included radiological surveys in the immediate area of CAS 02-23-02.  Measurements collected 
included exposure rates and FIDLER readings.  Removable alpha and beta/gamma 
contamination were also assessed.  Measurements were collected within the boundaries of 
URMAs and around the perimeter of these areas.  Table 4 presents the results of these surveys 
(BN, 2000). 
TABLE 4. CONTAMINATED LAND SURVEY DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT 
TYPE
NUMBER OF 
MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
MINIMUM 
VALUE
AVERAGE
VALUE
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION
LIMIT
Removable Alpha 14 2 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 0.14 dpm/100 cm2 5 dpm/100 cm2
Removable Beta 14 12 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 1.1 dpm/100 cm2 16 dpm/100 cm2
Exposure Rate 14 80 uR/hr 10 uR/hr 19 uR/hr 20 uR/hr1
FIDLER 14 85 cps 75 cps 78 cps 100 cps
1 Procedurally, detection limit is not determined for this type of instrument.  Value reported is sensitivity 
All values were below detection limits except for one isolated exposure rate reading.  However, a 
site visit was conducted in 2007, and no anomalous radiological readings were measured, 
indicating that the previously elevated reading is no longer representative of site conditions.
These ground-based survey data consist of measurements that are focused in the post-test drilling 
areas in and around the URMAs, thereby augmenting the wide-area data collected via fly-over 
surveys.  These data provide an additional resource indicating that post-test drilling operations 
did not lead to surface soil contamination.   
The NV/YMP RadCon Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004b) is used at the NTS to implement the 
requirements set forth in 10 CFR 835.  The manual allows for the release of areas from 
radiological controls when certain radiological limits are met.  The limits were established as 
acceptable levels for use by the general public, and thus, are conservative given the ongoing 
controls at CAS 02-23-02 and the lack of both public and worker access to the site.  Table 5 
outlines these release values.  BN (2000) survey measurements in the area of CAS 02-23-02 are 
well below the radiological control limits outlined in Table 5.   
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TABLE 5. SURFACE CONTAMINATION VALUES1 IN DPM/100 CM2
RADIONUCLIDES REMOVABLE2, 4 TOTAL (FIXED +REMOVABLE)2, 3
natural uranium, uranium-235, uranium-238, and associated decay 
products 1,0007 5,0007
transuranics, radium-226, radium-228, thorium-230, thorium-228, 
protactinium-231, actinium-227, iodine-125, and iodine-129 20 500 
natural thorium, thorium-232, strontium-90, radium-223, radium-224, 
uranium-232, iodine-126, iodine-131, and iodine-133 200 1,000 
beta-gamma emitters (nuclides with decay modes other than alpha 
emission or spontaneous fission), except strontium-90 and others 
noted above5 1,000 5,000 
tritium and tritiated compounds6 10,000 N/A
1 The values in this table, with the exception noted in footnote 5, apply to radioactive contamination deposited on, but not incorporated into the 
interior or matrix of, the contaminated item. Where surface contamination by both alpha and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides exists, the limits 
established for alpha and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides apply independently. 
2 As used in this table, dpm (disintegrations per minute) means the rate of emission by radioactive material as determined by correcting the 
counts per minute observed by an appropriate detector for background, efficiency, and geometric factors associated with the instrumentation. 
3 The levels may be averaged over 1 square meter provided the maximum surface activity in any area of 100 cm2 is less than three times the value 
specified. For purposes of averaging, any square meter of surface shall be considered to be above the surface contamination value if: (1) From 
measurements of a representative number of sections it is determined that the average contamination level exceeds the applicable value; or (2) it 
is determined that the sum of the activity of all isolated spots or particles in any 100 cm2 area exceeds three times the applicable value. 
4 The amount of removable radioactive material per 100 cm2 of surface area should be determined by swiping the area with dry filter or soft 
absorbent paper, applying moderate pressure, and then assessing the amount of radioactive material on the swipe with an appropriate instrument 
of known efficiency. (Note:  The use of dry material may not be appropriate for tritium.) When removable contamination on objects of surface 
area less than 100 cm2 is determined, the activity per unit area shall be based on the actual area and the entire surface shall be wiped. It is not 
necessary to use swiping techniques to measure removable contamination levels if direct scan surveys indicate that the total residual surface 
contamination levels are within the limits for removable contamination. 
5 This category of radionuclides includes mixed fission products, including strontium-90 present in them. It does not apply to strontium-90 which 
has been separated from the other fission products or mixtures where the strontium-90 has been enriched. 
6 Tritium contamination may diffuse into the volume or matrix of materials. Evaluation of surface contamination shall consider the extent to 
which such contamination may migrate to the surface in order to ensure the surface contamination value provided in this appendix is not 
exceeded. Once this contamination migrates to the surface, it may be removable, not fixed; therefore, a “`Total”' value does not apply. 
7 (alpha) 
2.4.3.3 RIDP Data
Several RIDP measurements were taken within 500 m of the CALABASH site (Figure 4).  RIDP 
values were used to evaluate operational history and support the conclusion that the elevated 
exposure rate readings observed during the drilling operations did not indicate a widespread 
contaminant release.  RIDP measurements taken within 500 m of the CALABASH site were 
evaluated against limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995) as explained in Section 2.2.4.3 
of this SAFER Plan.  Table 6 provides the maximum, minimum, and average values of these data 
and compares the maximum value to the limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995).  All 
values are well below these limits.  This evaluation is not intended as a formal dose assessment 
but as a means by which these data may be compared to evaluate the validity of the operational 
history release assumptions. 
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TABLE 6. RIDP DATA SUMMARY
RADIONUCLIDE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MINIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
AVERAGE
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MAX VALUE
FRACTION OF 
DCG
americium-241 4 40.89 36.37 37.98 0.02
barium-133 4 5.41 4.3 4.62 0
cobalt-60 4 1.15 0.6 0.9 0
cesium-137 4 145.71 52.25 105.03 0.04
europium-152 4 49.83 13.04 30.65 0.03
europium -154 4 38.12 12.37 24.27 0.02
europium -155 4 0.89 0.78 0.83 0
plutonium-238 4 65.424 58.192 60.768 0.01
plutonium -239 4 269.874 240.042 250.668 0.05
strontium-90 4 269.62 96.67 194.34 0
Results for radionuclides measured by RIDP in the CALABASH vicinity and at the 
non-operational areas where releases did not occur were compared.  All CALABASH maximum 
values were within the range of the values measured at the non-operational areas.  Therefore, 
these results support the process knowledge, Contaminated Land Report survey data, and 
fly-over data. 
2.4.4 CONCLUSION
The operational history indicates that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the 
detonation or subsequent activities at the CALABASH site.  Therefore, without a credible 
exposure pathway, the potential for a worker to receive a dose greater than 25 mrem/yr in this 
area is not realistic.  This conclusion is supported by the 100-percent coverage fly-over survey 
data, focused measurements provided by the Contaminated Land Report survey data, and the 
RIDP data.
The site is in a stable condition and requires no additional controls.  Based on the information 
presented above, data are adequate to support a closure option of no further action.
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2.5 CAS 02-23-03, CONTAMINATED BERM
CAS 02-23-03 was designated to address potential surface soil contamination associated with the 
FLASK-RED underground nuclear detonation.  This CAS consists of a berm historically 
identified as radiologically contaminated.  The berm is associated with a post-test cable pull.  
The FLASK-RED detonation did not form a subsidence crater.  The area is a potential crater and 
no stability study has been completed, so both access and future land use are limited.  The 
FLASK-RED detonation cavity is part of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Sub-Project.  
Field visits made to this CAS on January 18, 1995; February 9, 1995; and July 26, 2007, describe 
a berm extending west from U2-az3 with miscellaneous debris (e.g., metal) enclosed by a fence 
with radiological postings.  Located at the east end of the fenced area is a concrete pad partially 
covered with pea gravel.  The berm runs east to west for approximately 215 ft and contains 
native soil and debris.  At the west end of the fenced area is a smaller berm of soil.   
The FFACO location for the CAS is incorrect.  The recommendation is made to update the 
FFACO coordinates of this CAS.  This conclusion is supported by the coordinates given in 
REECo (1991), the U2az-3 emplacement hole coordinates (Raytheon Services Nevada [RSN], 
1991), and the 2007 site visit.
2.5.1 OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The FLASK-RED detonation was part of Operation Mandrel and was conducted on May 26, 
1970.  The detonation had a 35-ton yield.  FLASK-RED was detonated in emplacement hole 
U2az-3.  A 1970 memorandum from LLNL indicates there was a problem with the instrument 
cable pull.  This memorandum states, “Prior to covering the cable with backfill, spots with 
readings greater than 100 R/hr contact were detected.”  The diagram included with this 
memorandum suggests that the orientation of the berm is consistent with the orientation of the 
cable (LLNL, 1970).  No post-test drilling was conducted as part of the FLASK-RED operations 
(RSN, 1991).  The cable was likely activated, not contaminated.  It is impractical to sample the 
cable itself as it is inaccessible to workers and therefore cannot lead to an NTS worker dose 
greater than 25 mrem/yr.  
2.5.2 RELEASE INFORMATION
DOE/NV (1996) documented radiological releases from the detonation of FLASK-RED and 
from the subsequent cable pull.  The cable was pulled from the emplacement hole immediately 
after the detonation and covered to limit test personnel exposures.  It is currently covered by the 
berm.  The release included xenon-133, xenon-133m, and xenon-135.  These are gaseous 
radionuclides with short half-lives and are not suspected to be present in the soil.  The longest 
half-life of these radionuclides is approximately 5 days (Nuclear Data Center, 2006).  There was 
no post-test drilling at the site.  There is no evidence of surface contamination at the site. 
Additional evidence exists that the cable pull did not result in contaminant releases to the surface 
soils.  A similar cable pull was conducted at Project 56 No. 4.  This safety test resulted in an 
inadvertent fission event.  An instrumentation cable was pulled from the test hole, and exposure 
rates of 20 to 30 R/hr were recorded.  An exposure rate as high as 50 R/hr was recorded 
approximately 98 ft from ground zero.  However, within an hour, the survey team recorded 
significantly lower values, on the order of 10 R/hr.  This rapid decrease in radiological readings 
may have been because the cable was activated, not contaminated (DNA, 1982), which means 
CAU 107 SAFER Plan 
Section:  Unit Description 
Revision:  0 
Date:  September 2008 
26
that the radioactivity associated with the FLASK-RED cable is unlikely to be released to the 
surface soils.  
Post-activity surveys did not detect alpha contamination at this site (REECo, 1973a).  The lack of 
alpha contamination during test operations indicates that the cable pull operation did not bring 
subsurface contaminants to the surface soils.  
All of the above information shows that a release to the surface soils around or under the 
FLASK-RED cable is unlikely.  
2.5.3 HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
The following data were used to evaluate the potential surface release being investigated for 
CAS 02-23-03 to determine the likelihood of a release to the surface soils in the area resulting 
from FLASK-RED operations. 
2.5.3.1 Fly-Over Data
The fly-over survey performed in 1994 does not show detectable levels of radionuclides in the 
area of this CAS and does not identify any nearby areas as ROIs (Hendricks and Riedhauser, 
1999).  The fly-over survey process is well established and has been used at many sites to make 
the “yes-no” type of decision used in this SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2005).  The fly-over data 
have been used in a semi-quantitative way to support the conclusion made based on operational 
history that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the FLASK-RED detonation or 
associated activities.  There were 133 measurements collected within a 500-m radius of the 
FLASK-RED detonation (Figure 5).  While the fly-over data, depicted in Figure 5, are shown as 
points, the field of view of the detector is large; thus, the fly-over survey provided 100-percent 
coverage of this area.  These data were analyzed as provided in Proctor (1997) and Hendricks 
and Riedhauser (1999).  The results of the analyzed survey data are shown in Table 7.  All 
measurements were less than the detection limit of the instrumentation.
TABLE 7. FLY-OVER DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT TYPE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION LIMIT
NUMBER
MEASUREMENTS         
>DETECTION LIMIT
Total man-made 133 1.5 microR/hr 0
americium-241 133 50 cps 0
The fly-over data presented above represent many individual measurements (referred to as point 
data), and each measurement is corrected for background radiation.  The fly-over survey process 
continuously collects background radiation levels then corrects each measurement to remove it, 
resulting in data that show the added man-made radiation resulting from testing or other 
activities.  The fly-over measurements for total man-made radiation are very sensitive, with the 
detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr.  Typical background exposure rates are approximately 
15 microR/hr.  Thus, the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr results in detection of man-made 
radiation that is greater than approximately 10 percent of natural background radiation.
The fly-over surveys have very good sensitivity for americium-241.  Americium-241 sensitivity 
is approximately 50 cps.  A specific correlation to soil concentration values was not performed; 
however, a conservative correlation of 50 cps to 300 nCi/m2 has been estimated by RSL based on 
other similar flights and the flight altitude of 200 ft.  This value, 300 nCi/m2, was then compared 
to RIDP measurements made in non-operational areas of the NTS where no local releases of 
CAU 107 SAFER Plan 
Section:  Unit Description 
Revision:  0 
Date:  September 2008 
27
radioactive material occurred to determine whether or not the fly-over survey is capable of 
discerning levels of radioactivity indicative of a widespread radiological release.  Since the RIDP 
values in the non-operational areas range from 24 to 573 nCi/m2 and the fly-over sensitivity is 
approximately 300 nCi/m2, this shows that the fly-over survey is capable of discerning where 
operational releases have occurred.  No americium-241 fly-over survey measurements were 
greater than the detection limit, similar to the non-operational areas of the NTS.  These data 
confirm that there was not a widespread release to surface soils.
2.5.3.2 Contaminated Land Report Data
Results of the surveys conducted in support of BN (2000) were used qualitatively to support the 
conclusions gleaned from the operational history.  The surveys conducted for BN (2000) 
included radiological surveys in the immediate area of CAS 02-23-03.  Measurements collected 
included exposure rates and FIDLER readings.  Removable alpha and beta/gamma 
contamination were also assessed.  Measurements were collected within the boundaries of 
URMAs and around the perimeter of these areas.  Table 8 presents the results of these surveys 
(BN, 2000). 
TABLE 8. CONTAMINATED LAND SURVEY DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT 
TYPE
NUMBER OF 
MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
MINIMUM 
VALUE
AVERAGE
VALUE
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION
LIMIT
Removable Alpha 8 2 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 0.25 dpm/100 cm2 5 dpm/100 cm2
Removable Beta 8 3 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 0.88 dpm/100 cm2 16 dpm/100 cm2
Exposure Rate 8 20 uR/hr 10 uR/hr 16 uR/hr  20 uR/hr1
FIDLER 8 70 cps 60 cps 62 cps 100 cps
1 Procedurally, detection limit is not determined for this type of instrument.  Value reported is sensitivity 
All values were below detection limits.  These ground-based survey data consist of 
measurements that are focused in the post-test drilling areas in and around the URMAs, thereby 
augmenting the wide-area data collected via fly-over surveys.  These data provide an additional 
resource indicating that post-test operations did not lead to surface soil contamination.   
The NV/YMP RadCon Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004b) is used at the NTS to implement the 
requirements set forth in 10 CFR 835.  The manual allows for the release of areas from 
radiological controls when certain radiological limits are met.  The limits were established as 
acceptable levels for use by the general public and, thus, are conservative given the ongoing 
controls at CAS 02-23-03 and the lack of both public and worker access to the site.  Table 9 
outlines these release values.  BN (2000) survey measurements in the area of CAS 02-23-03 are 
well below the radiological control limits outlined in Table 9.   
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TABLE 9. SURFACE CONTAMINATION VALUES1 IN DPM/100 CM2
RADIONUCLIDE REMOVABLE2, 4 TOTAL (FIXED +REMOVABLE)2, 3
natural uranium, uranium-235, uranium-238, and associated decay 
products 1,0007 5,0007
transuranics, radium-226, radium-228, thorium-230, thorium-228, 
protactinium-231, actinium-227, iodine-125, and iodine-129 20 500 
natural thorium, thorium-232, strontium-90, radium-223, radium-224, 
uranium-232, iodine-126, iodine-131, and iodine-133 200 1,000 
beta-gamma emitters (nuclides with decay modes other than alpha 
emission or spontaneous fission), except strontium-90 and others 
noted above5 1,000 5,000 
tritium and tritiated compounds6 10,000 N/A
1 The values in this table, with the exception noted in footnote 5, apply to radioactive contamination deposited on, but not incorporated into the 
interior or matrix of, the contaminated item. Where surface contamination by both alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides exists, the limits 
established for alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides apply independently. 
2 As used in this table, dpm (disintegrations per minute) means the rate of emission by radioactive material as determined by correcting the 
counts per minute observed by an appropriate detector for background, efficiency, and geometric factors associated with the instrumentation. 
3 The levels may be averaged over 1 square meter provided the maximum surface activity in any area of 100 cm2 is less than three times the value 
specified. For purposes of averaging, any square meter of surface shall be considered to be above the surface contamination value if: (1) From 
measurements of a representative number of sections it is determined that the average contamination level exceeds the applicable value; or (2) it 
is determined that the sum of the activity of all isolated spots or particles in any 100 cm2 area exceeds three times the applicable value. 
4 The amount of removable radioactive material per 100 cm2 of surface area should be determined by swiping the area with dry filter or soft 
absorbent paper, applying moderate pressure, and then assessing the amount of radioactive material on the swipe with an appropriate instrument 
of known efficiency. (Note:  The use of dry material may not be appropriate for tritium.) When removable contamination on objects of surface 
area less than 100 cm2 is determined, the activity per unit area shall be based on the actual area and the entire surface shall be wiped. It is not 
necessary to use swiping techniques to measure removable contamination levels if direct scan surveys indicate that the total residual surface 
contamination levels are within the limits for removable contamination. 
5 This category of radionuclides includes mixed fission products, including the strontium-90 present in them. It does not apply to strontium-90 
which has been separated from the other fission products or mixtures where the strontium-90 has been enriched. 
6 Tritium contamination may diffuse into the volume or matrix of materials. Evaluation of surface contamination shall consider the extent to 
which such contamination may migrate to the surface in order to ensure the surface contamination value provided in this appendix is not 
exceeded. Once this contamination migrates to the surface, it may be removable, not fixed; therefore, a “Total” value does not apply. 
7 (alpha) 
2.5.3.3 RIDP Data
Several RIDP measurements were taken within 500 m of the FLASK-RED site (Figure 5).  RIDP 
values were used to evaluate operational history and support the conclusion that the elevated 
exposure rate readings observed during the drilling operations did not indicate a widespread 
contaminant release.  RIDP measurements taken within 500 m of the FLASK-RED site were 
evaluated against limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995) as explained in Section 2.2.4.3 
of this SAFER Plan.  Table 10 provides the maximum, minimum, and average values of these 
data and compares the maximum value to the limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995).
All values are well below these limits.  This evaluation is not intended as a formal dose 
assessment but as a means by which these data may be compared to evaluate the validity of the 
operational history release assumptions. 
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TABLE 10. RIDP DATA SUMMARY
RADIONUCLIDE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MINIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
AVERAGE
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MAX VALUE
FRACTION OF 
DCG
americium-241 2 45.11 35.80 40.45 0.02
barium-133 2 5.89 4.61 5.25 0.00
cobalt-60 2 0.87 0.60 0.73 0.00
cesium-137 2 263.70 13.13 138.42 0.08
europium-152 2 15.92 12.98 14.45 0.01
europium -154 2 12.64 11.42 12.03 0.01
europium -155 2 1.00 0.80 0.90 0.00
plutonium-238 2 66.90 16.15 18.25 0.01
plutonium -239 2 302.92 801.36 905.56 0.06
strontium-90 2 487.95 24.29 256.12 0.00
Results for radionuclides measured by RIDP in the FLASK-RED vicinity and at the 
non-operational areas where releases did not occur were compared.  All FLASK-RED maximum 
values were within the range of the values measured at the non-operational areas. Therefore, 
these results support the process knowledge, Contaminated Land Report survey data, and 
fly-over data. 
2.5.4 CONCLUSION
The operational history indicates that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the 
detonation or subsequent activities at the FLASK-RED site.  Therefore, without a credible 
exposure pathway, the potential for a worker to receive a dose greater than 25 mrem/yr in this 
area is not realistic.  This is supported by the 100-percent coverage fly-over survey data, focused 
measurements provided by the Contaminated Land Report survey data, and the RIDP data.
The site is in a stable condition and requires no additional controls.  Based on the information 
presented above, data are adequate to support a closure option of no further action.
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2.6 CAS 02-23-10, GOURD-AMBER CONTAMINATION AREA
CAS 02-23-10 was designated to address potential surface soil contamination associated with
post-test drilling at the location of the GOURD-AMBER underground nuclear detonation 
(REECo, 1973a).  REECo (1991) does not provide information about this site.  The 
GOURD-AMBER detonation did not form a subsidence crater.  The area is a potential crater and 
no stability study has been completed, so both access and future land use are limited.  The 
GOURD-AMBER detonation cavity is part of the UGTA Sub-Project. 
2.6.1 OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The GOURD-AMBER detonation was part of Operation Bowline and was conducted on 
April 24, 1969.  The detonation had a yield of less than 20 kt.  GOURD-AMBER was detonated 
in emplacement hole U2bf (DOE/NV, 2000).  Stationary radiation monitors were placed in an 
arc around the surface ground zero of the test.  No readings above background levels were 
detected by these monitors.  Post-test drilling was conducted at hole PS#1A.  The maximum 
gamma exposure rate measured during post-test drilling operations at hole PS#1A was 
0.1 mR/hr.  No alpha contamination was detected (REECo, 1973a). 
2.6.2 RELEASE INFORMATION
There was not a surface radiological release from the GOURD-AMBER detonation (DOE/NV, 
1996).  Slightly elevated exposure rate readings were noted during post-test drilling operations at 
hole PS#1A (REECo, 1973a).  Operational history indicates this type of elevated reading was 
typical of post-test drilling and sampling operations and is not a unique indicator of surface 
radiological contamination.  The post-test holes were drilled in order to collect samples; 
therefore, elevated readings were often observed from the release of gaseous radionuclides or 
elevated radioactivity emanating from within the sample container.  DOE/NV (1996) does not 
document a radiological release from this detonation; thus, it is concluded that elevated exposure 
rate measurements were due to the contained sample material and not soil contamination or other 
surface release. 
2.6.3 HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
The following data were used to evaluate the potential surface release being investigated for 
CAS 02-23-10 and were used to determine the likelihood of a release to the surface soils in the 
area resulting from GOURD-AMBER operations. 
2.6.3.1 Fly-Over Data
The fly-over survey performed in 1994 shows low levels of detectable radioactivity (Hendricks 
and Riedhauser, 1999).  The GOURD-AMBER CAS is on the perimeter of the SEDAN ROI, on 
the edge of contaminant extent from the SEDAN test (CAS 10-45-01).  Thus, the low levels of 
radiological contamination detected in this area are not attributable to the GOURD-AMBER 
detonation but are related to the contamination extent of CAS 10-45-01, which will be addressed 
with a future CAU closure.
The fly-over survey process is well established and has been used at many sites to make the 
“yes-no” type of decision used in this SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2005).  The fly-over data have 
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been used in a semi-quantitative way to support the conclusion made based on operational 
history that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the GOURD-AMBER 
operations.  There were 135 measurements collected within a 500-m radius of the surface ground 
zero of the GOURD-AMBER detonation (Figure 6).  While the fly-over data, depicted in 
Figure 6, are shown as points, the field of view of the detector is large; thus, the fly-over survey 
provided 100-percent coverage of this area.  These data were analyzed as provided in Proctor 
(1997) and Hendricks and Riedhauser (1999).  The results of the analyzed survey data are shown 
in Table 11.
All measurements for americium-241 were below the detection limit, and 70 measurements for 
total man-made radioactivity were greater than the detection limit.  These measurements were 
made in the known, contiguous contaminant plume of CAS 10-45-01, and this area will be 
addressed with a future CAU closure.  However, as shown in Section 2.6.3.3, these data are also 
below the dose limit.
TABLE 11. FLY-OVER DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT TYPE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION LIMIT
NUMBER
MEASUREMENTS         
>DETECTION LIMIT
Total man-made 135 1.5 microR/hr 70
americium-241 135 50 cps 0
The fly-over data presented above represent many individual measurements (referred to as point 
data), and each measurement is corrected for background radiation.  The fly-over survey process 
continuously collects background radiation levels.  Each gross measurement is then corrected to 
remove background radiation levels, resulting in data that show the added man-made radiation 
resulting from testing or other activities.  The fly-over measurements for total man-made 
radiation are very sensitive, with the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr.  Typical background 
exposure rates are approximately 15 microR/hr.  Thus, the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr 
results in detection of man-made radiation that is greater than approximately 10 percent of 
natural background radiation.
The fly-over surveys have very good sensitivity for americium-241.  Americium-241 sensitivity 
is approximately 50 cps.  A specific correlation to soil concentration values was not performed; 
however, a conservative correlation of 50 cps to 300 nCi/m2 has been estimated by RSL based on 
other similar flights and the flight altitude of 200 ft.  This value, 300 nCi/m2, was then compared 
to RIDP measurements made in non-operational areas of the NTS where no local releases of 
radioactive material occurred to determine whether or not the fly-over survey is capable of 
discerning levels of radioactivity indicative of a widespread radiological release.  Since the RIDP 
values in the non-operational areas range from 24 to 573 nCi/m2 and the fly-over sensitivity is 
approximately 300 nCi/m2, this shows that the fly-over survey is capable of discerning where 
operational releases have occurred.  No americium-241 fly-over survey measurements were 
greater than the detection limit, similar to the non-operational areas of the NTS.  These data 
confirm that there was not a widespread release to surface soils.
2.6.3.2 Contaminated Land Report Data
Radiological surveys conducted for BN (2000) did not include this CAS location because 
radiological contamination was not suspected in the area.  The area is not controlled for 
radiological purposes. 
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2.6.3.3 RIDP Data
Several RIDP measurements were taken within 500 m of the GOURD-AMBER site (DRI, 2007) 
(Figure 6).  RIDP values were used to evaluate operational history and support the conclusion 
that the GOURD-AMBER detonation did not lead to a widespread contaminant release to 
surface soils.  RIDP measurements taken within 500 m of the GOURD-AMBER site were 
evaluated against limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995) as explained in Section 2.2.4.3 
of this SAFER Plan.  Table 12 provides the maximum, minimum, and average values of these 
data and compares the maximum value to the limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995).
All values are well below these limits.  This evaluation is not intended as a formal dose 
assessment but as a means by which these data may be compared to evaluate the validity of the 
operational history release assumptions. 
TABLE 12. RIDP DATA SUMMARY
RADIONUCLIDE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MINIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
AVERAGE
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MAX VALUE
FRACTION OF 
DCG
americium-241 4 64.43 47.82 55.35 0.03
cobalt-60 4 0.68 0.52 0.59 0.00
cesium-134 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
cesium-137 4 240.60 62.38 155.83 0.07
europium-152 4 18.14 14.89 16.43 0.01
europium-154 4 14.79 10.60 12.69 0.01
europium-155 4 1.44 0.95 1.23 0.00
lutetium-174 4 0.29 0.00 0.20 0.00
plutonium-238 4 54.76 28.04 43.90 0.01
plutonium-239 4 369.05 194.27 297.15 0.07
rhodium-101 4 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.00
ruthenium-106 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
antimony-125 4 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.00
strontium-90 4 166.20 49.81 91.04 0.00
Results for radionuclides measured by RIDP in the GOURD-AMBER vicinity and at the 
non-operational areas where releases did not occur were compared.  All GOURD-AMBER 
maximum values were within the range of the values measured at the non-operational areas.  
Therefore, these results support the process knowledge and fly-over data. 
2.6.4 CONCLUSION
The operational history indicates that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the 
GOURD-AMBER detonation.  Therefore, without a credible exposure pathway, the potential for 
a worker to receive a dose greater than 25 mrem/yr in this area is not realistic.  This is supported 
by the 100-percent coverage fly-over survey data and the RIDP data.  The low levels of 
contamination present are associated with the SEDAN test. 
The site is in a stable condition and requires no additional controls.  Based on the information 
presented above, data are adequate to support a closure option of no further action. 
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2.7 CAS 02-23-11, SAPPHO CONTAMINATION AREA
CAS 02-23-11 was designated to address potential surface soil contamination associated with 
post-test drilling at the location of the SAPPHO underground nuclear detonation (REECo, 
1973a).  REECo (1991) does not provide information about this site. The area is a potential 
subsidence crater and no stability study has been completed, so both access and future land use 
are limited.  The SAPPHO detonation cavity is covered by the UGTA Sub-Project.  This area is 
posted as a URMA, likely due to the deep underground source term that resulted from the 
nuclear test (Johnston, 2007).
2.7.1 OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The SAPPHO test was part of Operation Grommet and was conducted on March 23, 1972.  The 
test had a yield of less than 20 kt.  SAPPHO was detonated in emplacement hole U2dh-2 
(DOE/NV, 2000).  A re-entry survey was conducted after the test and measured background 
levels of radioactivity.  Post-test drilling was conducted at hole PS#1A.  The maximum gamma 
exposure rate measured during post-test drilling operations at hole PS#1A was 3 mR/hr.  No 
alpha contamination was detected (REECo, 1973b). 
2.7.2 RELEASE INFORMATION
DOE/NV (1996) documented radiological releases resulting from the post-test drilling operations 
at hole PS#1A.  The releases included xenon-133 and xenon-133m.  These are gaseous 
radionuclides with short half-lives and are not suspected to be present in the soil.  The longest 
half-life of these radionuclides is approximately 5 days (Nuclear Data Center, 2006).  Elevated 
exposure rate readings were noted during post-test drilling operations at hole PS#1A (REECo, 
1973b).  Operational history indicates this type of elevated reading was typical of post-test 
drilling and sampling operations and is not a unique indicator of surface radiological 
contamination.  The post-test holes were drilled in order to collect samples; therefore, elevated 
readings were often observed from the release of gaseous radionuclides or elevated radioactivity 
emanating from within the sample container.  In either case, this information shows that a 
radiological release to surface soils did not occur.
2.7.3 HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
The following data were used to evaluate the potential surface release being investigated for 
CAS 02-23-11 and were used to determine the likelihood of a release to the surface soils in the 
area resulting from SAPPHO operations. 
2.7.3.1 Fly-Over Data
The fly-over survey performed in 1994 shows low levels of detectable radioactivity (Hendricks 
and Riedhauser, 1999).  The SAPPHO CAS location is on the perimeter of the SEDAN ROI, on 
the edge of contaminant extent from the SEDAN test (CAS 02-23-05).  Thus, the low levels of 
radiological contamination detected in this area are not attributable to the SAPPHO detonation 
but are related to the contamination extent of CAS 02-23-05, which will be addressed with a 
future CAU closure.
The fly-over survey process is well established and has been used at many sites to make the 
“yes-no” type of decision used in this SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2005).  The fly-over data have 
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been used in a semi-quantitative way to support the conclusion made based on operational 
history that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the SAPPHO detonation or 
associated activities.  There were 126 measurements collected within a 500-m radius of the 
SAPPHO detonation (Figure 7).  While the fly-over data, depicted in Figure 7, are shown as 
points, the field of view of the detector is large; thus, the fly-over survey provided 100-percent 
coverage of this area.  These data were analyzed as provided in Proctor (1997) and Hendricks 
and Riedhauser (1999).  The results of the analyzed survey data are shown in Table 13.   
All measurements for americium-241 were below the detection limit, and 20 measurements for 
total man-made radioactivity were greater than the detection limit.  These measurements were 
made in the known contaminant plume of CAS 02-23-05, and this area will be addressed with a 
future CAU closure.  However, as shown in Section 2.7.3.3, these data are also below the dose 
limit.
TABLE 13. FLY-OVER DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT TYPE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION LIMIT
NUMBER
MEASUREMENTS         
>DETECTION LIMIT
Total man-made 126 1.5 microR/hr 20
americium-241 126 50 cps 0
The fly-over data presented above represent many individual measurements (referred to as point 
data), and each measurement is corrected for background radiation.  The fly-over survey process 
continuously collects background radiation levels then corrects each measurement to remove it, 
resulting in data that show the added man-made radiation resulting from testing or other 
activities.  The fly-over measurements for total man-made radiation are very sensitive, with the 
detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr.  Typical background exposure rates are approximately 
15 microR/hr. Thus, the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr results in detection of man-made 
radiation that is greater than approximately 10 percent of natural background radiation.
The fly-over surveys have very good sensitivity for americium-241.  Americium-241 sensitivity 
is approximately 50 cps.  A specific correlation to soil concentration values was not performed; 
however, a conservative correlation of 50 cps to 300 nCi/m2 has been estimated by RSL based on 
other similar flights and the flight altitude of 200 ft.  This value, 300 nCi/m2, was then compared 
to RIDP measurements made in non-operational areas of the NTS where no local releases of 
radioactive material occurred to determine whether or not the fly-over survey is capable of 
discerning levels of radioactivity indicative of a widespread radiological release.  Since the RIDP 
values in the non-operational areas range from 24 to 573 nCi/m2 and the fly-over sensitivity is 
approximately 300 nCi/m2, this shows that the fly-over survey is capable of discerning where 
operational releases have occurred.  No americium-241 fly-over survey measurements were 
greater than the detection limit, similar to the non-operational areas of the NTS.  These data 
confirm that there was not a widespread release to surface soils.
2.7.3.2 Contaminated Land Report Data
Results of the surveys conducted in support of BN (2000) were used qualitatively to support the 
conclusions gleaned from the operational history.  The surveys conducted for BN (2000) 
included radiological surveys in the immediate area of CAS 02-23-11.  Measurements collected 
included exposure rates and FIDLER readings.  Removable alpha and beta/gamma 
contamination were also assessed.  Measurements were collected within the boundaries of 
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URMAs and around the perimeter of these areas.  Table 14 presents the results of these surveys 
(BN, 2000). 
TABLE 14. CONTAMINATED LAND SURVEY DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT 
TYPE
NUMBER OF 
MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
MINIMUM 
VALUE
AVERAGE
VALUE
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION
LIMIT
Removable Alpha 13 2 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 0.23 dpm/100 cm2 5 dpm/100 cm2
Removable Beta 13 10 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 1.2 dpm/100 cm2 16 dpm/100 cm2
Exposure Rate 13 15 uR/hr 10 uR/hr 12 uR/hr  20 uR/hr1
FIDLER 13 75 cps 40 cps 63 cps 100 cps
1 Procedurally, detection limit is not determined for this type of instrument.  Value reported is sensitivity 
All values were below detection limits.  These ground-based survey data consist of 
measurements that are focused in the post-test drilling areas in and around the URMAs, thereby 
augmenting the wide-area data collected via fly-over surveys.  These data provide an additional 
resource indicating that post-test drilling operations did not lead to surface soil contamination.
The NV/YMP RadCon Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004b) is used at the NTS to implement the 
requirements set forth in 10 CFR 835.  The manual allows for the release of areas from 
radiological controls when certain radiological limits are met.  The limits were established as 
acceptable levels for use by the general public and, thus, are conservative given the ongoing 
controls at CAS 02-23-11 and the lack of both public and worker access to the site.  Table 15 
outlines these release values.  BN (2000) survey measurements in the area of CAS 02-23-11 are 
well below the radiological control limits outlined in Table 15.   
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TABLE 15. SURFACE CONTAMINATION VALUES1 IN DPM/100 CM2
RADIONUCLIDE REMOVABLE2, 4 TOTAL (FIXED +REMOVABLE)2, 3
natural uranium, uranium-235, uranium-238, and associated decay 
products 1,0007 5,0007
transuranics, radium-226, radium-228, thorium-230, thorium-228, 
protactinium-231, actinium-227, iodine-125, and iodine-129 20 500 
natural thorium, thorium-232, strontium-90, radium-223, radium-224, 
uranium-232, iodine-126, iodine-131, and iodine-133 200 1,000 
beta-gamma emitters (nuclides with decay modes other than alpha 
emission or spontaneous fission), except strontium-90 and others 
noted above5 1,000 5,000 
tritium and tritiated compounds6 10,000 N/A
1 The values in this table, with the exception noted in footnote 5, apply to radioactive contamination deposited on, but not incorporated into the 
interior or matrix of, the contaminated item. Where surface contamination by both alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides exists, the limits 
established for alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides apply independently. 
2 As used in this table, dpm (disintegrations per minute) means the rate of emission by radioactive material as determined by correcting the 
counts per minute observed by an appropriate detector for background, efficiency, and geometric factors associated with the instrumentation. 
3 The levels may be averaged over 1 square meter provided the maximum surface activity in any area of 100 cm2 is less than three times the value 
specified. For purposes of averaging, any square meter of surface shall be considered to be above the surface contamination value if: (1) From 
measurements of a representative number of sections it is determined that the average contamination level exceeds the applicable value; or (2) it 
is determined that the sum of the activity of all isolated spots or particles in any 100 cm2 area exceeds three times the applicable value. 
4 The amount of removable radioactive material per 100 cm2 of surface area should be determined by swiping the area with dry filter or soft 
absorbent paper, applying moderate pressure, and then assessing the amount of radioactive material on the swipe with an appropriate instrument 
of known efficiency. (Note:  The use of dry material may not be appropriate for tritium.) When removable contamination on objects of surface 
area less than 100 cm2 is determined, the activity per unit area shall be based on the actual area and the entire surface shall be wiped. It is not 
necessary to use swiping techniques to measure removable contamination levels if direct scan surveys indicate that the total residual surface 
contamination levels are within the limits for removable contamination. 
5 This category of radionuclides includes mixed fission products, including the strontium-90 present in them. It does not apply to strontium-90 
which has been separated from the other fission products or mixtures where the strontium-90 has been enriched. 
6 Tritium contamination may diffuse into the volume or matrix of materials. Evaluation of surface contamination shall consider the extent to 
which such contamination may migrate to the surface in order to ensure the surface contamination value provided in this appendix is not 
exceeded. Once this contamination migrates to the surface, it may be removable, not fixed; therefore, a “Total” value does not apply. 
7 (alpha) 
2.7.3.3 RIDP Data
Several RIDP measurements were taken within 500 m of the SAPPHO site (Figure 7).  RIDP 
values were used to evaluate operational history and support the conclusion that the elevated 
exposure rate readings observed during the drilling operations did not indicate a widespread 
contaminant release.  RIDP measurements taken within 500 m of the SAPPHO site were 
evaluated against limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995) as explained in Section 2.2.4.3 
of this SAFER Plan.  Table 16 provides the maximum, minimum, and average values of these 
data and compares the maximum value to the limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995).
All values are well below these limits.  This evaluation is not intended as a formal dose 
assessment but as a means by which these data may be compared to evaluate the validity of the 
operational history release assumptions. 
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TABLE 16. RIDP DATA SUMMARY
RADIONUCLIDE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MINIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
AVERAGE
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MAX VALUE
FRACTION OF 
DCG
americium-241 3 44.44 39.92 41.52 0.02
barium-133 3 4.63 0.00 1.54 0.00
cobalt-60 3 1.23 0.50 0.80 0.00
cesium-137 3 405.12 84.19 218.56 0.12
europium-152 3 14.59 12.25 13.49 0.01
europium -154 3 12.91 8.64 10.51 0.01
europium -155 3 0.88 0.75 0.83 0.00
plutonium-238 3 112.96 18.14 66.24 0.02
plutonium -239 3 347.44 248.40 33.54 0.07
strontium-90 3 1025.03 155.78 463.77 0.01
Results for radionuclides measured by RIDP in the SAPPHO vicinity and at the non-operational 
areas where releases did not occur were compared.  The slightly elevated RIDP measurement 
was collected within the known contaminant plume of CAS 02-23-05 and is consistent with the 
operational history.  Therefore, these results support the process knowledge, Contaminated Land 
Report survey data, and fly-over data. 
2.7.4 CONCLUSION
The operational history indicates that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the 
detonation or subsequent activities at the SAPPHO site.  Therefore, without a credible exposure 
pathway, the potential for a worker to receive a dose greater than 25 mrem/yr in this area is not 
realistic.  This is supported by the 100-percent coverage fly-over survey data, focused 
measurements provided by the Contaminated Land Report survey data, and the RIDP data.  The 
low levels of contamination present are associated with SEDAN test. 
The site is in a stable condition and requires no additional controls.  Based on the information 
presented above, data are adequate to support a closure option of no further action.
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2.8 CAS 02-23-12, SCUTTLE CONTAMINATION AREA
CAS 02-23-12 was designated to address potential surface soil contamination associated with the
SCUTTLE underground nuclear detonation.  This site was recently added to the FFACO due to a 
radiological release during detonation of SCUTTLE (DOE/NV, 1996).  REECo (1991) does not 
provide information about this site.  The area is a potential subsidence crater and no stability 
study has been completed, so both access and future land use are limited.  The SCUTTLE 
detonation cavity is covered by the UGTA Sub-Project.  This area is posted as a URMA, likely 
due to the deep underground source term that resulted from the nuclear test (Johnston, 2007).   
2.8.1 OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The SCUTTLE test was part of Operation Mandrel and was conducted on November 13, 1969.  
The test had a yield of 1.7 kt.  SCUTTLE was detonated in emplacement hole U2bh (DOE/NV, 
2000).  Stationary radiation monitors were placed in an arc around the surface ground zero of the 
test.  The maximum gamma exposure rate measured on perimeter monitors was 600 mR/hr and 
occurred 19 minutes after the SCUTTLE detonation.  Approximately 3 hours later all these 
monitors recorded background levels of radioactivity.  A re-entry survey was conducted after the 
test, and the maximum gamma exposure rate measured was 10 R/hr.  No alpha contamination 
was detected during the re-entry survey.  The maximum gamma exposure rate measured during 
post-test operations was 1.5 mR/hr.  No alpha contamination was detected during post-test 
operations (REECo, 1973a). 
2.8.2 RELEASE INFORMATION
DOE/NV (1996) documented radiological releases from the detonation of the SCUTTLE 
weapons test but not from post-test drilling activities.  The release included rubidium-88, 
iodine-133, xenon-135, and cesium-138.  These are gaseous and volatile radionuclides with short 
half-lives and are not suspected to be present in the soil. The longest half-life of these 
radionuclides is approximately 5 days (Nuclear Data Center, 2006).  Elevated exposure rate 
readings were noted as a result of this release. Operational history indicates this type of elevated 
reading was typical when radiological releases occurred during detonation and is not a unique 
indicator of surface radiological contamination.  Furthermore, the measurements taken by the 
perimeter radiation monitors measured a large decrease in radioactivity approximately 3 hours 
after the test.  This indicates that the released material was dispersed quickly, decayed rapidly, 
and did not settle onto the surface soils in the area. 
2.8.3 HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
The following data were used to evaluate the potential surface release being investigated for 
CAS 02-23-12 and were used to determine the likelihood of a release to the surface soils in the 
area resulting from SCUTTLE operations. 
2.8.3.1 Fly-Over Data
The fly-over survey performed in 1994 shows low levels of detectable radioactivity (Hendricks 
and Riedhauser, 1999).  This CAS is located within the contaminant extent from the SEDAN test 
(CAS 10-45-01).  Thus, the low levels of radiological contamination detected in this area are not 
attributable to the SCUTTLE detonation but are related to the contamination extent of 
CAS 10-45-01, which will be addressed with a future CAU closure.  
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The fly-over survey process is well established and has been used at many sites to make the 
“yes-no” type of decision used in this SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2005).  The fly-over data have 
been used in a semi-quantitative way to support the conclusion made based on operational 
history that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of SCUTTLE operations.  There 
were 138 measurements collected within a 500-m radius of the surface ground zero of the 
SCUTTLE detonation (Figure 8).  While the fly-over data, depicted in Figure 8, are shown as 
points, the field of view of the detector is large; thus, the fly-over survey provided 100-percent 
coverage of this area.  These data were analyzed as provided in Proctor (1997) and Hendricks 
and Riedhauser (1999).  The results of the analyzed survey data are shown in Table 17.   
All measurements for americium-241 were below the detection limit, and 116 measurements for 
total man-made radioactivity were greater than the detection limit.  These measurements were 
made in the known, contiguous contaminant plume of CAS 10-45-01, and this area will be 
addressed with a future CAU closure.  However, as shown in Section 2.8.3.3, these data are also 
below the dose limit.
TABLE 17. FLY-OVER DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT TYPE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION LIMIT
NUMBER
MEASUREMENTS         
>DETECTION LIMIT
Total man-made 138 1.5 microR/hr 116 
americium-241 138 50 cps 0
The fly-over data presented above represent many individual measurements (referred to as point 
data), and each measurement is corrected for background radiation.  The fly-over survey process 
continuously collects background radiation levels then corrects each measurement to remove it, 
resulting in data that show the added man-made radiation resulting from testing or other 
activities.  The fly-over measurements for total man-made radiation are very sensitive, with the 
detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr.  Typical background exposure rates are approximately 
15 microR/hr.  Thus, the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr results in detection of man-made 
radiation that is greater than approximately 10 percent of natural background radiation.
The fly-over surveys have very good sensitivity for americium-241.  Americium-241 sensitivity 
is approximately 50 cps.  A specific correlation to soil concentration values was not performed; 
however, a conservative correlation of 50 cps to 300 nCi/m2 has been estimated by RSL based on 
other similar flights and the flight altitude of 200 ft.  This value, 300 nCi/m2, was then compared 
to RIDP measurements made in non-operational areas of the NTS where no local releases of 
radioactive material occurred to determine whether or not the fly-over survey is capable of 
discerning levels of radioactivity indicative of a widespread radiological release.  Since the RIDP 
values in the non-operational areas range from 24 to 573 nCi/m2 and the fly-over sensitivity is 
approximately 300 nCi/m2, this shows that the fly-over survey is capable of discerning where 
operational releases have occurred.  No americium-241 fly-over survey measurements were 
greater than the detection limit, similar to the non-operational areas of the NTS.  These data 
confirm that there was not a widespread release to surface soils.
2.8.3.2 Contaminated Land Report Data
Results of the surveys conducted in support of BN (2000) were used qualitatively to support the 
conclusions gleaned from the operational history.  The surveys conducted for BN (2000) 
included radiological surveys in the immediate area of CAS 02-23-12.  Measurements collected 
included exposure rates and FIDLER readings.  Removable alpha and beta/gamma 
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contamination were also assessed.  Measurements were collected within the boundaries of 
URMAs and around the perimeter of these areas.  Table 18 presents the results of these surveys 
(BN, 2000). 
TABLE 18. CONTAMINATED LAND SURVEY DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT 
TYPE
NUMBER OF 
MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
MINIMUM 
VALUE
AVERAGE
VALUE
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION
LIMIT
Removable Alpha 8 2 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 0.8 dpm/100 cm2 5 dpm/100 cm2
Removable Beta 8 3 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 0.5 dpm/100 cm2 16 dpm/100 cm2
Exposure Rate 8 20 uR/hr 10 uR/hr 16 uR/hr  20 uR/hr1
FIDLER 8 90 cps 70 cps 75 cps 100 cps
1 Procedurally, detection limit is not determined for this type of instrument.  Value reported is sensitivity 
All values were below detection limits.  These ground-based survey data consist of 
measurements that are focused in the post-test drilling areas in and around the URMAs, thereby 
augmenting the wide-area data collected via fly-over surveys.  These data provide an additional 
resource indicating that post-test drilling operations did not lead to surface soil contamination.
The NV/YMP RadCon Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004b) is used at the NTS to implement the 
requirements set forth in 10 CFR 835.  The manual allows for the release of areas from 
radiological controls when certain radiological limits are met.  The limits were established as 
acceptable levels for use by the general public and, thus, are conservative given the ongoing 
controls at CAS 02-23-12 and the lack of both public and worker access to the site.  Table 19 
outlines these release values.  BN (2000) survey measurements in the area of CAS 02-23-12 are 
well below the radiological control limits outlined in Table 19.   
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TABLE 19. SURFACE CONTAMINATION VALUES1 IN DPM/100 CM2
RADIONUCLIDE REMOVABLE2, 4 TOTAL (FIXED +REMOVABLE)2, 3
natural uranium, uranium-235, uranium-238, and associated decay 
products 1,0007 5,0007
transuranics, radium-226, radium-228, thorium-230, thorium-228, 
protactinium-231, actinium-227, iodine-125, and iodine-129 20 500 
natural thorium, thorium-232, strontium-90, radium-223, radium-
224, uranium-232, iodine-126, iodine-131, and iodine-133 200 1,000 
beta-gamma emitters (nuclides with decay modes other than alpha 
emission or spontaneous fission), except strontium-90 and others 
noted above5 1,000 5,000 
tritium and tritiated compounds6 10,000 N/A
1 The values in this table, with the exception noted in footnote 5, apply to radioactive contamination deposited on, but not incorporated into the 
interior or matrix of, the contaminated item. Where surface contamination by both alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides exists, the limits 
established for alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides apply independently. 
2 As used in this table, dpm (disintegrations per minute) means the rate of emission by radioactive material as determined by correcting the 
counts per minute observed by an appropriate detector for background, efficiency, and geometric factors associated with the instrumentation. 
3 The levels may be averaged over 1 square meter provided the maximum surface activity in any area of 100 cm2 is less than three times the value 
specified. For purposes of averaging, any square meter of surface shall be considered to be above the surface contamination value if: (1) From 
measurements of a representative number of sections it is determined that the average contamination level exceeds the applicable value; or (2) it 
is determined that the sum of the activity of all isolated spots or particles in any 100 cm2 area exceeds three times the applicable value. 
4 The amount of removable radioactive material per 100 cm2 of surface area should be determined by swiping the area with dry filter or soft 
absorbent paper, applying moderate pressure, and then assessing the amount of radioactive material on the swipe with an appropriate instrument 
of known efficiency. (Note:  The use of dry material may not be appropriate for tritium.) When removable contamination on objects of surface 
area less than 100 cm2 is determined, the activity per unit area shall be based on the actual area and the entire surface shall be wiped. It is not 
necessary to use swiping techniques to measure removable contamination levels if direct scan surveys indicate that the total residual surface 
contamination levels are within the limits for removable contamination. 
5 This category of radionuclides includes mixed fission products, including the strontium-90 present in them. It does not apply to strontium-90 
which has been separated from the other fission products or mixtures where the strontium-90 has been enriched. 
6 Tritium contamination may diffuse into the volume or matrix of materials. Evaluation of surface contamination shall consider the extent to 
which such contamination may migrate to the surface in order to ensure the surface contamination value provided in this appendix is not 
exceeded. Once this contamination migrates to the surface, it may be removable, not fixed; therefore, a “Total” value does not apply. 
7 (alpha) 
2.8.3.3 RIDP Data
Several RIDP measurements were taken within 500 m of the SCUTTLE site (Figure 8).  RIDP 
values were used to evaluate operational history and support the conclusion that the elevated 
exposure rate readings observed during the drilling operations did not indicate a widespread 
contaminant release.  RIDP measurements taken within 500 m of the SCUTTLE site were 
evaluated against limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995) as explained in Section 2.2.4.3 
of this SAFER Plan.  Table 20 provides the maximum, minimum, and average values of these 
data and compares the maximum value to the limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995).
All values are well below these limits.  This evaluation is not intended as a formal dose 
assessment but as a means by which these data may be compared to evaluate the validity of the 
operational history release assumptions. 
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TABLE 20. RIDP DATA SUMMARY
RADIONUCLIDE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MINIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
AVERAGE
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MAX VALUE
FRACTION OF 
DCG
americium-241 3 129.52 49.75 79.81 0.05
cobalt-60 3 2.03 0.58 1.13 0.00
cesium-134 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
cesium-137 3 916.84 112.19 552.80 0.28
europium-152 3 19.59 8.83 14.74 0.01
europium-154 3 12.23 5.76 9.97 0.01
europium-155 3 2.05 1.16 1.53 0.00
lutetium-174 3 0.60 0.23 0.37 0.00
plutonium-238 3 110.08 42.29 67.84 0.02
plutonium-239 3 741.95 284.96 457.19 0.14
rhodium-101 3 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.00
ruthenium-106 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
antimony-125 3 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.00
strontium-90 3 732.01 89.58 441.36 0.00
Results for radionuclides measured by RIDP in the SCUTTLE vicinity and at the 
non-operational areas where releases did not occur were compared.  One slightly elevated RIDP 
measurement was collected within the known contaminant plume of CAS 10-45-01 and is 
consistent with the operational history.  Therefore, these results support the process knowledge, 
Contaminated Land Report survey data, and fly-over data. 
2.8.4 CONCLUSION
The operational history indicates that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the 
detonation or subsequent activities at the SCUTTLE site.  Therefore, without a credible exposure 
pathway, the potential for a worker to receive a dose greater than 25 mrem/yr in this area is not 
realistic.  This is supported by the 100-percent coverage fly-over survey data, focused 
measurements provided by the Contaminated Land Report survey data, and the RIDP data.  The 
low levels of contamination present are associated with the SEDAN test. 
The site is in a stable condition and requires no additional controls.  Based on the information 
presented above, data are adequate to support a closure option of no further action.
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2.9 CAS 03-23-24, SEAWEED B CONTAMINATION AREA
CAS 03-23-24 was designated to address potential surface soil contamination associated with the
SEAWEED B underground nuclear weapon detonation.  This site was added to the FFACO in 
2006 due to a radiological release during the detonation of SEAWEED B (DOE/NV, 1996).  
REECo (1991) does not provide information about this site.  The SEAWEED B detonation did 
not form a subsidence crater.  The area is a potential crater area and no stability study has been 
completed, so both access and future land use are limited.  The SEAWEED B detonation cavity 
is covered by the UGTA Sub-Project. 
2.9.1 OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The SEAWEED B test was part of Operation Mandrel and was conducted on October 16, 1969.
The test had a yield of less than 20 kt. SEAWEED B was detonated in emplacement hole 
U3hk-d (DOE/NV, 2000).  Stationary radiation monitors were placed in an arc around the 
surface ground zero of the test.  The maximum gamma exposure rate measured was 10.5 R/hr.  A 
re-entry survey was conducted after the test, and the maximum gamma exposure rate measured 
was 0.5 mR/hr.  No alpha contamination was detected (REECo, 1973a).  No post-test drilling 
was conducted for the SEAWEED B test (RSN, 1991). 
2.9.2 RELEASE INFORMATION
DOE/NV (1996) documented radiological releases from the detonation of the SEAWEED B 
weapons test.  The releases included xenon-138.  Xenon-138 is a gaseous radionuclide with a 
short half-life and is not suspected to be present in the soil.  The half-life of this radionuclide is 
approximately 14 minutes (Nuclear Data Center, 2006).  Elevated exposure rate readings were 
noted as a result of this release.  Operational history indicates this type of elevated reading was 
typical when radiological releases occurred during detonation and is not a unique indicator of 
surface radiological contamination.  Furthermore, the measurements taken by the stationary 
monitors during the detonation and the subsequent measurements taken during the post-test 
re-entry survey showed a large decrease in radioactivity minutes after the test.  This indicates 
that the released material was dispersed quickly, decayed rapidly, and did not settle onto the 
surface soils in the area. 
2.9.3 HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
The following data were used to evaluate the potential surface release being investigated for 
CAS 03-23-24 and were used to determine the likelihood of a release to the surface soils in the 
area resulting from SEAWEED B operations. 
2.9.3.1 Fly-Over Data
The fly-over survey performed in 1994 does not show detectable levels of radionuclides in the 
area of this CAS and does not identify any nearby areas as ROIs (Hendricks and Riedhauser, 
1999).  The fly-over survey process is well established and has been used at many sites to make 
the “yes-no” type of decision used in this SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2005).  The fly-over data 
have been used in a semi-quantitative way to support the conclusion made based on operational 
history that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the SEAWEED B detonation or 
associated activities.  There were 137 measurements collected within a 500-m radius of the 
SEAWEED B detonation (Figure 9).  While the fly-over data, depicted in Figure 9, are shown as 
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points, the field of view of the detector is large; thus, the fly-over survey provided 100-percent 
coverage of this area.  These data were analyzed as provided in Proctor (1997) and Hendricks 
and Riedhauser (1999).  The results of the analyzed survey data are shown in Table 21.  All 
measurements were less than the detection limit of the instrumentation.
TABLE 21. FLY-OVER DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT TYPE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION LIMIT
NUMBER
MEASUREMENTS         
>DETECTION LIMIT
Total man-made 137 1.5 microR/hr 0
americium-241 137 50 cps 0
The fly-over data presented above represent many individual measurements (referred to as point 
data), and each measurement is corrected for background radiation.  The fly-over survey process 
continuously collects background radiation levels then corrects each measurement to remove it, 
resulting in data that show the added man-made radiation resulting from testing or other 
activities.  The fly-over measurements for total man-made radiation are very sensitive, with the 
detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr.  Typical background exposure rates are approximately 
15 microR/hr. Thus, the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr results in detection of man-made 
radiation that is greater than approximately 10 percent of natural background radiation.
The fly-over surveys have very good sensitivity for americium-241.  Americium-241 sensitivity 
is approximately 50 cps.  A specific correlation to soil concentration values was not performed; 
however, a conservative correlation of 50 cps to 300 nCi/m2 has been estimated by RSL based on 
other similar flights and the flight altitude of 200 ft.  This value, 300 nCi/m2, was then compared 
to RIDP measurements made in non-operational areas of the NTS where no local releases of 
radioactive material occurred to determine whether or not the fly-over survey is capable of 
discerning levels of radioactivity indicative of a widespread radiological release.  Since the RIDP 
values in the non-operational areas range from 24 to 573 nCi/m2 and the fly-over sensitivity is 
approximately 300 nCi/m2, this shows that the fly-over survey is capable of discerning where 
operational releases have occurred.  No americium-241 fly-over survey measurements were 
greater than the detection limit, similar to the non-operational areas of the NTS.  These data 
confirm that there was not a widespread release to surface soils.
2.9.3.2 Contaminated Land Report Data
Results of the surveys conducted in support of BN (2000) were used qualitatively to support the 
conclusions gleaned from the operational history.  The surveys conducted for BN (2000) 
included radiological surveys in the immediate area of CAS 03-23-24.  Measurements collected 
included exposure rates and FIDLER readings.  Removable alpha and beta/gamma 
contamination were also assessed.  Measurements were collected within the boundaries of 
URMAs and around the perimeter of these areas.  Table 22 presents the results of these surveys 
(BN, 2000). 
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TABLE 22. CONTAMINATED LAND SURVEY DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT 
TYPE
NUMBER OF 
MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
MINIMUM 
VALUE
AVERAGE
VALUE
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION
LIMIT
Removable Alpha 5 5 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 1.4 dpm/100 cm2 5 dpm/100 cm2
Removable Beta 5 0 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 16 dpm/100 cm2
Exposure Rate 5 15 uR/hr 15 uR/hr 15 uR/hr  20 uR/hr1
FIDLER 5 70 cps 60 cps 65 cps 100 cps
1 Procedurally, detection limit is not determined for this type of instrument.  Value reported is sensitivity 
All values were below detection limits.  These ground-based survey data consist of 
measurements that are focused in the immediate area of the CAS, thereby augmenting the 
wide-area data collected via fly-over surveys.  These data provide an additional resource 
indicating that SEAWEED B operations did not lead to surface soil contamination.   
The NV/YMP RadCon Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004b) is used at the NTS to implement the 
requirements set forth in 10 CFR 835.  The manual allows for the release of areas from 
radiological controls when certain radiological limits are met.  The limits were established as 
acceptable levels for use by the general public and, thus, are conservative given the ongoing 
controls at CAS 03-23-24 and the lack of both public and worker access to the site.  Table 23 
outlines these release values.  BN (2000) survey measurements in the area of CAS 03-23-24 are 
well below the radiological control limits outlined in Table 23.   
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TABLE 23. SURFACE CONTAMINATION VALUES1 IN DPM/100 CM2
RADIONUCLIDE REMOVABLE2, 4 TOTAL (FIXED +REMOVABLE)2, 3
natural uranium, uranium-235, uranium-238, and associated decay 
products 1,0007 5,0007
transuranics, radium-226, radium-228, thorium-230, thorium-228, 
protactinium-231, actinium-227, iodine-125, and iodine-129 20 500 
natural thorium, thorium-232, strontium-90, radium-223, radium-
224, uranium-232, iodine-126, iodine-131, and iodine-133 200 1,000 
beta-gamma emitters (nuclides with decay modes other than alpha 
emission or spontaneous fission), except strontium-90 and others 
noted above5 1,000 5,000 
tritium and tritiated compounds6 10,000 N/A
1 The values in this table, with the exception noted in footnote 5, apply to radioactive contamination deposited on, but not incorporated into the 
interior or matrix of, the contaminated item. Where surface contamination by both alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides exists, the limits 
established for alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides apply independently. 
2 As used in this table, dpm (disintegrations per minute) means the rate of emission by radioactive material as determined by correcting the 
counts per minute observed by an appropriate detector for background, efficiency, and geometric factors associated with the instrumentation. 
3 The levels may be averaged over 1 square meter provided the maximum surface activity in any area of 100 cm2 is less than three times the value 
specified. For purposes of averaging, any square meter of surface shall be considered to be above the surface contamination value if: (1) From 
measurements of a representative number of sections it is determined that the average contamination level exceeds the applicable value; or (2) it 
is determined that the sum of the activity of all isolated spots or particles in any 100 cm2 area exceeds three times the applicable value. 
4 The amount of removable radioactive material per 100 cm2 of surface area should be determined by swiping the area with dry filter or soft 
absorbent paper, applying moderate pressure, and then assessing the amount of radioactive material on the swipe with an appropriate instrument 
of known efficiency. (Note:  The use of dry material may not be appropriate for tritium.) When removable contamination on objects of surface 
area less than 100 cm2 is determined, the activity per unit area shall be based on the actual area and the entire surface shall be wiped. It is not 
necessary to use swiping techniques to measure removable contamination levels if direct scan surveys indicate that the total residual surface 
contamination levels are within the limits for removable contamination. 
5 This category of radionuclides includes mixed fission products, including the strontium-90 present in them. It does not apply to strontium-90 
which has been separated from the other fission products or mixtures where the strontium-90 has been enriched. 
6 Tritium contamination may diffuse into the volume or matrix of materials. Evaluation of surface contamination shall consider the extent to 
which such contamination may migrate to the surface in order to ensure the surface contamination value provided in this appendix is not 
exceeded. Once this contamination migrates to the surface, it may be removable, not fixed; therefore, a “Total” value does not apply. 
7 (alpha) 
2.9.3.3 RIDP Data
The RIDP did not include the area of this CAS because radiological contamination was not 
suspected in this area (McArthur and Mead, 1987).  Figure 9 shows the single RIDP 
measurement collected in the vicinity of this CAS, indicating an NTS worker dose of less than 
25 mrem/yr. 
2.9.4 CONCLUSION
The operational history indicates that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the 
detonation or subsequent activities at the SEAWEED B site.  Therefore, without a credible 
exposure pathway, the potential for a worker to receive a dose greater than 25 mrem/yr in this 
area is not realistic.  This is supported by the 100-percent coverage fly-over survey data and 
focused measurements provided by Contaminated Land Report survey data.  
The site is in a stable condition and requires no additional controls.  Based on the information 
presented above, data are adequate to support a closure option of no further action.
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2.10 CAS 03-23-27, ADZE CONTAMINATION AREA
CAS 03-23-27 was designated to address potential surface soil contamination associated with the
ADZE underground nuclear weapons test.  This site was recently added to the FFACO based on 
post-test cable pull activities (REECo, 1973a).  This CAS consists of a berm historically 
identified as being radiologically contaminated (REECo, 1995).  The ADZE test did not form a 
subsidence crater.  The area is a potential subsidence crater and no stability study has been 
completed, so both access and future land use are limited.  The ADZE detonation cavity is 
covered by the UGTA Sub-Project.  This area is posted as a URMA, likely due to the deep 
underground source term that resulted from the nuclear test (Johnston, 2007).   
2.10.1OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The ADZE test was part of Operation Crosstie and was conducted on May 28, 1968.  The test 
had a yield of less than 20 kt.  ADZE was detonated in emplacement hole U3fw (DOE/NV, 
2000).  Radiological contamination was suspected to be present from post-test cable pull 
operations.  The maximum gamma exposure rate measured during the cable pull operation was 
60 R/hr on the cable.  No alpha contamination was detected (REECo, 1973a).  The cable has 
been previously removed from the ADZE location.  
2.10.2RELEASE INFORMATION
DOE/NV (1996) documented radiological releases resulting from the cable pull operations for 
the ADZE test.  The releases included iodine-133, iodine-135, and xenon-138.  These are 
gaseous radionuclides with short half-lives and are not expected to be present in the soil.  The 
longest half-life of these radionuclides is approximately 57 days (Nuclear Data Center, 2006).  
Elevated exposure rate readings were noted during the cable pull operations.  Operational history 
indicates this type of elevated reading was typical of post-test cable pulls and is not a unique 
indicator of surface radiological contamination.  The cable pull operation allowed gaseous 
radionuclides to escape.  These gases diffused quickly and did not settle onto surface soils, 
explaining why no contamination was detected in environmental samples (Kathren, 1984). 
2.10.3HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
The following data were used to evaluate the potential surface release being investigated for 
CAS 03-23-27 and were used to determine the likelihood of a release to the surface soils in the 
area resulting from ADZE operations. 
2.10.3.1 Fly-Over Data
The fly-over survey performed in 1994 does not show detectable levels of radionuclides in the 
area of this CAS and does not identify any nearby areas as ROIs (Hendricks and Riedhauser, 
1999).  The fly-over survey process is well established and has been used at many sites to make 
the “yes-no” type of decision used in this SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2005).  The fly-over data 
have been used in a semi-quantitative way to support the conclusion made based on operational 
history that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the ADZE detonation or 
associated activities.  There were 140 measurements collected within a 500-m radius of the 
ADZE detonation (Figure 10). While the fly-over data, depicted in Figure 10, are shown as 
points, the field of view of the detector is large; thus, the fly-over survey provided 100-percent 
coverage of this area.  These data were analyzed as provided in Proctor (1997) and Hendricks 
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and Riedhauser (1999).  The results of the analyzed survey data are shown in Table 24.  All 
measurements were less than the detection limit of the instrumentation.
TABLE 24. FLY-OVER DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT TYPE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION LIMIT
NUMBER
MEASUREMENTS         
>DETECTION LIMIT
Total man-made 140 1.5 microR/hr 0
americium-241 140 50 cps 0
The fly-over data presented above represent many individual measurements (referred to as point 
data), and each measurement is corrected for background radiation.  The fly-over survey process 
continuously collects background radiation levels then corrects each measurement to remove it, 
resulting in data that show the added man-made radiation resulting from testing or other 
activities.  The fly-over measurements for total man-made radiation are very sensitive, with the 
detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr.  Typical background exposure rates are approximately 
15 microR/hr.  Thus, the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr results in detection of man-made 
radiation that is greater than approximately 10 percent of natural background radiation.
The fly-over surveys have very good sensitivity for americium-241.  Americium-241 sensitivity 
is approximately 50 cps.  A specific correlation to soil concentration values was not performed; 
however, a conservative correlation of 50 cps to 300 nCi/m2 has been estimated by RSL based on 
other similar flights and the flight altitude of 200 ft.  This value, 300 nCi/m2, was then compared 
to RIDP measurements made in non-operational areas of the NTS where no local releases of 
radioactive material occurred to determine whether or not the fly-over survey is capable of 
discerning levels of radioactivity indicative of a widespread radiological release.  Since the RIDP 
values in the non-operational areas range from 24 to 573 nCi/m2 and the fly-over sensitivity is 
approximately 300 nCi/m2, this shows that the fly-over survey is capable of discerning where 
operational releases have occurred.  No americium-241 fly-over survey measurements were 
greater than the detection limit, similar to the non-operational areas of the NTS.  These data 
confirm that there was not a widespread release to surface soils.
2.10.3.2 Contaminated Land Report Data
Results of the surveys conducted in support of BN (2000) were used qualitatively to support the 
conclusions gleaned from the operational history.  The surveys conducted for BN (2000) 
included radiological surveys in the immediate area of CAS 03-23-27.  Measurements collected 
included exposure rates and FIDLER readings.  Removable alpha and beta/gamma 
contamination were also assessed.  Measurements were collected along the perimeter of the 
URMA.  Table 25 presents the results of these surveys (BN, 2000). 
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TABLE 25. CONTAMINATED LAND SURVEY DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT 
TYPE
NUMBER OF 
MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
MINIMUM 
VALUE
AVERAGE
VALUE
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION
LIMIT
Removable Alpha 11 5 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 1.2 dpm/100 cm2 5 dpm/100 cm2
Removable Beta 11 11 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 16 dpm/100 cm2
Exposure Rate 11 15 uR/hr 10 uR/hr 11 uR/hr  20 uR/hr1
FIDLER 11 75 cps 40 cps 64 cps 100 cps
1 Procedurally, detection limit is not determined for this type of instrument.  Value reported is sensitivity 
All values were below detection limits.  These ground-based survey data consist of 
measurements that are focused in the area of the CAS, thereby augmenting the wide-area data 
collected via fly-over surveys.  These data provide an additional resource indicating that ADZE 
operations did not lead to surface soil contamination.   
The NV/YMP RadCon Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004b) is used at the NTS to implement the 
requirements set forth in 10 CFR 835.  The manual allows for the release of areas from 
radiological controls when certain radiological limits are met.  The limits were established as 
acceptable levels for use by the general public and, thus, are conservative given the ongoing 
controls at CAS 03-23-24 and the lack of both public and worker access to the site.  Table 26 
outlines these release values.  BN (2000) survey measurements in the area of CAS 03-23-27 are 
well below the radiological control limits outlined in Table 26.   
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TABLE 26. SURFACE CONTAMINATION VALUES1 IN DPM/100 CM2
RADIONUCLIDE REMOVABLE2, 4 TOTAL (FIXED +REMOVABLE)2, 3
natural uranium, uranium-235, uranium-238, and associated decay 
products 1,0007 5,0007
transuranics, radium-226, radium-228, thorium-230, thorium-228, 
protactinium-231, actinium-227, iodine-125, and iodine-129 20 500 
natural thorium, thorium-232, strontium-90, radium-223, radium-
224, uranium-232, iodine-126, iodine-131, and iodine-133 200 1,000 
beta-gamma emitters (nuclides with decay modes other than alpha 
emission or spontaneous fission), except strontium-90 and others 
noted above5 1,000 5,000 
tritium and tritiated compounds6 10,000 N/A
1 The values in this table, with the exception noted in footnote 5, apply to radioactive contamination deposited on, but not incorporated into the 
interior or matrix of, the contaminated item. Where surface contamination by both alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides exists, the limits 
established for alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides apply independently. 
2 As used in this table, dpm (disintegrations per minute) means the rate of emission by radioactive material as determined by correcting the 
counts per minute observed by an appropriate detector for background, efficiency, and geometric factors associated with the instrumentation. 
3 The levels may be averaged over 1 square meter provided the maximum surface activity in any area of 100 cm2 is less than three times the value 
specified. For purposes of averaging, any square meter of surface shall be considered to be above the surface contamination value if: (1) From 
measurements of a representative number of sections it is determined that the average contamination level exceeds the applicable value; or (2) it 
is determined that the sum of the activity of all isolated spots or particles in any 100 cm2 area exceeds three times the applicable value. 
4 The amount of removable radioactive material per 100 cm2 of surface area should be determined by swiping the area with dry filter or soft 
absorbent paper, applying moderate pressure, and then assessing the amount of radioactive material on the swipe with an appropriate instrument 
of known efficiency. (Note:  The use of dry material may not be appropriate for tritium.) When removable contamination on objects of surface 
area less than 100 cm2 is determined, the activity per unit area shall be based on the actual area and the entire surface shall be wiped. It is not 
necessary to use swiping techniques to measure removable contamination levels if direct scan surveys indicate that the total residual surface 
contamination levels are within the limits for removable contamination. 
5 This category of radionuclides includes mixed fission products, including the strontium-90 present in them. It does not apply to strontium-90 
which has been separated from the other fission products or mixtures where the strontium-90 has been enriched. 
6 Tritium contamination may diffuse into the volume or matrix of materials. Evaluation of surface contamination shall consider the extent to 
which such contamination may migrate to the surface in order to ensure the surface contamination value provided in this appendix is not 
exceeded. Once this contamination migrates to the surface, it may be removable, not fixed; therefore, a “Total” value does not apply. 
7 (alpha) 
2.10.3.3 RIDP Data
The RIDP did not include the area of this CAS because radiological contamination was not 
suspected in this area (McArthur and Mead, 1987).  Figure 10 shows the single RIDP 
measurement collected in the vicinity of this CAS, indicating an NTS worker dose of less than 
25 mrem/yr. 
2.10.4CONCLUSION
The operational history indicates that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the 
detonation or subsequent activities at the ADZE site.  Therefore, without a credible exposure 
pathway, the potential for a worker to receive a dose greater than 25 mrem/yr in this area is not 
realistic.  This is supported by the 100-percent coverage fly-over survey data and Contaminated 
Land Report radiological surveys.
The site is in a stable condition and requires no additional controls.  Based on the information 
presented above, data are adequate to support a closure option of no further action.
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2.11 CAS 03-23-28, MANZANAS CONTAMINATION AREA
CAS 03-23-28 was designated to address potential surface soil contamination associated with the 
MANZANAS underground nuclear weapons test.  The site was recently added to the FFACO 
due to a radiological release during detonation of the MANZANAS test (DOE/NV, 1996).
REECo (1991) does not provide information about this site.  The MANZANAS test did not form 
a subsidence crater.  The area is a potential subsidence crater and no stability study has been 
completed, so both access and future land use are limited.  The MANZANAS detonation cavity 
is covered by the UGTA Sub-Project.  This area is posted as a URMA, likely due to the deep 
underground source term that resulted from the nuclear test (Johnston, 2007). 
2.11.1OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The MANZANAS test was part of Operation Mandrel and was conducted on May 21, 1970.  The 
test had a yield of less than 20 kt.  MANZANAS was detonated in emplacement hole U3gr 
(DOE/NV, 2000).  Stationary radiation monitors were placed in an arc around the surface ground 
zero.  The maximum gamma exposure rate measured was 45 mR/hr.  A re-entry survey was 
conducted after the test and measured background levels of radioactivity and detected no alpha 
contamination.  Post-test drilling documentation does not indicate any abnormal events that may 
have caused surface contamination (REECo, 1973a). 
2.11.2RELEASE INFORMATION
DOE/NV (1996) documented radiological releases from the detonation of the MANZANAS 
weapons test but not from post-test drilling activities.  Elevated exposure rate readings were 
noted as a result of this release.  Operational history indicates this type of elevated reading was 
typical when radiological releases occurred during detonation and is not a unique indicator of 
surface radiological contamination.  Furthermore, the measurements taken by the stationary 
monitors during the detonation and the subsequent measurements taken during the post-test 
re-entry survey showed a large decrease in radioactivity minutes after the test.  This indicates 
that the released material was dispersed quickly, decayed rapidly, and did not settle onto the 
surface soils in the area. 
2.11.3HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
The following data were used to evaluate the potential surface release being investigated for 
CAS 03-23-28 and were used to determine the likelihood of a release to the surface soils in the 
area resulting from MANZANAS operations. 
2.11.3.1 Fly-Over Data
The fly-over survey performed in 1994 does not show detectable levels of radionuclides in the 
area of this CAS and does not identify any nearby areas as ROIs (Hendricks and Riedhauser, 
1999).  The fly-over survey process is well established and has been used at many sites to make 
the “yes-no” type of decision used in this SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2005).  The fly-over data 
have been used in a semi-quantitative way to support the conclusion made based on operational 
history that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the MANZANAS detonation or 
associated activities.  There were 136 measurements collected within a 500-m radius of the 
MANZANAS detonation (Figure 11).  While the fly-over data, depicted in Figure 11, are shown 
as points, the field of view of the detector is large; thus, the fly-over survey provided 100-percent 
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coverage of this area.  These data were analyzed as provided in Proctor (1997) and Hendricks 
and Riedhauser (1999).  The results of the analyzed survey data are shown in Table 27.  All 
measurements were less than the detection limit of the instrumentation.
TABLE 27. FLY-OVER DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT TYPE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION LIMIT
NUMBER
MEASUREMENTS         
>DETECTION LIMIT
Total man-made 136 1.5 microR/hr 0
americium-241 136 50 cps 0
The fly-over data presented above represent many individual measurements (referred to as point 
data), and each measurement is corrected for background radiation.  The fly-over survey process 
continuously collects background radiation levels then corrects each measurement to remove it, 
resulting in data that show the added man-made radiation resulting from testing or other 
activities.  The fly-over measurements for total man-made radiation are very sensitive, with the 
detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr.  Typical background exposure rates are approximately 
15 microR/hr.  Thus, the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr results in detection of man-made 
radiation that is greater than approximately 10 percent of natural background radiation.
The fly-over surveys have very good sensitivity for americium-241.  Americium-241 sensitivity 
is approximately 50 cps.  A specific correlation to soil concentration values was not performed; 
however, a conservative correlation of 50 cps to 300 nCi/m2 has been estimated by RSL based on 
other similar flights and the flight altitude of 200 ft.  This value, 300 nCi/m2, was then compared 
to RIDP measurements made in non-operational areas of the NTS where no local releases of 
radioactive material occurred to determine whether or not the fly-over survey is capable of 
discerning levels of radioactivity indicative of a widespread radiological release.  Since the RIDP 
values in the non-operational areas range from 24 to 573 nCi/m2 and the fly-over sensitivity is 
approximately 300 nCi/m2, this shows that the fly-over survey is capable of discerning where 
operational releases have occurred.  No americium-241 fly-over survey measurements were 
greater than the detection limit, similar to the non-operational areas of the NTS.  These data 
confirm that there was not a widespread release to surface soils.
2.11.3.2 Contaminated Land Report Data
Results of the surveys conducted in support of BN (2000) were used qualitatively to support the 
conclusions gleaned from the operational history.  The surveys conducted for BN (2000) 
included radiological surveys in the immediate area of CAS 03-23-28.  Measurements collected 
included exposure rates and FIDLER readings.  Removable alpha and beta/gamma 
contamination were also assessed.  Measurements were collected along the perimeter of the 
URMA.  Table 28 presents the results of these surveys (BN, 2000). 
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TABLE 28. CONTAMINATED LAND SURVEY DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT 
TYPE
NUMBER OF 
MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
MINIMUM 
VALUE
AVERAGE
VALUE
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION
LIMIT
Removable Alpha 14 5 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 1 dpm/100 cm2 5 dpm/100 cm2
Removable Beta 14 19 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 1.6 dpm/100 cm2 16 dpm/100 cm2
Exposure Rate 14 15 uR/hr 10 uR/hr 11 uR/hr  20 uR/hr1
FIDLER 14 95 cps 80 cps 89 cps 100 cps
1 Procedurally, detection limit is not determined for this type of instrument.  Value reported is sensitivity 
All values were below detection limits.  These ground-based survey data consist of 
measurements that are focused in the area of the CAS, thereby augmenting the wide-area data 
collected via fly-over surveys.  These data provide an additional resource indicating that 
MANZANAS operations did not lead to surface soil contamination.   
The NV/YMP RadCon Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004b) is used at the NTS to implement the 
requirements set forth in 10 CFR 835.  The manual allows for the release of areas from 
radiological controls when certain radiological limits are met.  The limits were established as 
acceptable levels for use by the general public and, thus, are conservative given the ongoing 
controls at CAS 03-23-28 and the lack of both public and worker access to the site.  Table 29 
outlines these release values.  BN (2000) survey measurements in the area of CAS 03-23-28 are 
well below the radiological control limits outlined in Table 29.   
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TABLE 29. SURFACE CONTAMINATION VALUES1 IN DPM/100 CM2
RADIONUCLIDE REMOVABLE2, 4 TOTAL (FIXED +REMOVABLE)2, 3
natural uranium, uranium-235, uranium-238, and associated decay 
products 1,0007 5,0007
transuranics, radium-226, radium-228, thorium-230, thorium-228, 
protactinium-231, actinium-227, iodine-125, and iodine-129 20 500 
natural thorium, thorium-232, strontium-90, radium-223, radium-
224, uranium-232, iodine-126, iodine-131, and iodine-133 200 1,000 
beta-gamma emitters (nuclides with decay modes other than alpha 
emission or spontaneous fission), except strontium-90 and others 
noted above5 1,000 5,000 
tritium and tritiated compounds6 10,000 N/A
1 The values in this table, with the exception noted in footnote 5, apply to radioactive contamination deposited on, but not incorporated into the 
interior or matrix of, the contaminated item. Where surface contamination by both alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides exists, the limits 
established for alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides apply independently. 
2 As used in this table, dpm (disintegrations per minute) means the rate of emission by radioactive material as determined by correcting the 
counts per minute observed by an appropriate detector for background, efficiency, and geometric factors associated with the instrumentation. 
3 The levels may be averaged over 1 square meter provided the maximum surface activity in any area of 100 cm2 is less than three times the value 
specified. For purposes of averaging, any square meter of surface shall be considered to be above the surface contamination value if: (1) From 
measurements of a representative number of sections it is determined that the average contamination level exceeds the applicable value; or (2) it 
is determined that the sum of the activity of all isolated spots or particles in any 100 cm2 area exceeds three times the applicable value. 
4 The amount of removable radioactive material per 100 cm2 of surface area should be determined by swiping the area with dry filter or soft 
absorbent paper, applying moderate pressure, and then assessing the amount of radioactive material on the swipe with an appropriate instrument 
of known efficiency. (Note:  The use of dry material may not be appropriate for tritium.) When removable contamination on objects of surface 
area less than 100 cm2 is determined, the activity per unit area shall be based on the actual area and the entire surface shall be wiped. It is not 
necessary to use swiping techniques to measure removable contamination levels if direct scan surveys indicate that the total residual surface 
contamination levels are within the limits for removable contamination. 
5 This category of radionuclides includes mixed fission products, including the strontium-90 present in them. It does not apply to strontium-90 
which has been separated from the other fission products or mixtures where the strontium-90 has been enriched. 
6 Tritium contamination may diffuse into the volume or matrix of materials. Evaluation of surface contamination shall consider the extent to 
which such contamination may migrate to the surface in order to ensure the surface contamination value provided in this appendix is not 
exceeded. Once this contamination migrates to the surface, it may be removable, not fixed; therefore, a “Total” value does not apply. 
7 (alpha) 
2.11.3.3 RIDP Data
The RIDP did not include the area of this CAS because radiological contamination was not 
suspected in this area (DRI, 2007).  No RIDP measurements were used to evaluate this CAS. 
2.11.4CONCLUSION
The operational history indicates that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the 
detonation or subsequent activities at the MANZANAS site.  Therefore, without a credible 
exposure pathway, the potential for a worker to receive a dose greater than 25 mrem/yr in this 
area is not realistic.  This is supported by the 100-percent coverage fly-over survey data and 
Contaminated Land Report radiological surveys at this location. 
The site is in a stable condition and requires no additional controls.  Based on the information 
presented above, data are adequate to support a closure option of no further action.
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2.12 CAS 03-23-29, TRUCHAS-CHAMISAL CONTAMINATION AREA
CAS 03-23-29 was designated to address potential surface soil contamination associated with the
detonation and post-test drilling at the location of the TRUCHAS-CHAMISAL underground 
nuclear weapons detonation.  REECo (1991) does not provide information about this site.  The 
TRUCHAS-CHAMISAL detonation did not form a subsidence crater.  The area is a potential 
crater and no stability study has been completed, so both access and future land use are limited.  
The TRUCHAS-CHAMISAL detonation cavity is covered by the UGTA Sub-Project.  This area 
is posted as a URMA, likely due to the deep underground source term that resulted from the 
nuclear test (BN, 2000). 
2.12.1OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The TRUCHAS-CHAMISAL detonation was part of Operation Emery and was conducted on 
October 28, 1970.  The detonation had a yield of less than 20 kt.  TRUCHAS-CHAMISAL was 
detonated in emplacement hole U3ho (DOE/NV, 2000).  Radiological contamination was 
suspected to be present at the surface from post-test pig pull operations.  Pig pulls were similar to 
cable pulls, but instead of instruments being connected to the end of the cable, a sampling device 
called a pig was connected to the end of the cable.  The pig was opened on site to collect sample 
material; therefore, the pig pull had a greater potential to cause surface contamination than either 
gas sampling or cable pulls.  Stationary radiation monitors were placed in an arc around the 
surface ground zero of the test.  The maximum gamma exposure rate measured by these 
monitors, 34 R/hr, was collected during pig pull operations.  A re-entry survey was conducted 
after the test, and the maximum exposure rate reading was 2 millirads per hour.  The millirad 
unit indicates that both gamma- and beta-emitting radionuclides were present.  Alpha 
contamination was also detected on the concrete pad and in soils near the surface ground zero 
(REECo, 1973a). 
2.12.2RELEASE INFORMATION
DOE/NV (1996) documented radiological releases from the detonation of 
TRUCHAS-CHAMISAL and from the subsequent pig pull.  The releases included xenon-133, 
xenon-135, barium-140, and lanthanum-140.  The xenon isotopes are gaseous radionuclides with 
short half-lives and are not suspected to be present in the soil.  Barium and lanthanum are not 
gaseous; however, barium-140 has the longer half-life of 12 days (Nuclear Data Center, 2006).
TRUCHAS-CHAMISAL is different from the other underground tests and detonations discussed 
in this SAFER Plan in that historical documentation indicates that low levels of surface 
contamination are present.  In addition, a contaminated sheave used to extract the pig from the 
hole was also left on site (REECo, 1972). 
2.12.3HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
The following data were used to evaluate the potential surface release for CAS 03-23-29 and 
were used to determine the likelihood of a widespread release to the surface soils resulting from 
TRUCHAS-CHAMISAL operations.  Historical operational data indicate that there is low-level 
surface contamination at this site. 
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2.12.3.1 Fly-Over Data
The fly-over survey performed in 1994 does not show detectable levels of radionuclides in the 
area of this CAS and does not identify any nearby areas as ROIs (Hendricks and Riedhauser, 
1999).  The fly-over survey process is well established and has been used at many sites to make 
the “yes-no” type of decision used in this SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2005).  The fly-over data 
have been used in a semi-quantitative way to support the conclusion made based on operational 
history that a widespread release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the TRUCHAS-
CHAMISAL detonation or associated activities.  There were 131 measurements collected within 
a 500-m radius of the TRUCHAS-CHAMISAL detonation (Figure 12).  While the fly-over data, 
depicted in Figure 12, are shown as points, the field of view of the detector is large; thus, the fly-
over survey provided 100-percent coverage of this area.  These data were analyzed as provided 
in Proctor (1997) and Hendricks and Riedhauser (1999).  The results of the analyzed survey data 
are shown in Table 30.  All measurements were less than the detection limit of the 
instrumentation; however, these data only evaluate the potential for a widespread release and do 
not quantify the known, low-level point-source contamination at the site.
TABLE 30. FLY-OVER DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT TYPE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION LIMIT
NUMBER
MEASUREMENTS         
>DETECTION LIMIT
Total man-made 131 1.5 microR/hr 0
americium-241 131 50 cps 0
The fly-over data presented above represent many individual measurements (referred to as point 
data), and each measurement is corrected for background radiation.  The fly-over survey process 
continuously collects background radiation levels then corrects each measurement to remove it, 
resulting in data that show the added man-made radiation resulting from testing or other 
activities.  The fly-over measurements for total man-made radiation are very sensitive, with the 
detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr.  Typical background exposure rates are approximately 
15 microR/hr.  Thus, the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr results in detection of man-made 
radiation that is greater than approximately 10 percent of natural background radiation.
The fly-over surveys have very good sensitivity for americium-241.  Americium-241 sensitivity 
is approximately 50 cps.  A specific correlation to soil concentration values was not performed; 
however, a conservative correlation of 50 cps to 300 nCi/m2 has been estimated by RSL based on 
other similar flights and the flight altitude of 200 ft.  This value, 300 nCi/m2, was then compared 
to RIDP measurements made in non-operational areas of the NTS where no local releases of 
radioactive material occurred to determine whether or not the fly-over survey is capable of 
discerning levels of radioactivity indicative of a widespread radiological release.  Since the RIDP 
values in the non-operational areas range from 24 to 573 nCi/m2 and the fly-over sensitivity is 
approximately 300 nCi/m2, this shows that the fly-over survey is capable of discerning where 
operational releases have occurred.  No americium-241 fly-over survey measurements were 
greater than the detection limit, similar to the non-operational areas of the NTS.  These data 
confirm that there was not a widespread release to surface soils.
2.12.3.2 Contaminated Land Report Data
BN (2000) provides radiological survey results for this area. Measurements collected include 
exposure rate and FIDLER readings.  Removable alpha and beta/gamma contamination were 
also assessed.  Measurements were taken along the fence line.  All measurements were consistent 
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with background levels.  The survey results show that contamination is not migrating outside the 
potential crater area.  Table 31 presents the results of these surveys (BN, 2000).
TABLE 31. CONTAMINATED LAND SURVEY DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT 
TYPE
NUMBER OF 
MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
MINIMUM 
VALUE
AVERAGE
VALUE
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION
LIMIT
Removable Alpha 6 0 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 5 dpm/100 cm2
Removable Beta 6 5 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 1 dpm/100 cm2 16 dpm/100 cm2
Exposure Rate 6 10 uR/hr 10 uR/hr 10 uR/hr  20 uR/hr1
FIDLER 6 90 cps 78 cps 83 cps 100 cps
1 Procedurally, detection limit is not determined for this type of instrument.  Value reported is sensitivity 
All values were below detection limits.  These ground-based survey data consist of 
measurements that are focused in the area of the CAS, thereby augmenting the wide-area data 
collected via fly-over surveys indicating that a widespread contaminant release did not occur and 
that the known historical contamination has not migrated outside of the potential crater area. 
The NV/YMP RadCon Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004b) is used at the NTS to implement the 
requirements set forth in 10 CFR 835.  The manual allows for the release of areas from 
radiological controls when certain radiological limits are met.  The limits were established as 
acceptable levels for use by the general public and, thus, are conservative given the ongoing 
controls at CAS 03-23-29 and the lack of both public and worker access to the site.  Table 32 
outlines these release values.  BN (2000) survey measurements in the area of CAS 03-23-29 are 
well below the radiological control limits outlined in Table 32.   
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TABLE 32. SURFACE CONTAMINATION VALUES1 IN DPM/100 CM2
RADIONUCLIDE REMOVABLE2, 4 TOTAL (FIXED +REMOVABLE)2, 3
natural uranium, uranium-235, uranium-238, and associated decay 
products 1,0007 5,0007
transuranics, radium-226, radium-228, thorium-230, thorium-228, 
protactinium-231, actinium-227, iodine-125, and iodine-129 20 500 
natural thorium, thorium-232, strontium-90, radium-223, radium-
224, uranium-232, iodine-126, iodine-131, and iodine-133 200 1,000 
beta-gamma emitters (nuclides with decay modes other than alpha 
emission or spontaneous fission), except strontium-90 and others 
noted above5 1,000 5,000 
tritium and tritiated compounds6 10,000 N/A
1 The values in this table, with the exception noted in footnote 5, apply to radioactive contamination deposited on, but not incorporated into the 
interior or matrix of, the contaminated item. Where surface contamination by both alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides exists, the limits 
established for alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides apply independently. 
2 As used in this table, dpm (disintegrations per minute) means the rate of emission by radioactive material as determined by correcting the 
counts per minute observed by an appropriate detector for background, efficiency, and geometric factors associated with the instrumentation. 
3 The levels may be averaged over 1 square meter provided the maximum surface activity in any area of 100 cm2 is less than three times the value 
specified. For purposes of averaging, any square meter of surface shall be considered to be above the surface contamination value if: (1) From 
measurements of a representative number of sections it is determined that the average contamination level exceeds the applicable value; or (2) it 
is determined that the sum of the activity of all isolated spots or particles in any 100 cm2 area exceeds three times the applicable value. 
4 The amount of removable radioactive material per 100 cm2 of surface area should be determined by swiping the area with dry filter or soft 
absorbent paper, applying moderate pressure, and then assessing the amount of radioactive material on the swipe with an appropriate instrument 
of known efficiency. (Note:  The use of dry material may not be appropriate for tritium.) When removable contamination on objects of surface 
area less than 100 cm2 is determined, the activity per unit area shall be based on the actual area and the entire surface shall be wiped. It is not 
necessary to use swiping techniques to measure removable contamination levels if direct scan surveys indicate that the total residual surface 
contamination levels are within the limits for removable contamination. 
5 This category of radionuclides includes mixed fission products, including the strontium-90 present in them. It does not apply to strontium-90 
which has been separated from the other fission products or mixtures where the strontium-90 has been enriched. 
6 Tritium contamination may diffuse into the volume or matrix of materials. Evaluation of surface contamination shall consider the extent to 
which such contamination may migrate to the surface in order to ensure the surface contamination value provided in this appendix is not 
exceeded. Once this contamination migrates to the surface, it may be removable, not fixed; therefore, a “Total” value does not apply. 
7 (alpha) 
2.12.3.3 RIDP Data
The RIDP did not include the area of this CAS because radiological contamination was not 
suspected in this area (DRI, 2007).  No RIDP measurements were used to evaluate this CAS. 
2.12.4CONCLUSION
Data presented above show that no widespread release to surface soils that could cause an NTS 
worker dose greater than 25 mrem/yr occurred; therefore, data are adequate to support a closure 
option of closure in place with administrative controls.  Historical evidence indicates that there is 
limited contamination within the potential crater area of the TRUCHAS-CHAMISAL detonation 
both on the concrete pad and on the sheave.  However, the stability of the potential crater area is 
uncertain and these areas are currently assumed to be unsafe for entry.  The site is currently 
posted in compliance with 10 CFR 835 as a URMA.  Contamination levels along this boundary 
are below the levels specified in Table 32, and contamination is not migrating outside the 
potential crater area (BN, 2000).  The Demarcation Project will continue to monitor the area for 
compliance with 10 CFR 835.  As a conservative measure, a UR will be implemented that 
encompasses the current URMA boundary.  The current URMA postings combined with the UR 
are adequate administrative controls to limit site access and worker dose. 
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2.13 CAS 04-23-02, ATMOSPHERIC TEST SITE T4-A
CAS 04-23-02 was designated to address potential surface soil contamination associated with the
RAY atmospheric nuclear weapons test.  This test was detonated from a tower (DOE/NV, 2000).  
CAS 04-23-02 is identified only by the FFACO listing of the geographical coordinates for the 
RAY atmospheric test.  There are no fenced areas or radiological postings to identify the site.  
REECo (1991) does not provide information about this site.  Field visits were conducted on 
January 23, 1996, and April 18, 2006.  The 1996 site visit report noted that a 25- by 25-ft 
concrete slab partially obscured by soil and gravel exists at the CAS location.  The slab has a 
partially broken steel anchor present.  During the 2006 site visit, there were no fencing or 
postings, and a marker was placed to identify the site.   
2.13.1OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The RAY test was part of Operation Upshot Knothole and was conducted on April 11, 1953.
The test was a lower-yield test with a yield of 200 tons.  The radiological safety report, 
documenting radiological conditions at the time of the test, states that a well-defined plume 
migrated south over the current location of the Big Explosives Experimental Facility (AEC, 
1953).  Contaminant plume dispersion in a lateral (east to west) direction was not noted in the 
Radiological Safety Report (AEC, 1953). 
2.13.2RELEASE INFORMATION
DOE/NV (1996) does not provide documentation for nuclear weapons tests conducted during 
this time period.  As noted above, AEC (1953) documented a release of radiological 
contamination that dispersed in a straight, narrow path to the south. 
2.13.3HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
A review of historical release information indicates that this area is within the contiguous 
contaminant plume from the FOX, NANCY, APPLE 1, and KEPLER tests, which are associated 
with CAS 04-23-01.  The contaminant plume resulting from the RAY test, if still detectable, 
should be to the south of the detonation site based on historical operational data.  However, there 
is no detectable contaminant plume that is consistent with this operational history.  Thus, the low 
levels of radiological contamination detected in this area are not attributable to the RAY test but 
are related to the contamination extent of CAS 04-23-01, which will be addressed with a future 
CAU closure.  However, available data are presented below to informally indicate the potential 
NTS worker dose in the area.  
2.13.3.1 Fly-Over Data
The fly-over survey performed in 1994 shows low levels of detectable radioactivity (Hendricks 
and Riedhauser, 1999).  This CAS is located within the contaminant extent from the FOX, 
NANCY, APPLE 1, and KEPLER tests, which are associated with CAS 04-23-01, which will be 
addressed with a future CAU closure.   
There were 131 measurements collected within a 500-m radius of the surface ground zero of the 
RAY detonation (Figure 13).  While the fly-over data, depicted in Figure 13, are shown as 
points, the field of view of the detector is large; thus, the fly-over survey provided 100-percent 
coverage of this area.  These data were analyzed as provided in Proctor (1997) and Hendricks 
and Riedhauser (1999).  The results of the analyzed survey data are shown in Table 33.   
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All measurements for americium-241 were below the detection limit, and 91 measurements for 
total man-made radioactivity were greater than the detection limit.  These measurements were 
made in the known, contiguous contaminant plume of CAS 04-23-01, and this area will be 
addressed with a future CAU closure.  
TABLE 33. FLY-OVER DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT TYPE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION LIMIT
NUMBER
MEASUREMENTS         
>DETECTION LIMIT
Total man-made 131 1.5 microR/hr 91
americium-241 131 50 cps 0
The fly-over data presented above represent many individual measurements (referred to as point 
data), and each measurement is corrected for background radiation.  The fly-over survey process 
continuously collects background radiation levels then corrects each measurement to remove it, 
resulting in data that show the added man-made radiation resulting from testing or other 
activities.  The fly-over measurements for total man-made radiation are very sensitive, with the 
detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr.  Typical background exposure rates are approximately 
15 microR/hr.  Thus, the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr results in detection of man-made 
radiation that is greater than approximately 10 percent of natural background radiation.
The fly-over surveys have very good sensitivity for americium-241.  Americium-241 sensitivity 
is approximately 50 cps.  A specific correlation to soil concentration values was not performed; 
however, a conservative correlation of 50 cps to 300 nCi/m2 has been estimated by RSL based on 
other similar flights and the flight altitude of 200 ft.  This value, 300 nCi/m2, was then compared 
to RIDP measurements made in non-operational areas of the NTS where no local releases of 
radioactive material occurred to determine whether or not the fly-over survey is capable of 
discerning levels of radioactivity indicative of a widespread radiological release.  Since the RIDP 
values in the non-operational areas range from 24 to 573 nCi/m2 and the fly-over sensitivity is 
approximately 300 nCi/m2, this shows that the fly-over survey is capable of discerning where 
operational releases have occurred.  No americium-241 fly-over survey measurements were 
greater than the detection limit, similar to the non-operational areas of the NTS.  These data 
confirm that there was not a widespread release to surface soils.
2.13.3.2 Contaminated Land Report Data
Radiological surveys conducted for BN (2000) did not include this CAS location because the 
area is not controlled for radiological purposes due to the low levels of contamination. 
2.13.3.3 RIDP Data
RIDP measurements were collected in the immediate vicinity of the CAS to characterize the 
extent of the plume from the KEPLER test (McArthur and Kordas, 1985) (Figure 13).  RIDP 
measurements taken within 500 m of the RAY site were evaluated against limits set forth in 
Anspaugh and Daniels (1995) as explained in Section 2.2.4.3 of this SAFER Plan.  Table 34 
provides the maximum, minimum, and average values of these data and compares the maximum 
value to the limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995).  All values are well below these 
limits.  This evaluation is not intended as a formal dose assessment but as a means by which 
these data may be compared to evaluate the validity of the operational history release 
assumptions. 
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TABLE 34. RIDP DATA SUMMARY
RADIONUCLIDE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MINIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
AVERAGE
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MAX VALUE
FRACTION OF 
DCG
americium-241 10 52.67 29.11 36.67 0.02
cobalt-60 10 1.76 0.48 0.82 0.00
cesium-137 10 1745.49 37.81 340.23 0.54
europium-152 10 172.46 11.11 47.42 0.10
europium -154 10 29.62 8.99 13.49 0.02
europium -155 10 1.27 0.60 0.79 0.00
plutonium-238 10 89.26 49.29 62.14 0.02
plutonium -239 10 327.74 181.17 228.22 0.06
strontium-90 10 2208.29 47.84 430.43 0.01
The slightly elevated RIDP measurements were collected within the larger known contaminant 
plume associated with the FOX, NANCY, APPLE 1, and KEPLER tests.  Therefore, these 
results support the process knowledge, Contaminated Land Report survey data, and fly-over 
data.
2.13.4CONCLUSION
The operational history indicates that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the 
RAY detonation; therefore, without a credible exposure pathway, the potential for a worker to 
receive a dose greater than 25 mrem/yr in this area is not realistic.  This conclusion is supported 
by the 100-percent coverage fly-over survey data and the RIDP data.  The low levels of 
contamination present are associated with the FOX, NANCY, APPLE 1, and KEPLER tests. 
The site is in a stable condition and requires no additional controls.  Based on the information 
presented above, data are adequate to support a closure option of no further action. 
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2.14 CAS 05-23-06, ATMOSPHERIC TEST SITE
CAS 05-23-06 was designated to address potential surface soil contamination associated with the 
ABLE, BAKER, BAKER-2, EASY, and FOX nuclear weapons tests.  These atmospheric tests 
were detonated at more than 984 ft above ground level (Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1951).  
The ground zero location for the tests associated with this CAS was determined through visual 
observations of the fireball at the time of detonation.  These observations placed the ground zero 
9,843 ft to the northwest of the current FFACO location, off the playa, near the “Kay 
Blockhouse,” formerly known as “Alpha Blockhouse.”  A historical report states, “A red 
reference light was placed at ground zero in the center of the target.  During the drop, all lights 
were turned off thirty seconds prior to burst time.  Directly under ground zero, workers built a 
blast-proof alpha-recording shelter or blockhouse” (DoD, 1982). Origins of the Nevada Test Site
provides a re-print of a hand-drawn map showing the “detector and target light array” and the 
Alpha Blockhouse with a single coordinate location (DOE, 2000).  This structure was built at the 
Ranger target ground zero to house instrumentation for the test series.  The Kay Blockhouse 
itself is a closed Industrial Sites CAS (CAS 05-33-01 in CAU 204). 
Additionally, the Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) for CAU 204 states: 
The site consists of the Kay Blockhouse and numerous burn pits and disturbed 
areas.  The site was identified in the 1992 REECo Contaminated Areas Report I 
(Sorom, 1992).  Various historical documents and drawings have identified 
CAS 05-33-01 by the following names:  Kay Blockhouse, Kay Bunker, Ranger 
Blockhouse, and Alpha Blockhouse. 
The Kay Blockhouse was originally constructed in 1951 for Operation Ranger, a 
series of five air drops (atmospheric nuclear tests) conducted from January 27 to 
February 6, 1951.  These tests were detonated over the Kay Blockhouse, where 
reaction history, fireball and neutron and gamma-ray measurements were taken.  
(U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada 
Operations Office [NNSA/NV], 2002) 
Based on these historical information sources, the actual location of CAS 05-23-06 is the Kay 
Blockhouse and the surrounding area, which was previously closed as an Industrial Site. 
2.14.1OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The ABLE, BAKER, BAKER-2, EASY, and FOX tests were part of Operation Ranger.  ABLE 
was a 1-kt test detonated on January 27, 1951; BAKER was an 8-kt test detonated on January 28, 
1951; BAKER-2 was an 8-kt test detonated on February 2, 1951; EASY was a 1-kt test 
detonated on February 1, 1951; and FOX was a 22-kt test detonated on February 6, 1951.  The 
devices were detonated well above the ground surface.  These five tests, the first nuclear tests 
conducted at the NTS, were weapons-related air-drop experiments (DOE/NV, 2000). 
2.14.2RELEASE INFORMATION
The Operation Ranger tests caused a radiological release to the air space above the NTS.  
However, process knowledge and operational history strongly indicate these tests did not cause 
radiological contamination of surface soils within the boundaries of the NTS.  Surface 
radiological contamination produced by a nuclear test conducted close to ground surface is 
largely from materials being drawn into the resulting radioactive cloud (DNA, 1981).  Since 
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these tests were detonated at more than 984 ft above ground level, this process did not occur.
Historical information indicates that neutron activation occurred from the Operation Ranger 
tests.  Use of the Kay Blockhouse was limited for several years after the tests due to radiation 
levels associated with sodium-22.  Sodium-22 has a half-life of 2.6 years (Nuclear Data Center, 
2006).  Soil activation was not noted as a contributor to these radiation levels (NNSA/NV, 2002). 
2.14.3HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
The CAU 204 Corrective Action Decision Document (NNSA/NSO, 2004a) reports the results of 
sampling conducted in accordance with the CAU 204 CAIP.  The characterization activities 
included the surface ground zero location of the Operation Ranger tests.  Results indicated the 
presence of depleted uranium (DU) above the preliminary action levels.  DU contamination is 
not associated with Operation Ranger activities.  The CAU 204 Closure Report (NNSA/NSO, 
2006a) documents closure activities in the area, which included extending the RMA and 
implementing a FFACO UR encompassing the area.  The following data were used to evaluate 
the potential surface release being investigated for CAS 05-23-06 and were used to determine if 
the existing FFACO UR is appropriate for this CAS. 
2.14.3.1 Fly-Over Data
The fly-over survey performed in 1994 does not show detectable levels of radionuclides in the 
area of this CAS and does not identify any nearby areas as ROIs (Hendricks and Riedhauser, 
1999).  The fly-over survey process is well established and has been used at many sites to make 
the “yes-no” type of decision used in this SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2005).  The fly-over data 
have been used in a semi-quantitative way to support the conclusion made based on operational 
history that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of Operation Ranger detonations.  
There were 132 measurements collected within a 500-m radius of the Operation Ranger 
detonations (Figure 14).  While the fly-over data, depicted in Figure 14, are shown as points, the 
field of view of the detector is large; thus, the fly-over survey provided 100-percent coverage of 
this area.  These data were analyzed as provided in Proctor (1997) and Hendricks and Riedhauser 
(1999).  The results of the analyzed survey data are shown in Table 35.  All measurements were 
less than the detection limit of the instrumentation.
TABLE 35. FLY-OVER DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT TYPE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION LIMIT
NUMBER
MEASUREMENTS         
>DETECTION LIMIT
Total man-made 132 1.5 microR/hr 0
americium-241 132 50 cps 0
The fly-over data presented above represent many individual measurements (referred to as point 
data), and each measurement is corrected for background radiation.  The fly-over survey process 
continuously collects background radiation levels then corrects each measurement to remove it, 
resulting in data that show the added man-made radiation resulting from testing or other 
activities.  The fly-over measurements for total man-made radiation are very sensitive, with the 
detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr.  Typical background exposure rates are approximately 
15 microR/hr.  Thus, the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr results in detection of man-made 
radiation that is greater than approximately 10 percent of natural background radiation.
The fly-over surveys have very good sensitivity for americium-241.  Americium-241 sensitivity 
is approximately 50 cps.  A specific correlation to soil concentration values was not performed; 
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however, a conservative correlation of 50 cps to 300 nCi/m2 has been estimated by RSL based on 
other similar flights and the flight altitude of 200 ft.  This value, 300 nCi/m2, was then compared 
to RIDP measurements made in non-operational areas of the NTS where no local releases of 
radioactive material occurred to determine whether or not the fly-over survey is capable of 
discerning levels of radioactivity indicative of a widespread radiological release.  Since the RIDP 
values in the non-operational areas range from 24 to 573 nCi/m2 and the fly-over sensitivity is 
approximately 300 nCi/m2, this shows that the fly-over survey is capable of discerning where 
operational releases have occurred.  No americium-241 fly-over survey measurements were 
greater than the detection limit, similar to the non-operational areas of the NTS.  These data 
confirm that there was not a widespread release to surface soils.
2.14.3.2 Contaminated Land Report Data
Results of the surveys conducted in support of BN (2000) were used qualitatively to support the 
conclusions gleaned from the operational history.  The surveys conducted for BN (2000) 
included radiological surveys within the current Kay Blockhouse RMA.  Measurements collected 
included exposure rates and FIDLER readings.  Removable alpha and beta/gamma 
contamination were also assessed.  Table 36 presents the results of these surveys (BN, 2000). 
TABLE 36. CONTAMINATED LAND SURVEY DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT 
TYPE
NUMBER OF 
MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
MINIMUM 
VALUE
AVERAGE
VALUE
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION
LIMIT
Removable Alpha 10 38 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2  6.4 dpm/100 cm2 5 dpm/100 cm2
Removable Beta 10 77 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 14 dpm/100 cm2 16 dpm/100 cm2
Exposure Rate 10 30 uR/hr 15 uR/hr 21 uR/hr  20 uR/hr1
FIDLER 10 713 cps 100 cps 408 cps 100 cps
1 Procedurally, detection limit is not determined for this type of instrument.  Value reported is sensitivity 
All values greater than detection limits were visually identified as DU shrapnel, which is not a 
contaminant of concern associated with Operation Ranger activities (BN, 2000).  These 
ground-based survey data consist of measurements that are focused in the area of the CAS, 
thereby augmenting the wide-area data collected via fly-over surveys.  These data provide an 
additional resource indicating that the current FFACO UR is appropriate for closure of 
CAS 05-23-06 and that a surface release to surface soils or significant soil activation did not 
occur.
The NV/YMP RadCon Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004b) is used at the NTS to implement the 
requirements set forth in 10 CFR 835.  The manual allows for the release of areas from 
radiological controls when certain radiological limits are met.  The limits were established as 
acceptable levels for use by the general public and, thus, are conservative given the ongoing 
controls at CAS 05-23-06 and the lack of both public and worker access to the site.  Table 37 
outlines these release values.  The maximum alpha value of 38 dpm/100 cm2 results from DU, 
not from transuranics, so BN (2000) survey measurements in the area of CAS 05-23-06 are well 
below the radiological control limits outlined in Table 37.    
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TABLE 37. SURFACE CONTAMINATION VALUES1 IN DPM/100 CM2
RADIONUCLIDE REMOVABLE2, 4 TOTAL (FIXED +REMOVABLE)2, 3
natural uranium, uranium-235, uranium-238, and associated decay 
products 1,0007 5,0007
transuranics, radium-226, radium-228, thorium-230, thorium-228, 
protactinium-231, actinium-227, iodine-125, and iodine-129 20 500 
natural thorium, thorium-232, strontium-90, radium-223, radium-
224, uranium-232, iodine-126, iodine-131, and iodine-133 200 1,000 
beta-gamma emitters (nuclides with decay modes other than alpha 
emission or spontaneous fission), except strontium-90 and others 
noted above5 1,000 5,000 
tritium and tritiated compounds6 10,000 N/A
1 The values in this table, with the exception noted in footnote 5, apply to radioactive contamination deposited on, but not incorporated into the 
interior or matrix of, the contaminated item. Where surface contamination by both alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides exists, the limits 
established for alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides apply independently. 
2 As used in this table, dpm (disintegrations per minute) means the rate of emission by radioactive material as determined by correcting the 
counts per minute observed by an appropriate detector for background, efficiency, and geometric factors associated with the instrumentation. 
3 The levels may be averaged over 1 square meter provided the maximum surface activity in any area of 100 cm2 is less than three times the value 
specified. For purposes of averaging, any square meter of surface shall be considered to be above the surface contamination value if: (1) From 
measurements of a representative number of sections it is determined that the average contamination level exceeds the applicable value; or (2) it 
is determined that the sum of the activity of all isolated spots or particles in any 100 cm2 area exceeds three times the applicable value. 
4 The amount of removable radioactive material per 100 cm2 of surface area should be determined by swiping the area with dry filter or soft 
absorbent paper, applying moderate pressure, and then assessing the amount of radioactive material on the swipe with an appropriate instrument 
of known efficiency. (Note:  The use of dry material may not be appropriate for tritium.) When removable contamination on objects of surface 
area less than 100 cm2 is determined, the activity per unit area shall be based on the actual area and the entire surface shall be wiped. It is not 
necessary to use swiping techniques to measure removable contamination levels if direct scan surveys indicate that the total residual surface 
contamination levels are within the limits for removable contamination. 
5 This category of radionuclides includes mixed fission products, including the strontium-90 present in them. It does not apply to strontium-90 
which has been separated from the other fission products or mixtures where the strontium-90 has been enriched. 
6 Tritium contamination may diffuse into the volume or matrix of materials. Evaluation of surface contamination shall consider the extent to 
which such contamination may migrate to the surface in order to ensure the surface contamination value provided in this appendix is not 
exceeded. Once this contamination migrates to the surface, it may be removable, not fixed; therefore, a “Total” value does not apply. 
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2.14.3.3 RIDP Data
RIDP measurements were collected in the immediate vicinity of the CAS (McArthur and Kordas, 
1985) (Figure 14).  RIDP measurements taken within 500 m of the Operation Ranger site were 
evaluated against limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995) as explained in Section 2.2.4.3 
of this SAFER Plan.  Table 38 provides the maximum, minimum, and average values of these 
data and compares the maximum value to the limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995).
All values are well below these limits.  This evaluation is not intended as a formal dose 
assessment but demonstrates that the current FFACO UR is protective of NTS workers. 
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TABLE 38. RIDP DATA SUMMARY
RADIONUCLIDE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MINIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
AVERAGE
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MAX VALUE
FRACTION OF 
DCG
americium-241 23 38.90 31.41 35.12 0.02
cobalt-60 23 0.92 0.55 0.68 0.00
cesium-137 23 21.97 4.34 13.14 0.01
europium-152 23 515.19 26.15 169.70 0.29
europium -154 23 9.09 5.29 7.27 0.01
europium -155 23 1.29 1.04 1.18 0.00
plutonium-238 23 13.10 10.57 11.82 0.00
plutonium -239 23 371.34 299.81 335.19 0.07
strontium-90 23 18.44 3.65 11.03 0.00
2.14.4CONCLUSION
The operational history indicates that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the 
Operation Ranger detonations; therefore, without a credible exposure pathway, the potential for a 
worker to receive a dose greater than 25 mrem/yr in this area is not realistic.  This is supported 
by the 100-percent coverage fly-over survey data, focused measurements provided by the 
Contaminated Land Report survey data, the RIDP data, and data collected as part of the closure 
of CAU 204.
The site is in a stable condition and requires no additional controls.  Based on the information 
presented above, data are adequate to support a closure option of no further action. 
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2.15 CAS 09-23-06, MOUND OF CONTAMINATED SOIL
CAS 09-23-06 was designated to address potential surface soil contamination associated with 
post-test drilling near the location of the PITON-A underground nuclear weapons detonation.
This CAS consists of a mound of soil that has been historically identified as radiologically 
contaminated.  This mound is within a fenced area that is approximately 400 square feet (ft2) in 
area.  The entire area, including the mound, is controlled for radiological purposes and is posted 
as a URMA, most likely because of an abandoned injection well within the fenced area that 
historically received radiological and chemical effluent associated with other U-9itsy30 post-test 
drillbacks (NNSA/NSO, 2007b).  The injection well was originally drilled as a post-test hole 
(U-9itsy30 PS #1A). The injection well and fenced area was identified as CAS 09-20-03 and was 
included in CAU 542.  The CAS was investigated to determine if a surface release had occurred 
within the fenced area.  During the investigation, no COCs were detected in soil samples 
collected within the fenced area.  In addition, a radiological survey noted that no areas of 
elevated radioactivity were found within the fenced boundary.  Based on the evidence that no 
surface release had occurred, the CAS was closed with no further action in 2007 (NNSA/NSO, 
2007b).
The mound appears to be associated with the post-test drilling activities and may be native soil 
removed to excavate a cellar or to convert the borehole to an injection well (REECo, 1991).  The 
CAS is located in a fenced and posted URMA, and there are numerous subsidence craters and 
potential subsidence craters in the vicinity.  Therefore, both access and future land use are 
limited.  The PITON-A detonation cavity itself is part of the UGTA Sub-Project. 
2.15.1OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The PITON-A detonation was part of Operation Mandrel and was conducted on May 28, 1970.
The detonation had a yield of less than 20 kt.  PITON-A was detonated in emplacement hole 
U9itsy30 (DOE/NV, 2000).  Radiological contamination was suspected to be present from 
post-test drilling conducted at hole PS#1A. PITON-A was detonated simultaneously with 
PITON-B; therefore, readings collected by stationary radiation monitors cannot be directly 
associated with the PITON-A site. 
2.15.2RELEASE INFORMATION
DOE/NV (1996) documented a radiological release from the detonation of PITON-A; however, 
it is noted that this release was masked by the larger release associated with PITON-C, which 
was detonated on the same day and in the same general area as PITON-A.   
2.15.3HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
Industrial Sites CAS 09-20-03, an injection well surface release point assigned to CAU 542, is 
located within the same fenced area as CAS 09-23-06.  The CAS boundary for CAU 542 
included the entire fenced area, and the CAS was investigated for evidence of a surface release 
within the fenced area from the injection well activities.  The injection well historically received 
radiological and chemical effluent associated with other U-9itsy30 post-test drillbacks (NNSA/NSO, 
2007b).  In 2006, a walkover radiological survey was conducted inside the fenced area, and no 
areas with elevated radioactivity were identified.  Soil samples were collected from 
CAS 09-20-03 near the unused injection well discharge pipe.  Also, two samples were collected 
from outside the fenced area to determine background levels for gamma-emitting radionuclides.  
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No analytes were detected at concentrations that exceeded final action levels, and the CAS was 
closed with no further action (NNSA/NSO, 2007b).
The following data were used to evaluate the potential surface release being investigated for 
CAS 09-23-06 and were used to determine the likelihood of a release to the surface soils in the 
area.
2.15.3.1 Fly-Over Data
The fly-over survey performed in 1994 shows detectable levels of radioactivity but does not 
identify the area as an ROI (Hendricks and Riedhauser, 1999).  This CAS is located within the 
plume extents of the HOOD test, which is associated with CAS 09-23-14, and the 
CHARLESTON test, which is associated with CAS 09-99-01.  The HOOD test had the highest 
yield of any atmospheric test conducted at the NTS (DOE/NV, 2000).  Thus, the low levels of 
radiological contamination detected in this area are not attributable to the PITON-A detonation, 
but are related to the contamination extent of CASs 09-23-14 and 09-99-01, which will be 
addressed with a future CAU closure. 
The fly-over survey process is well established and has been used at many sites to make the 
“yes-no” type of decision used in this SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2005).  The fly-over data have 
been used in a semi-quantitative way to support the conclusion made based on operational 
history that a widespread release to surface soils did not occur as a result of PITON-A 
operations.  There were 133 measurements collected within a 500-m radius of the surface 
PITON-A detonation (Figure 15).  While the fly-over data, depicted in Figure 15, are shown as 
points, the field of view of the detector is large; thus, the fly-over survey provided 100-percent 
coverage of this area.  These data were analyzed as provided in Proctor (1997) and Hendricks 
and Riedhauser (1999).  The results of the analyzed survey data are shown in Table 39.   
All measurements for americium-241 were below the detection limit, and 120 measurements for 
total man-made radioactivity were greater than the detection limit.  These measurements were 
made in the known, contiguous contaminant plume of CASs 09-23-14 and 09-99-01, which will 
be addressed with a future CAU closure.
TABLE 39. FLY-OVER DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT TYPE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION LIMIT
NUMBER
MEASUREMENTS         
>DETECTION LIMIT
Total man-made 133 1.5 microR/hr 120 
americium-241 133 50 cps 0
The fly-over data presented above represent many individual measurements (referred to as point 
data), and each measurement is corrected for background radiation.  The fly-over survey process 
continuously collects background radiation levels then corrects each measurement to remove it, 
resulting in data that show the added man-made radiation resulting from testing or other 
activities.  The fly-over measurements for total man-made radiation are very sensitive, with the 
detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr.  Typical background exposure rates are approximately 
15 microR/hr.  Thus, the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr results in detection of man-made 
radiation that is greater than approximately 10 percent of natural background radiation.
The fly-over surveys have very good sensitivity for americium-241.  Americium-241 sensitivity 
is approximately 50 cps.  A specific correlation to soil concentration values was not performed; 
however, a conservative correlation of 50 cps to 300 nCi/m2 has been estimated by RSL based on 
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other similar flights and the flight altitude of 200 ft.  This value, 300 nCi/m2, was then compared 
to RIDP measurements made in non-operational areas of the NTS where no local releases of 
radioactive material occurred to determine whether or not the fly-over survey is capable of 
discerning levels of radioactivity indicative of a widespread radiological release.  Since the RIDP 
values in the non-operational areas range from 24 to 573 nCi/m2 and the fly-over sensitivity is 
approximately 300 nCi/m2, this shows that the fly-over survey is capable of discerning where 
operational releases have occurred.  No americium-241 fly-over survey measurements were 
greater than the detection limit, similar to the non-operational areas of the NTS.
2.15.3.2 Contaminated Land Report Data
Results of the surveys conducted in support of BN (2000) were used qualitatively to support the 
conclusions gleaned from the operational history.  The surveys conducted for BN (2000) 
included radiological surveys in the immediate area of CAS 02-23-02.  Measurements collected 
included exposure rates and FIDLER readings.  Removable alpha and beta/gamma 
contamination were also assessed.  Measurements were collected within the boundaries of 
URMA and around the perimeter of these areas.  Table 40 presents the results of these surveys 
(BN, 2000).
TABLE 40. CONTAMINATED LAND SURVEY DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT 
TYPE
NUMBER OF 
MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
MINIMUM 
VALUE
AVERAGE
VALUE
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION
LIMIT
Removable Alpha 5 0 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 5 dpm/100 cm2
Removable Beta 5 8 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 1.6 dpm/100 cm2 16 dpm/100 cm2
Exposure Rate 5 10 uR/hr 10 uR/hr 10 uR/hr  20 uR/hr1
FIDLER 5 50 cps 40 cps 43 cps 100 cps
1 Procedurally, detection limit is not determined for this type of instrument.  Value reported is sensitivity 
All values were below detection limits.  These ground-based survey data consist of 
measurements that are focused in the post-test drilling areas in and around the URMAs and the 
suspect mound thereby augmenting the wide-area data collected via fly-over surveys.  These data 
provide an additional resource indicating that post-test drilling operations did not lead to surface 
soil contamination.   
The NV/YMP RadCon Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004b) is used at the NTS to implement the 
requirements set forth in 10 CFR 835.  The manual allows for the release of areas from 
radiological controls when certain radiological limits are met.  The limits were established as 
acceptable levels for use by the general public and, thus, are conservative given the ongoing 
controls at CAS 09-23-06 and the lack of both public and worker access to the site.  Table 41 
outlines these release values.  BN (2000) survey measurements in the area of CAS 09-23-06 are 
well below the radiological control limits outlined in Table 41.  
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TABLE 41. SURFACE CONTAMINATION VALUES1 IN DPM/100 CM2
RADIONUCLIDE REMOVABLE2, 4 TOTAL (FIXED +REMOVABLE)2, 3
natural uranium, uranium-235, uranium-238, and associated decay 
products 1,0007 5,0007
transuranics, radium-226, radium-228, thorium-230, thorium-228, 
protactinium-231, actinium-227, iodine-125, and iodine-129 20 500 
natural thorium, thorium-232, strontium-90, radium-223, radium-224, 
uranium-232, iodine-126, iodine-131, and iodine-133 200 1,000 
beta-gamma emitters (nuclides with decay modes other than alpha 
emission or spontaneous fission), except strontium-90 and others 
noted above5 1,000 5,000 
tritium and tritiated compounds6 10,000 N/A
1 The values in this table, with the exception noted in footnote 5, apply to radioactive contamination deposited on, but not incorporated into the 
interior or matrix of, the contaminated item. Where surface contamination by both alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides exists, the limits 
established for alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides apply independently. 
2 As used in this table, dpm (disintegrations per minute) means the rate of emission by radioactive material as determined by correcting the 
counts per minute observed by an appropriate detector for background, efficiency, and geometric factors associated with the instrumentation. 
3 The levels may be averaged over 1 square meter provided the maximum surface activity in any area of 100 cm2 is less than three times the value 
specified. For purposes of averaging, any square meter of surface shall be considered to be above the surface contamination value if: (1) From 
measurements of a representative number of sections it is determined that the average contamination level exceeds the applicable value; or (2) it 
is determined that the sum of the activity of all isolated spots or particles in any 100 cm2 area exceeds three times the applicable value. 
4 The amount of removable radioactive material per 100 cm2 of surface area should be determined by swiping the area with dry filter or soft 
absorbent paper, applying moderate pressure, and then assessing the amount of radioactive material on the swipe with an appropriate instrument 
of known efficiency. (Note:  The use of dry material may not be appropriate for tritium.) When removable contamination on objects of surface 
area less than 100 cm2 is determined, the activity per unit area shall be based on the actual area and the entire surface shall be wiped. It is not 
necessary to use swiping techniques to measure removable contamination levels if direct scan surveys indicate that the total residual surface 
contamination levels are within the limits for removable contamination. 
5 This category of radionuclides includes mixed fission products, including the strontium-90 present in them. It does not apply to strontium-90 
which has been separated from the other fission products or mixtures where the strontium-90 has been enriched. 
6 Tritium contamination may diffuse into the volume or matrix of materials. Evaluation of surface contamination shall consider the extent to 
which such contamination may migrate to the surface in order to ensure the surface contamination value provided in this appendix is not 
exceeded. Once this contamination migrates to the surface, it may be removable, not fixed; therefore, a “Total” value does not apply. 
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2.15.3.3 RIDP Data
Several RIDP measurements were taken within 500 m of the PITON-A site (Figure 15).  RIDP 
values were used to evaluate operational history and support the conclusion that the elevated 
exposure rate readings observed during the drilling operations did not indicate a widespread 
contaminant release from PITON-A operations.  RIDP measurements taken within 500 m of the 
PITON-A site were evaluated against limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995) as 
explained in Section 2.2.4.3 of this SAFER Plan.  Table 42 provides the maximum, minimum, 
and average values of these data and compares the maximum value to the limits set forth in 
Anspaugh and Daniels (1995).  All values are well below these limits.   
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TABLE 42. RIDP DATA SUMMARY
RADIONUCLIDE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MINIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
AVERAGE
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MAX VALUE
FRACTION OF 
DCG
americium-241 5 96.00 44.16 64.28 0.04
barium-133 5 4.95 4.00 4.35 0.00
cobalt-60 5 2.69 0.50 1.20 0.00
cesium-137 5 235.68 164.50 190.53 0.07
europium-152 5 210.97 13.43 106.88 0.12
europium -154 5 13.05 8.69 11.35 0.01
europium -155 5 1.27 0.95 1.09 0.00
plutonium-238 5 142.52 65.55 95.43 0.02
plutonium -239 5 644.53 296.48 431.58 0.12
strontium-90 5 436.16 304.43 352.59 0.00
The slightly elevated RIDP measurements were collected within the known contaminant plume 
of CASs 09-23-14 and 09-99-01.  Therefore, these results support the process knowledge, 
Contaminated Land Report survey data, and fly-over data.  This evaluation is not intended as a 
formal dose assessment because this area is contiguous to CASs 09-23-14 and 09-99-01, which 
will be addressed with a future CAU closure. 
2.15.4CONCLUSION
The operational history indicates that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the 
detonation or subsequent activities at the PITON-A site.  Therefore, without a credible exposure 
pathway, the potential for a worker to receive a dose greater than 25 mrem/yr in this area is not 
realistic.  This is supported by the 100-percent coverage fly-over survey data, focused 
measurements provided by the Contaminated Land Report survey data, the RIDP data, and data 
collected as part of the closure of CAU 542. A known contiguous contaminant plume is to the 
north and east of the site, and contamination in this area is associated with CASs 09-23-14 and 
09-99-01, which will be addressed with a future CAU closure. 
The site is in a stable condition and requires no additional controls.  Based on the information 
presented above, data are adequate to support a closure option of no further action.
82
FIGURE 15
CAU 107 SAFER Plan
Section:  Unit Description 
Revision:  0
Date:  September 2008
CAU 107 SAFER Plan 
Section:  Unit Description 
Revision:  0 
Date:  September 2008 
83
2.16 CAS 10-23-04, ATMOSPHERIC TEST SITE M-10
CAS 10-23-04 was designated to address potential surface soil contamination associated with the 
JOHN nuclear weapons test. This test was detonated at approximately 19,000 ft amsl 
(DOE/NV, 2000).  This test left no surface impression, and there is no distinct contamination 
plume associated with this CAS.  Ground zero does not exist for this test given the height of 
detonation.  Field visits were made to the site on February 1, 1996, and March 20, 2006.  The 
1996 site visit report recorded no fencing or postings present.  Postings are not required at this 
CAS location under requirements of 10 CFR 835.  Field crew and vehicles were surveyed upon 
completion of the field visit.  No readings were detected above background levels.  During the 
2006 site visit, there were no postings or fencing other than the site marker placed during the 
1996 field visit. 
2.16.1OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The JOHN test was part of Operation Plumbbob and was conducted on July 19, 1957.  The test 
had a yield of about 2-kt and was a test of an air-to-air missile system.  The JOHN nuclear device 
was launched by a rocket and was detonated well above the ground surface, causing a wide, swift 
dispersion pathway.  The radiological safety report for this test states, “The initial ground survey 
teams detected no increase in radiation levels within the Nevada Test Site” (REECo, 1957). 
2.16.2RELEASE INFORMATION
The JOHN test caused a radiological release to the air space above the NTS.  However, process 
knowledge and operational history strongly indicate that the JOHN test did not cause 
radiological contamination of surface soils within the boundaries of the NTS.  Surface 
radiological contamination produced by a nuclear test conducted close to ground surface is 
largely from materials being drawn into the resulting radioactive cloud (DNA, 1981).  Since this 
test was detonated at 19,000 ft amsl, this process did not occur (Spriggs, 2007).
2.16.3HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
The surface location for ground zero of the JOHN test location is well within the SEDAN ROI 
and is the contaminant extent from the SEDAN test (CAS 10-45-01).  Thus, the characterization 
data in this area are more representative of CAS 10-45-01, not CAS 10-23-04.  This area will be 
addressed with a future CAU closure.   
The JOHN test could not have caused either surface contamination or ground activation because 
the height of the burst was greater than 10,000 ft (Spriggs, 2007).  This is supported by the data 
in Section 2.3 of this SAFER Plan showing that neither contamination nor ground activation 
occurred as a result of the HA test, which was also detonated well above ground level.  Because 
this site is within the SEDAN contaminant plume, this CAS is evaluated through the historical 
operational information.  Data collected in this area characterize the impacts of CAS 10-45-01 
and therefore are only discussed briefly below.
2.16.3.1 Fly-Over Data
The fly-over survey performed in 1994 shows low levels of detectable radioactivity (Hendricks 
and Riedhauser, 1999).  This CAS is located within the contiguous contaminant extent from the 
SEDAN, UNCLE, and ESS tests, associated with CASs 10-45-01, 10-45-02, and 10-45-03.
There were 140 measurements collected within a 500-m radius of the surface ground zero of the 
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JOHN detonation (Figure 16).  While the fly-over data, depicted in Figure 16, are shown as 
points, the field of view of the detector is large; thus, the fly-over survey provided 100-percent 
coverage of this area.  These data were analyzed as provided in Proctor (1997) and Hendricks 
and Riedhauser (1999).  The results of the analyzed survey data are shown in Table 43.  Twelve 
measurements for americium-241 were above the detection limit, and all measurements for total 
man-made radioactivity were greater than the detection limit.  These measurements were made in 
the known, contiguous contaminant plume of CASs 10-45-01, 10-45-02, and 10-45-03, which 
will be addressed with a future CAU closure.  
TABLE 43. FLY-OVER DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT TYPE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION LIMIT
NUMBER
MEASUREMENTS         
>DETECTION LIMIT
Total man-made 140 1.5 microR/hr 140 
americium-241 140 50 cps 12
2.16.3.2 Contaminated Land Report Data
Radiological surveys conducted for BN (2000) did not include this CAS location because the 
area is not controlled for radiological purposes. 
2.16.3.3 RIDP Data
RIDP measurements were collected in the immediate vicinity of the CAS to characterize the 
extent of the plume from the SEDAN, UNCLE and ESS tests (McArthur and Kordas, 1985) 
(Figure 16).  RIDP measurements taken within the vicinity of the surface ground zero of the 
JOHN test were evaluated against limits set forth in Anspaugh and Daniels (1995) as explained 
in Section 2.2.4.3 of this SAFER Plan.  Table 44 provides the maximum, minimum, and average 
values of these data and compares the maximum value to the limits set forth in Anspaugh and 
Daniels (1995).  All values are well below these limits.  This evaluation is not intended as a 
formal dose assessment because this area is contiguous to CASs 10-45-01, 10-45-02, and 
10-45-03, which will be addressed with a future CAU closure. 
TABLE 44. RIDP DATA SUMMARY
RADIONUCLIDE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MINIMUM 
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
AVERAGE
VALUE
(nCi/m2)
MAX VALUE
FRACTION OF 
DCG
americium-241 4 325.94 169.83 249.83 0.13
cobalt-60 4 10.60 4.37 7.20 0.01
cesium-134 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
cesium-137 4 1320.03 757.31 1037.40 0.41
europium-152 4 25.09 19.83 21.63 0.01
europium-154 4 18.42 16.54 17.90 0.01
europium-155 4 4.24 1.80 2.48 0.00
lutetium-174 4 1.17 0.30 0.67 0.00
plutonium-238 4 277.11 144.40 212.40 0.05
plutonium-239 4 1866.97 972.78 1431.00 0.36
2.16.4CONCLUSION
The operational history indicates that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the 
JOHN detonation; therefore, without a credible exposure pathway, the potential for a worker to 
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receive a dose greater than 25 mrem/yr in this area is not realistic.  This is supported by the 
100-percent coverage fly-over survey data and the RIDP data.  A known contiguous contaminant 
plume is to the north and east of the site, and contamination in this area is associated with 
CASs 10-45-01, 10-45-02, and 10-45-03, which will be addressed with a future CAU closure.   
The site is in a stable condition and requires no additional controls.  Based on the information 
presented above, data are adequate to support a closure option of no further action. 
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2.17 CAS 18-23-02, U-18D CRATER (SULKY)
CAS 18-23-02 was designated to address potential surface soil contamination associated with the 
SULKY nuclear weapons test. The CAS is described in the FFACO as a fenced RMA of 
approximately 50,900 ft2 with expected contaminants of transuranics and fission products.  The 
SULKY test produced a circular mound approximately 79 ft in radius and 21 ft high consisting 
of rubble and large basalt blocks (Videon, 1965).  The original mound volume was estimated at 
11,379 cubic yards (Videon, 1965).  This CAS includes only the surface expression of the 
SULKY rubble mound and ejecta inside the fenced RMA. 
2.17.1OPERATIONAL HISTORY
The SULKY test was conducted during Operation Whetstone, and was part of the Plowshare 
Program.  It was conducted on December 18, 1964, and had a 92-ton yield.  SULKY was 
detonated at a depth of 90 ft in emplacement hole U18d (Videon, 1965).  The test was conducted 
on Buckboard Mesa in the western part of the NTS.  The purposes of the test were to determine 
the distribution and concentrations of radioactivity released from this type of test and to obtain 
information on cratering mechanics in basalt (DOE/NV, 1997). 
The SULKY device was placed in a 36-inch-diameter hole.  The hole was then stemmed using a 
plug of “Cal Seal” (a fast-setting grout) directly above the device, and the remainder of the 
borehole was filled with pea gravel (Videon, 1965).  Two 100-ft-deep angle holes and one 
25-ft-deep hole were drilled adjacent to the U-18d emplacement hole for installation of 
instrumentation.  The explosion resulted in a rubble mound referred to as a “retarc” (“crater” 
spelled backwards) with minimal ejecta and few particulates.  Two years after the test, the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Waterways Experiment Station drilled two holes adjacent to the 
rubble mound to obtain data on subsurface characteristics of the rubble. 
2.17.2RELEASE INFORMATION
Release of radionuclides was expected from the SULKY test.  DOE/NV (1996) states that the 
release was detected off site and identifies several isotopes of krypton, strontium, ytterbium, 
iodine, xenon, cesium, and barium in the release.  The report also lists the test release at R+12 
hours as 1.3 x 105 curies.  The test release occurred from the surface ground zero location and 
lasted for 35 days. 
2.17.3HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION INFORMATION
The following data were used to evaluate the potential surface release being investigated for 
CAS 18-23-02 to determine the likelihood of a widespread release to the surface soils resulting 
from SULKY operations.  
2.17.3.1 Fly-Over Data
The fly-over survey performed in 1994 does not show detectable levels of radionuclides in the 
area of this CAS and does not identify any nearby areas as ROIs (Hendricks and Riedhauser, 
1999).  The fly-over survey process is well established and has been used at many sites to make 
the “yes-no” type of decision used in this SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2005).  The fly-over data 
have been used in a semi-quantitative way to support the conclusion made based on operational 
history that a widespread release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the SULKY 
CAU 107 SAFER Plan 
Section:  Unit Description 
Revision:  0 
Date:  September 2008 
88
detonation or associated activities.  There were 137 measurements collected within a 500-m 
radius of the SULKY detonation (Figure 17).  While the fly-over data, depicted in Figure 17, are 
shown as points, the field of view of the detector is large; thus, the fly-over survey provided 100-
percent coverage of this area.  These data were analyzed as provided in Proctor (1997) and 
Hendricks and Riedhauser (1999).  The results of the analyzed survey data are shown in Table 
45.  All measurements were less than the detection limit of the instrumentation; however, these 
data only evaluate the potential for a widespread release and do not quantify the known, low-
level point-source contamination at the site.
TABLE 45. FLY-OVER DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT TYPE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION LIMIT
NUMBER
MEASUREMENTS        
>DETECTION LIMIT
Total man-made 137 1.5 microR/hr 0
americium-241 137 50 cps 0
The fly-over data presented above represent many individual measurements (referred to as point 
data), and each measurement is corrected for background radiation.  The fly-over survey process 
continuously collects background radiation levels then corrects each measurement to remove it, 
resulting in data that show the added man-made radiation resulting from testing or other 
activities.  The fly-over measurements for total man-made radiation are very sensitive, with the 
detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr.  Typical background exposure rates are approximately 
15 microR/hr.  Thus, the detection limit of 1.5 microR/hr results in detection of man-made 
radiation that is greater than approximately 10 percent of natural background radiation.
The fly-over surveys have very good sensitivity for americium-241.  Americium-241 sensitivity 
is approximately 50 cps.  A specific correlation to soil concentration values was not performed; 
however, a conservative correlation of 50 cps to 300 nCi/m2 has been estimated by RSL based on 
other similar flights and the flight altitude of 200 ft.  This value, 300 nCi/m2, was then compared 
to RIDP measurements made in non-operational areas of the NTS where no local releases of 
radioactive material occurred to determine whether or not the fly-over survey is capable of 
discerning levels of radioactivity indicative of a widespread radiological release.  Since the RIDP 
values in the non-operational areas range from 24 to 573 nCi/m2 and the fly-over sensitivity is 
approximately 300 nCi/m2, this shows that the fly-over survey is capable of discerning where 
operational releases have occurred.  No americium-241 fly-over survey measurements were 
greater than the detection limit, similar to the non-operational areas of the NTS.  These data 
confirm that there was not a widespread release to surface soils.
2.17.3.2 Contaminated Land Report Data
BN (2000) provides radiological survey results for this area. Measurements collected include 
exposure rates and FIDLER readings.  Removable alpha and beta/gamma contamination were 
also assessed.  Measurements were taken along the fence line and on some boulders within the 
RMA.  All measurements were consistent with background levels except for one FIDLER 
measurement collected inside the RMA on a boulder.  The survey results show that 
contamination is not migrating outside the RMA.  Table 46 presents the results of these surveys 
(BN, 2000).
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TABLE 46. CONTAMINATED LAND SURVEY DATA SUMMARY
MEASUREMENT 
TYPE
NUMBER OF 
MEASUREMENTS
MAXIMUM 
VALUE
MINIMUM 
VALUE
AVERAGE
VALUE
APPROXIMATE 
DETECTION
LIMIT
Removable Alpha 15 2 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 0.27 dpm/100 cm2 5 dpm/100 cm2
Removable Beta 15 10 dpm/100 cm2 0 dpm/100 cm2 2.6 dpm/100 cm2 16 dpm/100 cm2
Exposure Rate 15 30 uR/hr 15 uR/hr 16 uR/hr  20 uR/hr1
FIDLER 15 140 cps 53 cps 65 cps 100 cps
1 Procedurally, detection limit is not determined for this type of instrument.  Value reported is sensitivity 
These ground-based survey data consist of measurements that are focused in the area of the CAS, 
thereby augmenting the wide-area data collected via fly-over surveys indicating that a 
widespread contaminant release did not occur and that the known historical contamination has 
not migrated outside of the RMA. 
The NV/YMP RadCon Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004b) is used at the NTS to implement the 
requirements set forth in 10 CFR 835.  The manual allows for the release of areas from 
radiological controls when certain radiological limits are met.  The limits were established as 
acceptable levels for use by the general public and, thus, are conservative given the ongoing 
controls at CAS 18-23-02 and the lack of both public and worker access to the site.  Table 47 
outlines these release values.  BN (2000) survey measurements in the area of CAS 18-23-02 are 
well below the radiological control limits outlined in Table 47.   
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TABLE 47. SURFACE CONTAMINATION VALUES1 IN DPM/100 CM2
RADIONUCLIDE REMOVABLE2, 4 TOTAL (FIXED +REMOVABLE)2, 3
natural uranium, uranium-235, uranium-238, and associated decay 
products 1,0007 5,0007
transuranics, radium-226, radium-228, thorium-230, thorium-228, 
protactinium-231, actinium-227, iodine-125, and iodine-129 20 500 
natural thorium, thorium-232, strontium-90, radium-223, radium-
224, uranium-232, iodine-126, iodine-131, and iodine-133 200 1,000 
beta-gamma emitters (nuclides with decay modes other than alpha 
emission or spontaneous fission), except strontium-90 and others 
noted above5 1,000 5,000 
tritium and tritiated compounds6 10,000 N/A
1 The values in this table, with the exception noted in footnote 5, apply to radioactive contamination deposited on, but not incorporated into the 
interior or matrix of, the contaminated item. Where surface contamination by both alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides exists, the limits 
established for alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides apply independently. 
2 As used in this table, dpm (disintegrations per minute) means the rate of emission by radioactive material as determined by correcting the 
counts per minute observed by an appropriate detector for background, efficiency, and geometric factors associated with the instrumentation. 
3 The levels may be averaged over 1 square meter provided the maximum surface activity in any area of 100 cm2 is less than three times the value 
specified. For purposes of averaging, any square meter of surface shall be considered to be above the surface contamination value if: (1) From 
measurements of a representative number of sections it is determined that the average contamination level exceeds the applicable value; or (2) it 
is determined that the sum of the activity of all isolated spots or particles in any 100 cm2 area exceeds three times the applicable value. 
4 The amount of removable radioactive material per 100 cm2 of surface area should be determined by swiping the area with dry filter or soft 
absorbent paper, applying moderate pressure, and then assessing the amount of radioactive material on the swipe with an appropriate instrument 
of known efficiency. (Note:  The use of dry material may not be appropriate for tritium.) When removable contamination on objects of surface 
area less than 100 cm2 is determined, the activity per unit area shall be based on the actual area and the entire surface shall be wiped. It is not 
necessary to use swiping techniques to measure removable contamination levels if direct scan surveys indicate that the total residual surface 
contamination levels are within the limits for removable contamination. 
5 This category of radionuclides includes mixed fission products, including the strontium-90 present in them. It does not apply to strontium-90 
which has been separated from the other fission products or mixtures where the strontium-90 has been enriched. 
6 Tritium contamination may diffuse into the volume or matrix of materials. Evaluation of surface contamination shall consider the extent to 
which such contamination may migrate to the surface in order to ensure the surface contamination value provided in this appendix is not 
exceeded. Once this contamination migrates to the surface, it may be removable, not fixed; therefore, a “Total” value does not apply. 
2.17.3.3 RIDP Data
The RIDP did not include the area of this CAS because radiological contamination was not 
suspected in this area (DRI, 2007).  No RIDP measurements were used to evaluate this CAS. 
2.17.4CONCLUSION
Data presented above show that no widespread release to surface soils that could cause an NTS 
worker dose greater than 25 mrem/yr occurred; therefore, data are adequate to support a closure 
option of closure in place with administrative controls.  Historical evidence indicates that there 
may be limited contamination within the RMA; however, representative sampling of this site 
would be difficult to achieve due to the nature of the large rubble pile created by the test and the 
difficulty in reaching the areas that would most likely be contaminated.  Further, any 
contamination is likely on the large rubble, not in the soils.  The site is currently posted in 
compliance with 10 CFR 835 as an RMA.  Contamination levels along this boundary are below 
the levels specified in Table 47, and contamination is not migrating outside the RMA (BN, 
2000). The Demarcation Project will continue to monitor the area for compliance with 
10 CFR 835.  As a conservative measure, a UR will be implemented that encompasses the 
current RMA boundary.  The current RMA postings combined with the UR are adequate 
administrative controls to limit site access and worker dose.
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3.0 DATA QUALITY OBJECTIVES 
The DQO process is a seven-step systematic planning method based on the scientific method.  
The information presented in this document is based on historical data generated from 
preliminary assessment activities for CAU 107.  The DQOs were developed according to the 
EPA Guidance on Systematic Planning Using the Data Quality Objectives Process (EPA, 
2006).  The steps systematically build on the data acquired during preliminary assessment work 
and background research. 
3.1 SUMMARY OF DQO ANALYSIS
3.1.1 STATE THE PROBLEM (STEP 1) 
Step 1 of the DQO process describes the problem to be studied and develops a conceptual site 
model (CSM) to gain a sufficient understanding in defining the problem. 
3.1.1.1 Problem Statement
The problem statement for CAU 107 is, “Conceptual corrective actions have been clearly 
identified based on historical data and background information.  Are the sites sufficiently 
characterized to support closure through no further action and/or administrative controls?” 
3.1.1.2 Conceptual Site Model
The CSM is used to organize and communicate information about site characteristics.  It reflects 
the best interpretation of available information.  The CSM is based on historical documentation, 
personnel interviews, site process knowledge, site visits, photographs, engineering drawings, 
field screening, and analytical results.  The CSM describes the most probable scenario for current 
conditions at the site and defines the assumptions that are the basis for choosing a conceptual 
corrective action alternative. 
The sites fall into the following categories: 
 Category A:  Sites associated with atmospheric tests with no confirmed release to surface 
soils
o CAS 01-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site - High Alt 
o CAS 05-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site 
o CAS 10-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site M-10 
 Category B:  Sites associated with underground tests and detonations with no confirmed 
release to surface soils 
o CAS 02-23-02, Contaminated Areas (2) 
o CAS 02-23-10, Gourd-Amber Contamination Area 
o CAS 02-23-11, Sappho Contamination Area 
o CAS 02-23-12, Scuttle Contamination Area 
o CAS 03-23-24, Seaweed B Contamination Area 
o CAS 03-23-28, Manzanas Contamination Area 
o CAS 09-23-06, Mound of Contaminated Soil 
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 Category C:  Sites associated with atmospheric or underground tests and detonations with 
possible release to surface soils 
o CAS 02-23-03, Contaminated Berm  
o CAS 03-23-27, Adze Contamination Area 
o CAS 03-23-29, Truchas-Chamisal Contamination Area 
o CAS 04-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site T4-a 
o CAS 18-23-02, U-18d Crater (Sulky) 
3.1.2 IDENTIFY THE GOAL OF THE STUDY (STEP 2) 
Step 2 of the DQO process identifies the questions the study will attempt to resolve and what 
actions may result.  The goal of the study is to answer the following questions satisfactorily: 
1. Does historical information indicate that a release to ground surface soils occurred as a result 
of the associated detonation? 
2. If so, is the soil impacted with contamination levels that exceed action levels?   
3. If so, do the risks to personnel and the environment justify a corrective action, or are the 
current 10 CFR 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection,” compliant controls adequate for 
this purpose? 
3.1.3 IDENTIFY INFORMATION INPUTS (STEP 3) 
Step 3 of the DQO process identifies the information needed to address the goals of the study.
3.1.3.1 Information Needs
In order to determine if a distinct, measurable release to the surface soils resulting from historical 
operations occurred and, if so, to quantify that release, existing historical information must be 
evaluated using the following criteria:  
 Documented process knowledge indicates a release to surface soils has not occurred. 
o Tests were documented to be performed well above ground surface. 
o Documented releases were short-lived, gaseous radionuclides. 
o Location and direction of plume deposition paths (or lack thereof) were recorded in 
post-test documentation. 
 Process knowledge and multiple, semi-quantitative data sets are in agreement with each 
other.
o Aerial survey data provide 100-percent coverage of areas. 
o RIDP data were collected from areas most likely to be contaminated on a statistically 
based grid. 
o Contaminated Lands Report Survey data were collected from areas most likely to be 
contaminated. 
o Soil sampling data were collected under an approved CAIP from sites with similar CSMs. 
3.1.3.2 Sources of Information
Existing information, such as historical documentation, personnel interviews, site process 
knowledge, site visits, photographs, and previous field screening and analytical results, will be 
evaluated to determine if it satisfies the decisions. 
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Qualitative Data 
Qualitative data identify or describe the characteristics or components of the site.  The quality 
assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) requirements are the least rigorous for qualitative data.
This measurement of quality is typically assigned to historical information and data where 
QA/QC may be highly variable or not known.  Professional judgment is often used to generate 
qualitative data. 
Visual observations made during field visits, process knowledge about the sites and the nature of 
the atmospheric tests, and historical records and interviews will be used to confirm the absence 
or presence of contamination.  
Semi-quantitative Data 
Semi-quantitative data indirectly measure the quantity or amount of a characteristic or 
component.  Inferences are drawn about the quantity or amount of a characteristic or component 
because a correlation has been shown to exist between the indirect measurement and the results 
from a quantitative measurement.  The QA/QC requirements on semi-quantitative collection and 
measurement systems are high but may not be as rigorous as for quantitative data. 
Previous data that have been collected, including results from the aerial radiological survey 
conducted in 1994 (Hendricks and Riedhauser, 1999), the RIDP study (McArthur, 1991), dose 
rate measurements, FIDLER readings, removable alpha and beta/gamma measurements, 
walkover radiological survey results, and other data, will be evaluated.  Some portions of these 
data sets may be considered quantitative.   
Quantitative Data 
Quantitative data measure the quantity or amount of a characteristic or component.  These data 
require the highest level of QA/QC in collection and measurement systems because the intended 
use of the data is to resolve primary decisions and/or to verify that closure standards have been 
met.  Laboratory analytical data are generally considered quantitative.   
For the sites where analytical data have been collected, these data will be evaluated to verify they 
meet the information needs and satisfy the criteria for the decision inputs.   
Portions of the RIDP data may qualify as quantitative.  Soil sampling data were collected and 
analyzed under both a field and laboratory QA/QC program.  In-situ measurements that directly 
quantify gamma-emitting radionuclides should be considered quantitative if appropriately 
validated.
3.1.4 DEFINE THE BOUNDARIES OF THE STUDY (STEP 4) 
Step 4 of the DQO process defines the target population of interest, specifies the spatial 
boundaries and time constraints of that population pertinent for decision making, and determines 
practical constraints on data collection. 
3.1.4.1 Population of Interest
The population of interest to resolve the decisions includes the spatial boundaries of the sites.
The spatial boundaries of all sites are limited to the surface or near-surface radioactive 
contamination.  This CAU contains several types of sites: 
 Atmospheric tests with no distinct, operationally related contaminant plume (3 of 15 sites) 
CAU 107 SAFER Plan 
Section:  Data Quality Objectives 
Revision:  0 
Date:  September 2008 
96
 Underground detonations with no documented history of release of particulate radionuclides 
or documented releases were very low (7 of 15 sites) 
 Atmospheric or underground tests and detonations with possible release to surface soils 
(5 of 15 sites, including CAS 02-23-03, CAS 03-23-27, and CAS 03-23-29, which involved 
pulling a contaminated cable from a test hole; CAS 04-23-02, an atmospheric test; and 
CAS 18-23-02, a cratering test) 
3.1.4.2 Time Constraints
The study data will be evaluated considering the length of time that will be required to complete 
the closure process and the closure report, as allowed for by the SAFER process.  Time 
constraints that may affect the schedule of this project include approval of the SAFER Plan and 
DQOs.  In addition, if classified information must be accessed, additional time may be needed to 
complete the study. 
3.1.5 DEVELOP THE ANALYTIC APPROACH (STEP 5) 
Step 5 of the DQO process develops a decision rule statement (“If…, then…”) that defines the 
conditions under which possible alternative actions will be chosen.  In this step, the action levels 
are specified and the sensitivity of the historical analytical methods is evaluated. 
3.1.5.1 Decision Rules
The decision rules are as follows: 
 If it is determined, through evaluation of the information inputs, that there has not been a 
distinct, measurable release to the surface soils resulting from the associated historical 
operations, then no further action will be required. 
 If it is determined that a distinct, measurable release to the surface soils resulted from the 
associated historical operations, then soil contamination levels will be determined and 
compared to action levels.  This will be accomplished by evaluating the following: 
o RIDP data, both in-situ and soil sample values 
o Aerial survey data where correlated 
o Soil sampling data from like sites 
o Soil sampling data collected in the vicinity of the site supporting other investigations 
 If radiological concentrations in the soil are less than the action levels, then no further action 
will be required. 
 If radiological concentrations are greater than action levels, then the risks to personnel and 
the environment will be evaluated to determine a path forward. 
 If it is determined that clean closure is not feasible, the site(s) will be closed in place with 
administrative controls. 
The decision flowchart is summarized in Figure 18. 
3.1.5.2 Action Levels
The action levels for radiological contaminants are based on the National Council on Radiation 
Protection (NCRP)-recommended screening limits for construction, commercial, industrial  
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land-use scenarios (NCRP, 1999) scaled to 25 mrem/yr dose constraint (Murphy, 2004) and 
10 CFR 835, which provides guidelines for levels of radiological control depending on the levels 
of radiological hazards present (CFR, 1993). Remaining radiological contamination will be 
posted per the NV/YMP RadCon Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004b).  The action levels will be the 
greater of either the levels described above or the local area background levels. 
3.1.5.3 Measurement and Analysis Sensitivity
The historical measurement and analysis methods must be capable of measuring analyte 
concentrations at or below the corresponding action levels. 
RIDP and aerial survey data allow calculations of minimum detectable activity.  As appropriate, 
detection limits will be determined and compared to the action levels described above.  Should 
detection limits be higher than the action levels, the detection limit will be used to make the 
appropriate closure decision, likely closure in place with administrative controls. 
3.1.6 SPECIFY PERFORMANCE OR ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA (STEP 6) 
Step 6 of the DQO process specifies performance criteria for the decision rules.  Setting tolerable 
limits on decision errors requires the planning team to weigh the relative effects of threats to 
human health and the environment, expenditure of resources, and the consequences of an 
incorrect decision.  This section provides an assessment of the possible outcomes of DQO 
decisions and the impact of those outcomes if the decisions are in error. 
In general, confidence in DQO decisions will be established qualitatively by the following: 
o Developing CSMs 
o Testing the validity of the CSMs based on an analysis of historical data 
o Evaluating the quality of the data based on data quality indicator parameters 
3.1.6.1 Decision Errors
The baseline condition (i.e., null hypothesis) is that soil has not been impacted with 
radionuclides at concentrations above action levels.  The alternative condition is that the soil has 
been impacted with radionuclides at concentrations above action levels. 
False Rejection 
This error would mean deciding that the baseline condition is false when, in fact, it is true.  This 
error means deciding that the soil is contaminated above action levels when it is not.  The 
consequence of this decision is increased cost for the closure effort or post-closure requirements. 
Several false positive errors have been identified through review of historical data.  False 
positive errors include the determination that a release to the surface soils occurred as a result of 
a nuclear detonation when, in light of further historical investigation, it is demonstrated that such 
a release did not occur.  Examples include CAS 01-23-02, where detonation occurred at 40,000 ft 
above ground, and CAS 03-23-24, where the only documented release involves very short-lived 
gaseous radionuclides. 
False Acceptance 
This error would mean deciding that the baseline condition is true when, in fact, it is false.  This 
error means deciding that the soil is not contaminated when, in fact, it is contaminated above 
action levels.  The potential consequence is an increased risk to human health and the 
environment.  This error will be controlled by having a high degree of confidence that the data 
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identify contamination, if present.  To satisfy this criterion, the data will be closely evaluated to 
ensure that the data cover the areas of the sites and are adequate to detect contamination at or 
below the action levels.  Further, since most of these sites are currently controlled for 
radiological purposes and there is no proximal public receptor, the impact of this error is 
minimized. 
3.1.7 DEVELOP THE PLAN FOR OBTAINING DATA (STEP 7) 
Step 7 of the DQO process provides the general approach for resolving the decisions.  The pool 
of existing data will be used to resolve the decisions outlined above. 
3.1.7.1 Process Knowledge
The historical operations associated with these sites are well documented through multiple 
historical sources.  Much of the operational information is based on semi-quantitative, or in some 
cases, quantitative data. 
3.1.7.2 Aerial survey data
Detection limits for this data can be established.  Aerial survey data provide 100-percent 
coverage of the study areas. 
3.1.7.3 Contaminated Lands Survey Data
These data are semi-quantitative and have been found to be consistent with process knowledge, 
aerial survey data, and RIDP data where available. 
3.1.7.4 RIDP Data
In general, RIDP did not cover these sites, as they were not suspected to contain surface 
contamination.  In some cases, the RIDP study boundary for other soils sites extends into regions 
near the subject sites. If needed, RIDP data will be converted to units of picocuries per gram and 
compared to action levels.  In general, evaluation of RIDP data will be used to support process 
knowledge assumptions and results of aerial surveys.  RIDP survey areas were first determined 
through the use of aerial survey data.  Aerial survey data provided a mechanism to bias study 
areas.  Within each study area, survey and sampling points were determined through a statistical 
approach that generally provided higher measurement frequencies in areas of higher 
contamination and lower frequencies in areas of lower contamination.   
Taken together, these data sets provide adequate information to do the following: 
 Determine if there has been a distinct, measurable release to the surface soils resulting from 
the associated historical operations. 
 Make comparisons to action levels as appropriate. 
 Determine if appropriate controls are already in place, thus providing the basis for no further 
action.
 Identify cases in which appropriate controls are not in place, leading to closure in place with 
administrative controls. 
CAU 107 SAFER Plan 
Section:  Data Quality Objectives 
Revision:  0 
Date:  September 2008 
100
3.2 RESULTS OF THE DQO ANALYSIS
Results of the DQO analysis are presented in Section 2.0.  The problem statement, “Conceptual 
corrective actions have been clearly identified based on historical data and background 
information.  Are the sites sufficiently characterized to support closure through no further action 
and/or administrative controls?” has been resolved through the collection and evaluation of the 
items discussed in Section 3.1.3.1, Information Needs.  The sites are sufficiently characterized to 
support the closure decisions described in this SAFER Plan.  The evaluation found that there was 
sufficient process knowledge and historical characterization data to resolve the first goal of the 
study outlined in Section 3.1.2, Identify the Goal of the Study (Step 2).  The resolution to the 
question, “Does historical information indicate that a release to ground surface soils occurred as 
a result of the associated test?” is presented in Section 2.0.  Available historical documentation 
and characterization data indicate that a release to surface soils did not occur as a result of the 
associated tests.  The decision rule outlined in Section 3.1.5.1, Decision Rules, states, “If it is 
determined, through evaluation of the information inputs, that there has not been a distinct, 
measurable release to the surface soils resulting from the associated historical operations, then no 
further action will be required.”  The sites will be closed as outlined in the SAFER Plan through 
the existing 10 CFR 835 controls.  Table 48 provides a summary of the results of the evaluation 
for the CASs discussed in Section 2.0. 
3.2.1 ACTION LEVEL DETERMINATION AND BASIS
Based on the evaluation presented in Section 2.0, releases of radionuclides to the surface soils as 
a result of the tests did not occur.  The decision flowchart (Figure 18) indicates that the 
development of action levels is not required if a release to the surface soils did not occur.   
3.2.2 HYPOTHESIS TEST
The null hypothesis is that a distinct, measurable release of radionuclides to the soils has not 
occurred as a result of the associated tests.  The two types of decision errors are false rejection 
and false acceptance.  A false rejection decision error would occur if it is determined that the soil 
is contaminated above action levels when it is not.  The consequence of this decision is increased 
cost for the closure effort or post-closure requirements.  A false acceptance decision error would 
occur if it is determined that the soil is not contaminated when, in fact, it is contaminated above 
action levels.  The potential consequence is an increased risk to human health and the 
environment. 
3.2.3 STATISTICAL MODEL
A statistical model does not apply to closure of CAU 107. 
3.2.4 DESIGN DESCRIPTION/OPTION
Because historical data have been used to determine a closure path for the sites in CAU 107 and 
additional data will not be collected, a design option for sampling is not applicable. 
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3.2.5 CSM
Through the review of the process knowledge and historical data presented in Section 2.0, the 
CSM for 13 of the 15 CASs is that a distinct, measurable release of radionuclides to the soils has 
not occurred as a result of the associated tests.  Data are adequate to support a closure option of 
no further action for these sites. 
Historical evidence indicates that there is limited contamination within the potential crater area 
of the TRUCHAS-CHAMISAL detonation associated with CAS 03-23-29.  However, levels are 
too low to be seen in fly-over data and do not pose a risk to workers or the environment.  Data 
are adequate to support a closure option of closure in place with administrative controls.  The site 
is in a stable condition and requires no additional controls; therefore, no additional closure 
activities will be conducted.  The site is currently posted in compliance with 10 CFR 835 as a 
URMA.  The Demarcation Project will monitor the area for continued compliance with 
10 CFR 835.
Historical evidence also indicates that tthere may be limited contamination present at the 
SULKY site associated with CAS 18-23-02.  However, levels are too low to be seen in fly-over 
data and do not pose a risk to workers or the environment.  Data are adequate to support a 
closure option of closure in place with administrative controls.  The site is in a stable condition 
and requires no additional controls; therefore, no additional closure activities will be conducted.
The site is currently posted in compliance with 10 CFR 835 as an RMA.  The Demarcation 
Project will monitor the area for continued compliance with 10 CFR 835.
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4.0 FIELD ACTIVITIES AND CLOSURE OBJECTIVES 
This section provides a description of and the rationale for proposed field activities for each site 
based on the CSM. 
4.1 CONTAMINANTS OF POTENTIAL CONCERN
Based on historical data and process knowledge presented in Section 2.0 of this report, there are 
no contaminants of potential concern at 13 of 15 CASs in CAU 107.  Contaminants of potential 
concern are assumed to be present at CAS 03-23-29 and CAS 18-23-02. 
4.2 REMEDIATION
Operational history and historical data indicate that there are no contaminants of concern at 13 of 
the 15 CASs in CAU 107.  These sites are in a stable condition and appropriately controlled 
under 10 CFR 835.  Data are adequate to support a closure option of no further action for these 
CASs.
CAS 03-23-29, Truchas-Chamisal Contamination Area, and CAS 18-23-02, U-18d Crater 
(Sulky), will be closed in place with administrative controls.  The sites are currently posted in 
compliance with 10 CFR 835.  These controls are adequate to close the sites in place; therefore, 
no additional closure activities will be conducted.  The current postings will be verified and 
maintained.  
4.3 VERIFICATION
Verification samples are not required for the closure of CAU 107. 
4.4 CLOSURE
Additional remediation activities are not required for closure of any of the sites in CAU 107.
Closure activities will consist of verifying that the current postings required under 10 CFR 835 
are in place.  The Demarcation Project of the NSTec RadCon Department provides routine field 
verification of the adequacy and condition of postings.  Verification will be performed under 
established Demarcation Project procedures.  Four sites do not require radiological controls 
under 10 CFR 835 regulations and as such require no closure activities. 
4.5 DURATION
Closure activities, including and verification of existing postings, is expected to take no more 
than 30 calendar days.
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5.0 REPORTS AND RECORDS AVAILABILITY 
This document is available in the DOE public reading rooms located in Las Vegas and Carson 
City, Nevada, or by contacting the appropriate DOE Project Manager.  The Nevada Division of 
Environmental Protection maintains the official Administrative Record for all activities 
conducted under the auspices of the FFACO.
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6.0 INVESTIGATION/REMEDIATION WASTE 
MANAGEMENT
This project is not expected to generate any investigation or remediation waste. 
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7.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE/QUALITY CONTROL 
Samples will not be collected for closure of CAU 107; therefore, a QA/QC plan is not applicable. 
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PROJECT ORGANIZATION 
The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office 
(NNSA/NSO) Federal Sub-Project Director is John Jones, and his telephone number is 
(702) 295-0532.
The identification of the project Health and Safety Officer and the Quality Assurance Officer can 
be found in the appropriate plan.  However, personnel are subject to change, and it is suggested 
that the appropriate NNSA/NSO Project Manager be contacted for further information.  The 
Task Manager will be identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order Monthly 
Activity Report prior to the start of field activities.
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U.S. Department of Energy 1 (Uncontrolled, electronic copy) 
National Nuclear Security Administration 
Nevada Site Office 
Technical Library 
P.O. Box 98518, M/S 505 
Las Vegas, NV 89193-8518 
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Office of Scientific and Technical Information 
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